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ABSTRACT
This inquiry participates in continuing philosophical debates over the 
appropriate relationship between religion and public education (RRPE) and the 
conceptual consequences of any such relationship for teachers (Purpel, 1989; 
Noddings, 1992, 1993; Yob & Laird, 1994, 1995; Gotz, 1997). Identifying 
problems inherent in RRPE, it proposes criteria for any attempt to renegotiate 
RRPE and thus reconceptualize teacher, i.e., affirmation of diversity, social 
authorization, moral-ethical idealism, non-'realist' ontology, love ethic, and 
meaningfulness. These criteria ground a critique of three paradigmatic conceptions 
of teacher— prophet, as technician, as common sense pragmatist—here found 
inadequate for an historical moment when conflicts over RRPE threaten school's 
claimed role in democratizing society. This critique concludes, however, that 
Cornel West's (1989) prophetic pragmatism provides a useful philosophical 
framework for renegotiating RRPE and reconceptualizing teacher.
Using an embodied literary-philosophical approach to analyze three teacher 
portraits from Toni Morrison's Beloved (Laird, 1991; Bogdan, 1992; Alston,
1996), this study demonstrates that one portrait—Baby Suggs—represents a teacher 
whose practice is consistent with prophetic pragmatism and meets the criteria 
above. Here named the prophetic pragmatic teacher (PPT), the concept derived 
from that portrait denotes a person who grounds teaching in a sense of the holy as
an unschematized response to existential mysteries of human experience (Otto, 
1958) and in ongoing creation of democratic community governed by a love ethic. 
PPT responds to current tensions of RRPE by presenting religious, secular, and 
scientific narratives on their own terms as contingent, imperfect, but meaningful 
instances of human desire to explain existence and thereby derive some moral and 
epistemological structures by which to order human lives. Deploying narrative, art, 
and poiësis in service o f a love ethic, PPT aims to motivate social criticism and 
inspire ameliorative vision in learners, yet does so from a position of pragmatic 
intellectual humility. Thus PPT is better able than teachers conceived as prophets, 
technicians, or common sense pragmatists to negotiate and renegotiate RRPE. For, 
unlike them, PPT decenters would-be totalizing narratives as necessary but limited 
attempts to comprehend what we do not know in order to fashion a meaningful 
present.
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Chapter I 
Negotiating the Relationship between Religion and Education: 
The Prophetic Pragmatic Teacher
Public Education: "Pvminp and Pvming in the Widening Gvre”*
Public education in the U.S. may well be falling apart, and the role of 
teacher, one of the traditional centers around which the educational process 
revolves, is subjected to increasingly powerful centrifugal social forces. Less than 
five decades after the Supreme Court finally expanded the Jeffersonian ideal of 
common, public education as a bedrock of democracy to all citizens, that still 
imperfectly realized ideal is threatened with cultural balkanization. Calls for school 
choice, vouchers, public support for private schools, gender and/or race specific 
public schools, and the phenomenal rise in home schooling appear to undermine 
the Dewey an ideal of the school as a place where all races, classes, and genders
‘William Butler Yeats, "The Second Coming," The Norton Anthology o f 
English Literature, 6th Edition, Vol. 2, M.H. Abrams, et. al., eds.. New York; 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1993, p. 1880. In drawing on Yeats' poem to 
characterize current tensions in U.S. education I do not intend to be overly 
apocalyptic or to imply that the concept of the teacher as prophetic pragmatist, 
which I will propose, is some "rough beast". . "slouching toward Bethlehem to be 
bom." I do think, however that his metaphors of broken circles and spinning out of 
control are apt characterizations of current educational conflicts. And I do hope to 
recover, through this concept of prophetic pragmatic teacher, a possibility of 
social harmony, the loss o f which fills Yeats' poem with such dread.
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come together to inculcate and sustain a culture of democracy. And the 
widespread public dissatisfaction with public schools which underlies many of 
these movements is often directed at teachers. Though not without their 
supporters, teachers are variously described as unionized obstacles to vital 
educational reforms, liberal threats to traditional values, racist and sexist agents of 
cultural hegemony, or intellectual laggards inadequate to the task of ensuring 
American economic superiority. These disagreements and the charges they inspire 
against teachers represent competing visions of the just society and the educated 
person and the sorts of teachers needed to carry out those visions.
Perhaps the most powerful of these centrifugal forces is a result of our 
deep cultural ambivalence and strong social disagreement over the appropriate 
relationship between religion and public education. In fact, much of the impetus 
behind the movements for school choice, vouchers, and public support for private 
education stems from many citizens' concern that secular public education is 
actively and deliberately undermining their religious beliefs. Teachers are often 
accused of promoting "secular humanism" or, in many instances where they openly 
reflect the religious values of their communities, of promoting religion.^ Caught 
between strict defenders of the notion of the separation of church and state and a
^ o r  a good overview of the current conflict over these issues see Barbara 
B. Gaddy, T. William Hall, and Robert J. Marzano, School Wars: Resolving Our 
Conflicts Over Religion and Values, San Francisco; Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996.
resurgent religious right, our traditional concepts of teacher are centers that 
cannot hold. The object of this inquiry is to de-center the conflicting positions over 
the appropriate place of religion in public education by constructing a concept 
teacher which will enable actual teachers to negotiate a balance amidst these 
centrifugal social forces.
So, one of the most important distinguishing characteristics of this moment 
in the cultural history of the United States and, more specifically, its public schools 
is the debate over the appropriate relationship between religion and education, a 
debate which cannot be accurately portrayed as a contest between wild-eyed 
religious fanatics and reasonable defenders of secular democracy, between a 
"worst. . . full of passionate intensity" and a "best. . . lacking all conviction. It is a 
conflict between competing visions of education and concepts of teacher. In 
response to such conflicts, the philosopher of education John Dewey (1938) once 
wrote that "all social movements involve conflicts which are reflected intellectually 
in controversies...It is the business of an intelligent theory of education to ascertain 
the causes for the conflicts that exist and then, instead of taking one side or the 
other, to indicate a plan of operations proceeding from a level deeper and more 
inclusive than is represented by the contending parties.'"* And the African-
^Yeats, op. cit.
^John Dewey, Experience and Education, New York; Collier/Macmillan, 
1938, p. 5.
American philosopher of religion. Cornel West (1993), has issued a similar 
challenge to get beyond the competing discourses o f Eurocentrism and 
multiculturalism—two ideological constructs which mask efforts by certain groups 
to gain access to the rewards of the status quo and which intersect in important 
ways the religious tensions in education—in order to create a cultural, political 
movement that can provide some consensus, some unity across the diversity of 
identities and positions which preserves the irreducibility of individual identity 
within participative communities/
The fundamental question, of course, is how. How do educational theorists 
go about finding a "more inclusive plan of operations?" How might they get 
beyond the conflict of competing discourses and concepts that threatens public 
education and achieve some degree of consensus on the relationship between 
religion and education and a concept teacher capable of negotiating that 
relationship ? What might all this mean for public education? What might it mean 
for the way we conceive the role of the teacher in public education and society in 
general? These are the questions which will guide this inquiry.
Obviously, the challenges and risks of re-negotiating the relationship 
between religion and education and revising the concept teacher are daunting, so
^Cornel West, Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times: Beyond 
Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism, Volume /, Monroe: Common Courage Press, 
1993, pp. 3-32.
daunting in fact that the discretion represented in the current ideal of strict
separation may be the better part of intellectual valor. This was, after all, the
apparent conclusion of those involved in the expansion of common schools in the
late 19th century when schools evolved in an increasingly secular direction.® And,
though Dewey did speculate upon the outlines of a "common" faith that would
separate the "religious" aspect of human experience from supernatural "religion"
and transfer it to his ideal of democracy guided by critical intelligence and thus
resolve the antagonism between religion and science, he was under no illusion that
his philosophy of religion was a settled belief capable of defining the presence of
religion in public education.^ His common faith actually involved the gradual
extinction of traditional supernatural religion, an eventuality he knew was unlikely
in the foreseeable future. Thus, his advice of 1908 probably still held, as far as he
was concerned, in 1934 and might still hold today;
Bearing the losses and inconveniences of our time as best we may, 
it is the part of men to labor persistently and patiently for the 
clarification and development of the positive creed of life implicit 
in democracy and science, and to work for the transformation of 
all practical instrumentalities of education till they are in harmony 
with these ideas. Till these ends are further along than we can 
honestly claim them to be at present, it is better that our schools 
should do nothing than that they should do the wrong things. It is 
better for them to confine themselves to their obviously urgent
®R. Freeman Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education, 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1950.
’John Dewey, A Common Faith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934.
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tasks than that they should, under the name of spiritual culture, 
form habits of mind which are at war with the habits of mind 
congruous with democracy and science. It is not laziness nor 
cynicism which calls for the laissez-faire policy, it is honesty, 
courage, sobriety, and faith.*
One might argue that contemporary American society is even further from 
Dewey's common faith today than it was when he wrote that optimistic philosophy 
of religion. Supernatural, other-worldly religious denominations have grown along 
with, and some scholars suggest, in direct response to more open, ecumenical 
denominations.® And the challenge is further complicated by the growth in 
religious diversity. Thus the threat of religious dogmatism is no less than it was in 
Dewey's day while the growth of religious diversity heightens the divisive potential 
of encounters among faiths in the public schools. In addition, the values of many 
fundamentalist and evangelical groups are fundamentally and violently opposed to 
the still incomplete evolution of democratic ideals regarding the human rights of 
women, children, gays and lesbians and others." Would re-negotiating the
*John Dewey, "Religion in Our Schools" in John Dewey: The Middle 
Works, 1899-1924, Volume 13, ed. Jo Ann Boyston, Carbondale; Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1977, p. 168.
®Rodger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching o f America, 1776-1990: 
Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy, New Jersey ; Rutgers University 
Press, 1990.
'“Kenneth Wald, Religion and Politics in the U.S., Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992.
"Leroy S. Rouner, ed.. Human Rights and the World's Religions, Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988.
relationship between religion and education compromise those rights?’*
Clearly, one of the toughest problems in any renegotiation of the 
relationship between faith and school and redefinition of the concept teacher is 
accommodating the extreme, for instance the absolutism characteristic of 
fundamentalist and conservative evangelical groups, as well as some proponents of 
science, and their contradiction of certain views of human rights." Dewey and the 
contemporary theologian Leonard Swidler (1990) have argued that dialogue 
among religions and between the religious and secular-scientific worlds, an 
inevitable aspect of any renegotiation of the relationship between religion and 
education or redefinition of the concept teacher^ will require the surrender of such 
absolutist claims as a fundamental prerequisite." Yet such a requirement clearly
"This and related challenges to the re-negotiation of the relationship 
between religion and education and thoughtfully articulated in Susan Laird, 
"Spiritual Education in Public Schools? Religious Education 90, no. 1 (Winter
1995): 118-132.
"In fact, absolutist truth claims are one of the defining characteristics of 
fundamentalism. See James Barr, Fundamentalism, Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1977 dx\A Beyond Fundamentalism, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984; 
and Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, The Power and the Glory: The 
Fundamentalist Challenge to the Modem World, Boston; Beacon Press, 1992. For 
a discussion of this conflict see Jefirey Ayala Milligan, "Gender and the Limits of 
Inclusion: Should Multiculturalism Include Fundamentalism?" Religious 
Education, in press.
"Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 33; Leonard Swidler, After the Absolute:
The Dialogical Future o f Religious Reflection, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990,
p. 66.
puts off serious reconsideration of this relationship to a distant and uncertain 
future, leaves unresolved the current tension between religion and public 
education, and perpetuates apparent ethical contradictions whereby cultural and 
epistemological arguments which are used to promote the rights of some groups 
constrain-if critics like Carter, Nord, and West are correct-the rights of others. It 
also ignores compelling arguments based on values of the multicultural movement 
and epistemic assumptions of post-analytic philosophy that would seem to require 
such a renegotiation of this relationship as well as a revision of traditional 
understandings of the concept teacher.
Amid such social polarization, if public education is to realize the ideal of 
itself as a force for creation and sustenance of democratic culture, then it must 
renegotiate the existing relationship between religion and public education, for to 
maintain the status quo appears to threaten the fragmentation of public education 
as a democratic commons. It follows that any such renegotiated relationship 
between religion and public education would have important consequence for our 
understanding of the concept teacher, since teachers, along with their students, are 
the central agents of the educational process. One fundamental premise of this
"See Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, "Multiculturalism and the Religious Right; Is 
Dialogue Possible?" Journal o f Thought 2 \, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 45-54 and 
Jeffrey Ayala Nfrlligan, "Religion, Public Education, and Dewey's Call for an 
'Intelligent' Theory of Education," Educational Foundations 10, no. 3 (Summer
1996): 69-84.
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inquiry, therefore, is that dominant traditional and contemporary concepts of 
teachers are inadequate to this task; they do not offer a conceptual model that can 
meet the needs of a new relationship between religion and education that seeks to 
preserve public schools as a democratic commons, nor do they offer a conceptual 
framework for the role of teachers that enables them to negotiate the intricacies of 
that relationship. The object of this inquiry is to articulate a concept of teacher 
which can fulfill both tasks.
In this chapter I will formulate a set of evaluative criteria which such a 
concept of teacher that is able to fulfill these tasks must meet. In the following 
chapters I will then deploy those criteria to identify and critique the inadequacies 
of three paradigmatic concepts of teachers—teacher as prophet, teacher as 
technician, and teacher as common sense pragmatist~\\?i a genealogical analysis 
of each concept and a critique of the ethical consequences of these concepts as 
they are characterized in three cases from Toni Morrison's Pulitzer Prize-winning 
novel. Beloved (1988). Finally, I will argue that Cornel West's revision of 
contemporary neo-pragmatism— pragmatism— offers a philosophical 
framework for a concept teacher that is consistent with the task of renegotiating 
the relationship between religion and public education and will enable teachers to 
negotiate a new balance amidst the tension between religious culture and public
education.'® I will call this alternative concept o f teacher the prophetic pragmatist.
In order to carry out the objective of this inquiry, it is necessary to 
understand the historical and contemporary context of debate over the relationship 
between religion and education since that context is an important source of 
criteria by which any new concept of teachers which aims to renegotiate that 
relationship will be evaluated. Therefore, in the following section of this chapter, I 
will attempt to sketch the history of this debate as means of identifying likely 
objections to this inquiry’s goal and the criteria for a new concept of teachers 
which may follow from those objections.
Historical Context: The Search for a Center
Debate over the relationship between religion and education and the role of 
teachers is really not new. It has gone on in the United States at one level or 
another for a hundred and fifty years. Though the influence of religion on 
education in America was deep and pervasive through the 17th and 18th centuries, 
it began to wane by the mid-19th century as the growth of religious diversity in the 
United States made the previously common practice of actively promoting 
protestant Christian religious values increasingly impractical.'^ New Catholic and
'®Comel West, The American Evasion o f Philosophy: A Genealogy o f 
Pragmatism, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, pp. 211-243.
'’Edwin Scott Gaustad, "Church, State, and Education in Historical 
Perspective" and James E. Wood, Jr., "Religion and Education in American 
Church-State Relations" in James E. Wood, Jr., ed.. Religion, the State and
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Jewish immigrants protested the unexamined protestant ethos of the new common 
schools as an infringement of their religious liberties, reflecting and in some cases 
furthering the gradual reinterpretation of the First Amendment as calling for the 
strict separation o f church and state. In addition, particularly toward the end of the 
century, schools increasingly assumed a role in preparing students for work in a 
newly industrial society." Thus as a result of both pragmatic interests and 
constitutional considerations raised by increasing religious diversity, the public 
schools of the United States were moving toward a largely secularized center by 
the end of the 19th century."
While disagreement over the place of religion in public education raged in 
the U.S. the larger debate over religion and its proper role in social discourse 
continued to roil the waters of philosophical, scientific, and political thought. The 
revolutionary ideas of philosophers such as Descartes, Enlightenment philosophers 
like Locke and Rousseau, and scientists such as Newton led to a "subjectivist turn" 
in philosophy which "granted science a monopoly on truth in the marketplace of
Education, Waco: Baylor University Press, 1984, pp. 15-18, 26-30; Butts, pp. 
114-15.
"H. Warren Button and Eugene P. Provenzo, Jr., History o f Education 
and Culture in America, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983, pp. 155-70.
"Gaustad, ibid.; Butts, pp. 112, 133.
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ideas. This rise in the importance and explanatory power of science increasingly 
forced philosophers and theologians to attempt to reconcile religious ideas and 
scientific reason as insights and breakthroughs in the sciences—first in astronomy 
and physics and then in geology and biology—rendered many religious beliefs 
suspect.^' Therefore, while the place of religion in education was eroding as a 
result of the practical difficulties of religiously diverse school populations and the 
legal difficulties of constitutional precepts, many of the most basic and long-held 
beliefs of the faithful were crumbling under the epistemic and ontological assaults 
of scientific inquiry. The rise of science in academic and intellectual circles was 
such by the early decades of the 20th century that John Dewey (1934) could look 
forward to the day that the religious attitude would be separated from supernatural 
religion and attached to the processes of science and democracy as the best hope
“^Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary 
Christianity, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, pp. 28-29.
^John H. Hick, Philosophy o f Religion, Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 
1973, pp. 43-44; S.E. Frost, Jr., Historical and Philosophical Foundations o f 
Western Education, Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1966, pp. 420-422. On the 
efforts of philosophers to demonstrate the relevance or irrelevance of reason to 
religious faith or to explain how the two interact see, for example, Immanuel Kant, 
Religion Within the Limits o f Reason Alone, Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. 
Hudson, eds./trans., Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1934; John Locke, The 
Reasonableness o f Christianity, IT. Ramsey, ed., Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1958; SovtnYaexkegazxé, Philosophical Fragments, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962; Rudolf Otto, The Idea o f the Holy, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1958; and Dewey J. Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to 
Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, Albany: State University 
ofNew York Press, 1991.
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for the moral growth of society.^
Though many post-Enlightenment philosophers and social critics—including 
Dewey—have predicted the demise of religious "superstition" and "dogma" in the 
face of advancing democracy, scientific knowledge and secularization, religion has 
refused to go away.“  In fact, contemporary studies of religion in the United States 
demonstrate that the percentage of Americans professing religious beliefs is as high 
now as it has ever been and that, contrary to expectations, it is precisely the more 
"fundamental," other-worldly sects that have shown the most dramatic growth.
The U.S. today is, according to Harold Bloom (1992), "saturated" in religion.^* 
Ironically, this new prominence of religious faith throughout the world, as well as 
here in the United States, has coincided with and is in part a response to the spread 
of "faith" in science, broadly construed, via contemporary secular education.^ 
Religious conservatives—Christians, Jews, Muslims and others—have responded to 
this modem "faith" and its often rather contemptuous dismissal of traditional
“ John Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit.
“ Marty and Appleby, pp. 11-13; Wald, pp. 74-79. See also Gilles Kepel, 
The Revenge o f God: The Resurgence o f Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the 
Modem World, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.
“ See, for example, Finke and Stark, op. cit., and Wald, pp. 74-79.
“ Harold Bloom, The American Religion: The Emergence o f the Post- 
Christian Nation, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
“ Kepel, pp. 117-19.
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religious belief by organizing highly effective social and political movements 
designed to recapture the public square from "secular human ismThi s  has 
included the establishment of religious schools and the education of children at 
home, two of the fastest growing sectors of U.S. education, in an effort to create a 
more religious social center.^* However, the rise in the political profile of religion 
has not solely been a phenomenon of the religious right. More liberal and even 
revolutionary movements have also claimed religious justification for their efforts 
to transform modem social structures which do not conform to divinely ordained 
ethical principles. Liberation theology is just one example of such religious- 
political alliances^
According to some scholars, the rise of conservative religious movements 
is a reaction to modernity and its effects on relatively homogenous socio-religious 
subcultures.^® Modernity brings differentiation and choice, which tend to 
undermine the shared assumptions that constitute the cultural identity of a group.
■^ Ibid., pp. 191-92; Marty and Appleby, pp. 37-42.
“ Cited in Helen Hardacre, "The Impact of Fundamentalisms on Women, 
the Family, and Interpersonal Relations," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott 
Appleby, eds.. Fundamentalisms and Society, Vol. 2, Chicago; University of 
Chicago Press, 1993, p. 129-39.
“ Robert McAfee Brown, Liberation Theology: An Introductory Guide, 
Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993.
“ See Barr, Fundamentalism, op. cit.; Lionel Capian. Studies in Religious 
Fundamentalism, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, p. 9; Marty 
and Appleby, pp. 10-18.
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While its emphasis on science and rationality challenged the authority of Biblical 
teaching as early as the turn of the 18th century, it was not until the development 
of mass communication and universal public schooling that the lull impact of these 
challenges was felt among the classes from which Christian fundamentalism in the 
United States eventually grew/' Applied to social theory and politics, its 
philosophical assumptions led to modem concepts of democracy, individual 
liberties, education and teachers, sowing the seeds of the contemporary "rights" 
that have undermined, though by no means eradicated, traditional patriarchal 
authority and which so threaten many religious conservatives.
The multicultural movement in U.S. society and education, for instance, is 
one manifestation of this extension of the concept of individual liberties which has 
spawned highly secular formulations of the concept teacher and thus elicited a 
strong response from many religious conservatives, though many of the 
mainstream and liberal religious groups have embraced it. Multiculturalism inspires 
much of the current debate over the relationship between religion and public 
education. The multicultural movement's roots lie partly in the struggle of 
African-Americans for the democratic rights guaranteed to all individuals, 
exhibiting an early organized expression in the founding of the N.A.A.C.P., like the 
fundamentalist movement, early in this century.^  ^An important stream in
‘^Marty and Appleby, pp. 31-32. See also Finke and Stark.
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multiculturalism's evolution has been African-American's struggle for civil rights 
and the application of the lessons of these struggles to Latin Americans, women. 
Native Americans, Asians, and gays and lesbians. Though the very concept of 
individual civil rights is rooted in the contributions of post-Enlightenment 
"modernist" philosophies, and thus hardly a reaction against modernity, feminist 
scholars and other cultural critics have come to recognize the subjectivities within 
this philosophical tradition that privilege white men and to reassert the importance 
of group identities. '^* So just as religion in general has undoubtedly benefited from 
the notion of freedom of religion as well as the technology that has evolved out of 
modernist philosophies, multiculturalism too has benefited from modernist 
assumptions about individual liberties. However, just as multiculturalists and 
feminists have argued that these same liberties have been deployed behind 
conceptual masks of objectivity and universality to empower some social positions
‘^James A. Banks, "Multicultural Education, History O f in Marvin L. 
Alkin, ed.. Encyclopedia o f Educational Research, VoL 3, New York: Macmillan, 
1992, pp. 870-74. Also L.H. Ekstrand, "Multicultural Education," C.C. 
Mukhopadhyay and Y.T. Moses, "Multicultural Education: Anthropological 
Perspectives," and S.E. Noffke, "Multicultural Education: Curriculum For" in 
Torsten Husen and T. Neville Postlethwaite, eds.. The International Encyclopedia 
o f Education, VoL 7, 2nd edition, Tarrytown: Elsevier Science, Inc., 1994, pp. 
3960-64.
” lbid.
^^See, for instance, Lorraine Code, What Can She Know? Feminist Theory 
and the Construction o f Kncfwledge, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
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at the expense of others, conservative religious critics have argued that similar 
modernist concepts of rationality, education, and teacher have been deployed to 
marginalize and silence them as well. It may well be, therefore, that the rise of 
conservative religious movements and the rise of identity politics are quite different 
responses to the same disempowering modernist concepts of rationality, 
knowledge, and truth and the related concepts—education and teac/ier—which have 
disseminated them.
The prosecution of this debate through much of the history of the U.S. 
both by those who would have public education guided by religious purposes and 
those who would exclude religion entirely from the schools has repeatedly focused 
on several specific points of disagreement. Disagreements over whether education 
should be primarily focused on pragmatic occupational concerns, over the most 
appropriate response to religious and cultural diversity, over what constitutes 
knowledge and reality have all reflected conflicting concepts of teacher at the 
center of quite different visions of education. In what follows, I will articulate 
these points of disagreement as a series of objections, and responses to those 
objections, to the basic proposition of this inquiry—that we need a new concept of 
teacher to negotiate a new relationship between religion and public education. By 
proceeding in this manner, my inquiry will identify the problems any such 
reconception of teacher will face as well as the criteria, implicit in those problems, 
which will constitute a basis for evaluating the paradigmatic concepts of teachers
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as prophets, technicians, and pragmatists as well as the success of a new concept 
of teacher as prophetic pragmatist.
Negotiating Balance: Objections. Responses. Problems 
The Pragmatic Problem
Perhaps the oldest, simplest and most common objection to the call for a 
reconception of teacher that can facilitate a new relationship between religion and 
public education rests on a disagreement over the purpose of education. Since at 
least the second half of the nineteenth century, when education was increasingly 
seen as a tool for assimilating immigrants and training students for useful trades, 
the common sense pragmatist has argued that the purpose of education is to 
prepare the young for economic and political participation in the existing culture.^* 
The young become useful, contributing members of society by acquiring the skills 
for a productive occupation and the information and attitudes necessary for full 
participation in democratic society. Education, in this view, should be about 
shaping students to fit the social roles of worker and citizen. Religion is seen as a 
private matter of personal belief which, though it may have relevance for the 
individual's understanding of his role as worker and citizen, can have no practical 
relevance as far as the teacher, as social agent, is concerned, because to do 
otherwise would involve the imposition of a particular set of religious beliefs. We
’^In using the term common sense pragmatist here I mean to distinguish 
between this common view of education and philosophical pragmatism.
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might call the objection raised here by the common sense pragmatist the pragmatic 
problem.
The pragmatic problem grows out of a quasi-functionalist educational 
philosophy which assumes the possibility of a clean and clear religious-secular 
dichotomy/^ Those who adhere to this position, however, ignore the fact that such 
a distinction is a relatively recent idea that, while it may be recognized as true by 
the non-religious, is probably not generally accepted by the religious, who argue 
that faith is relevant to all aspects of our lives. It is a position rooted in post- 
Enlightenment epistemic and ontological assumptions which have been thoroughly 
undermined by post-analytic philosophy and an understanding of religion as private 
belief rather than a system of social meaning-making with significance for all 
aspects of society. Thus the pragmatic problem is based on the belief that the 
world created by these post-Enlightenment philosophical assumptions is the way 
the world really is rather than a social construction. In making this assumption the 
common sense pragmatist commits what Dewey called "the philosophic fallacy" in 
asserting the objective, independent reality of the social status quo as a reality to 
which the individual must conform rather than as a contingent social construction
*^I use the term quasi-functionalist here because the philosophically 
functionalist aspect of this view of education is applied only to the secular side of 
the dichotomy. Traditional functionalism would, I think, acknowledge a role for 
education in fitting students for their socially defined religious roles as well as their 
economic and political roles.
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which individuals may change.”  It then proceeds to a narrow conception of 
teacher as a common sense pragmatist who trains or shapes the individual to fit the 
status quo rather than empowering the individual to participate in the construction 
of social reality. While the pragmatic problem seems on the surface a 
straightforward objection in favor of the down-to-earth practical concerns of 
getting along in the world, it in fact responds to and encompasses a cluster of 
objections based on very specific and questionable philosophical assumptions. 
Therefore, while the pragmatic problem does remind us of certain important 
practical expectations of teachers, it is not a compelling argument against a 
conception of teacher which would enable a renegotiated relationship between 
religion and public education.
The Diversity Problem
Another practical objection to the proposition of a concept teacher which 
renegotiates the relationship between religion and public education is the diversity 
problem. This objection rests on the recognition of the religious diversity 
represented in the United States, a recognition which contributed to the growing 
secularization of schools in the second half of the nineteenth century.”  Given the 
practical limitations of time on school curricula, it is impossible to include all
’^Cited in Jim Garrison, Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art o f 
Teaching, New York: Teachers College Press, 1997, p. 108.
” Gaustad, pp. 15-30; Butts, pp. 114-15.
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topics that are worthy of study. So what shall we include? What shall we exclude? 
Are we required, in the interest of fairness and neutrality, to treat all religions 
equally? Is it possible to do so and still adequately address other subjects like 
science of mathematics? If not, which religions shall we address? Which will we 
not address? How will we decide? How will we respond to the inevitable 
objections from those who are excluded? The obvious answer to these questions 
which the diversity problem raises is that someone must choose. But how can the 
teacher do so without, in effect, endorsing some views over others and thus 
violating the constitutional separation of church and state? The only practical 
response to the diversity problem, and the response increasingly taken in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, seems to be to exclude religion from public 
education and religious faith from the concept teacher. In this way, supposedly, we 
can avoid the controversy which attempts to include religion seem inevitably to 
occasion.
Ironically, however, the contemporary educational discourse responding to 
the diversity problem turns this argument on its head. Much of the literature on 
multiculturalism, for instance has focused on revealing the mechanisms by which 
social institutions have perpetuated cultural domination and the effects this has 
had on women and minorities.^® In response to the insights gained from this
^Christine Sleeter, ed.. Empowerment through Multicultural Education, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991, p. II; Cameron McCarthy,
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inquiry, multiculturalism in recent decades has evolved to include transformative, 
liberatory social agendas which recognize that empowerment of marginalized 
groups is a necessary co-requisite of meaningful, ameliorative social change. These 
agendas have some of their theoretical roots in a corpus of postmodernist and 
postcolonial literature which deconstructs the traditional conceptions of 
knowledge and power employed by dominant social groups to marginalize and 
oppress women and minorities.^ This project has created non-absolutist concepts 
of power, knowledge, culture and identity which lie at the heart of multiculturalism 
and constitute a challenge, not only to Christian fundamentalism and other 
conservative religious movements, but to many of the basic modernist assumptions 
which have undermined and marginalized religion as well. The post-analytic 
philosophy which informs the multicultural movement in education argues that the 
modernist claims of objectivity and rationality which have been advocated as an 
alternative to religious subjectivity and irrationality are in fact masks which protect
"After the Canon: Knowledge and Ideological Representation in the Multicultural 
Discourse on Curricular Reform" in Cameron McCarthy and Warren Crichlow, 
eds.. Race, Identity and Representation in Education, New York: Routledge, 
1993, pp. 290-91.
^See, for example, Michel Foucault, The History o f Sexuality: An 
Introduction, VoL 1, New York: Vintage, 1990; Edward Said, Orientalism, New 
York: Vintage, 1979; Paulo Freire, Pedagogy o f the Oppressed, New York: 
Continuum, 1990; Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and 
Transculturation, New York: Routledge, 1992.
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and promote the interests of subjective knowers/* Thus the effort to avoid the 
competing interests of the diversity problem by turning education to more 
objective interests may actually mask yet another subjective interest.
Some of the more conservative religious critics of multiculturalism in 
public education have turned this postmodern insight into the inevitable 
subjectivity of different subject positions to their causes. They charge that 
teachers, in fact, do impose a single point of view on a diverse society by actively 
undermining the religious and ethical values of children in favor of an ideology or 
even a "religion" of secular humanism, an ideology which they believe promotes 
evolutionary theory and gay rights, criticism of "traditional" American values, 
ethical relativism, and a lack of respect for authority. These critics advocate a 
concept of teacher as a kind of spiritual prophet, closely scrutinize textbooks, 
curricula, and teaching methods for "anti-religious" biases, and advocate "putting 
God back in our schools" through organized school prayer as a solution to the 
perceived moral and educational biases of teachers and the public schools they
serve.“^
However, not all critics of public education's treatment of religion occupy 
the far right of the political or religious spectrum. Many more moderate critics
’^This is Code's argument in What Can She Know?, op. cit. 
^^See Gaddy, Hall, and Marzano.
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share the view that American civic and academic culture are hostile to religious 
culture. Stephen L. Carter (1993), for instance, a professor of law at Yale 
University, has recently written a widely-read critique of how religious faith is 
"trivialized" in the public arena by a legal and political system that assumes that 
religion is a private matter that should not intrude on public decisions. This forces 
religious people to act as if their faith did not matter in their civic lives lest they be 
accused of forcing their religious views on others or subject themselves to the 
ridicule to which popular culture so often subjects religion and the religious. And 
public education. Carter argues, is no exception to this widespread anti-religious 
bias."”
The philosopher Warren Nord (1995) offers another reasoned critique of 
the current relationship between religion and education and the concept of teachers 
that relationship endorses. He makes two basic claims. First, he asserts that public 
education is not neutral vis a vis the religious faith students bring with them to 
school. Second, he argues public education has an ethical and legal obligation to be 
fair to religious worldviews. But, partly in reaction to the controversy religious
*^For an example of such an argument see Richard Pratte, "Civic 
Conscience and Religious Conscience: A Fundamental but not Fundamentalist 
Distinction," Philosophy o f Education 1987, Urbana: Philosophy of Education 
Society, 1987.
"Stephen L. Carter, Culture o f Disbelief: Haw American Law and Politics 
Trivialize Religious Devotion, New York: Doubleday, 1993.
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issues arouse, public education in fact ignores religion and its place in history and 
people's lives in its texts and curricula. According to Nord, public education is 
governed by a modernist, secular worldview which undermines religious faith 
because its basic philosophical assumptions, conceptions of human nature, history, 
evidence, rational argumentation, etc. systematically reject, undermine, and 
contradict religious assumptions. To ignore religion and then teach a subject— 
history or biology, for instance—from within this worldview as if it were Truth, 
when in fact it is contested, constitutes indoctrination in Nord's view. And in his 
view schools should avoid indoctrination. Public education should be neutral on 
religiously contested matters until students are mature enough to distinguish 
between teachers' opinions and truth—high school or early college—then education 
and educators no longer have the obligation to be scrupulously neutral but do have 
the ethical obligation to be fair."**
Finally, the African-American philosopher of religion. Cornel West (1989), 
has challenged the tendency of postmodern progressive intellectuals, including 
those in the multicultural movement, to ignore or downplay the relevance of 
religious faith, particularly to emancipatory cultural and political struggles. With 
the recent exception of liberation theology, they have tended to ignore the fact
^^Warren A. Nord, Religion and American Education: Rethinking a 
National Dilemma, Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 1995, pp. 63- 
97, 161-91, 236-41, 378.
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that "the culture of the wretched of the earth is deeply religious. m46
Since the Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Europe, most of the 
progressive energies among the intelligentsia have shunned religious 
channels. And in these days of global religious revivals, progressive 
forces are reaping the whirlwind. Those of us who remain in these 
religious channels see clearly how myopic such an antireligious 
strategy is. The severing of ties to churches, synagogues, temples, 
and mosques by the left intelligentsia is tantamount to political suicide.
This shunning of religious channels, according to West, is not only myopic in the
sense that it makes progressive intellectuals out of touch with the culture of the
oppressed, it is also myopic in that it renders them blind to the role of religious
faith in enabling the oppressed to cope with and resist their oppression. While
West recognizes the regressive role religion has played as summarized in Marx's
dictum about the "opiate of the masses," he maintains that faith has been an
absolutely vital source of existential sustenance in the face of the natural tragedies
endemic to human existence and a site of resistance to man-made tragedies such as
racism, patriarchy, and economic oppression.'**
The increasing loss of faith in the masks of objectivity and rationality as
refuges from the conflicting subjectivities of the diversity problem has opened up
education to charges of partiality and oppression from many constituencies. As a
*^West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, p. 233.
*’lbid., p. 234.
**Comel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America, New 
York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 139-141 dnd Prophesy Deliverance!, pp. 15-20.
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consequence of this criticism, for at least the past two or three decades, the 
concepts diversity and inclusion have been key terms in debates over educational 
reform/® Though there have been and continue to be considerable differences over 
what diversity ought to mean, how it should be fostered, and who and what ought 
to be included in education, there is a fairly widespread, though uneven, consensus 
that education in the past has not adequately reflected the social contributions of 
women and minorities. This sense of the past and present exclusion from schools, 
books, history, and power of women, African-Americans, American Indians, 
Latinos, Asian-Americans, gays and lesbians by a hegemonic, white, Euro- 
American male establishment lies at the heart of that vast and influential social 
movement we call multiculturalism. Multiculturalists have demanded and demand 
the inclusion of these marginalized cultures and their contributions in curricula and 
textbooks and their greater representation in enrollment and hiring. Though the 
multicultural movement has by no means eradicated racism, sexism, and 
homophobia in our schools and society, it has nonetheless enriched American 
culture and education through the inclusion of these long-silenced cultural 
groups. “
49Sleeter, pp. 1-23.
’“Ibid.; Cameron McCarthy and Warren Crichlow, eds.. Race, Identity and 
Representation in Education, New York; Routledge, 1993; Patricia Aufderheide, 
ed.. Beyond F.C.: Toward a Politics o f Understanding, St. Paul: Graywolf Press, 
1992; Rick Simonson and Scott Walker, eds.. Multicultural Literacy, St. Paul:
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Typically, religion, particularly denominational Christianity, has often 
appeared in the national dialogue on multiculturalism as an opponent, arguing 
against inclusion, particularly of feminist and gay points-of-view, and the perceived 
multiculturalist undermining of so-called traditional family values.** Perhaps 
because of this opposition, multiculturalists have often treated organized religion in 
the U.S., especially the religious right, primarily as the rear guard of white, 
patriarchal hegemony rather than as a set of rather distinct cultural groups in 
themselves who may have some claims to assert under the multiculturalist rubric of 
inclusion and cultural diversity.*^
Yet religious groups arguably do constitute cultures, and religion is 
frequently one, if not the most important constituent of a cultural identity.*  ^And 
while religious cultures often split along ethnic and gender lines, they also often 
cross those lines. Indeed, there is ample evidence that religion continues to be a 
major constitutive element of people's cultural identity; it may even be growing in
Graywolf Press, 1988.
**Gaddy, Hall, and Marzano, pp. 33-54, 115-134; Marty and Appleby, pp. 
76-77, 85.
*^ See, for instance, Richard Pratte, op. cit.
"For a definition of culture and the relevance of religion see Evelyn 
Kessler, Anthropology: The Humanizing Process, Boston; Allyn and Bacon, 1974, 
pp. 9-10.
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importance.’’* As noted above. West (1989) and Nord (1995), from quite different 
points on the political spectrum, both argue that it is primarily a highly educated 
secular elite who ignore or devalue religion's contribution to the public sphere, an 
argument they advance. West contends, at the risk of political suicide. Many 
scholars, as well as ordinary members of faith communities, have put forth 
forcefully argued claims that religious cultures are discriminated against and 
directly undermined by social institutions, particularly education.”  If education, 
like society in general, should give space and voice to minority points-of-view, 
then why, they ask, are religious points-of-view excluded?
Therefore, to argue from the diversity problem to justify the exclusion of 
religion from our concepts of teachers and public education, again depends upon 
the assumption that religious beliefs can and should be separated from the social 
and cultural identity of individuals, including teachers and students. Though some 
individuals can and do make such a distinction, the assumption that they must does 
violence to some religious students and teachers by imposing a particular 
worldview on a diverse world in the very act of attempting to avoid endorsing any
” Finke and Stark, op. cit.; Wald, op. cit.. For discussion of the cultural 
specificity of groups like Moral Majority see Steve Bruce, "The Moral Majority: 
the Politics of Fundamentalism in a Secular Society" in Lionel Caplan, ed.. Studies 
in Religious Fundamentalism, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, 
pp. 177-194.
’’Carter, op. cit.; Nord, op. cit.
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single worldview. As with the pragmatic problem, the diversity problem does 
highlight important constraints on a reconception of teacher and the relationship 
between religion and public education by calling attention to the bewildering range 
of cultures and identities which an inclusive system of democratic education must 
accommodate, but it does not constitute a compelling argument against the 
proposition that such new concepts are necessary and possible. On the contrary, it 
seems to present one of the most compelling arguments that such new concepts 
are vitally necessary.
The Authorization Problem
Another underlying issue to which the pragmatic problem implicitly 
responds and which follows from the diversity problem is the issue of teacher 
authority. We may call this the authorization problem. According to this objection, 
the authority of the teacher derives from her role as an agent of the state 
empowered by a social consensus, expressed through the apparatus of the 
educational system, regarding the value of certain skills and subject-matter. Where 
social consensus about the meaning and value of a particular topic exists—literacy 
or numeracy, for example—the teacher is authorized to instruct students in that 
skill or body of knowledge. However, where there is consensus on the value but 
no such consensus regarding the meaning of a topic-ethics or morality, for 
instance—the teacher’s authority to instruct students in that topic may become 
mired in disagreements over meaning. And where there is no such consensus
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regarding the meaning or value of a topic—a particular religion, for example—the 
teacher should not instruct students in that topic because the lack of social 
consensus precludes social authorization of such instruction. For the teacher to do 
so would either mean state endorsement of a particular religious point of view, a 
violation of the Constitution, or an exercise of illegitimate authority on the part of 
the teacher. Furthermore, the justification of religious worldviews rests upon 
supernatural rather than social authority. Such worldviews are not accountable to 
society, the source of the teacher’s authority. Therefore, the public school teacher 
has no authority on issues related to religion.
This argument from the source of a teacher’s authority against a concept 
teacher which allows for a religious orientation and thus contributes to the 
renegotiation of the relationship between religion and education is flawed in 
several respects. It assumes that authority is given by society, and the teacher is the 
passive recipient. But it does not question how those who bestow authority on the 
teacher—teacher training colleges, state certification agencies, etc.—acquired that 
authority. Authority is not so much given as it is claimed on the basis of the 
expressed or implied values of society. Thus the teacher’s authority derives from 
the perceived consistency of the teacher’s actions with the values of the society she 
serves. While there may indeed be considerable social disagreement over the 
appropriate expression and practical meaning of these values, one can argue that 
there are broadly held social values which should inspire and authorize the
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teacher’s practice.’® Thus the concept teacher may include a morally prophetic 
orientation even as it must, in response to the diversity problem, eschew the role 
of spiritual prophet advocated by some religious critics of public education.
However, the diversity problem also reminds us of the fact that these 
broadly held values are expressed in a variety of ethical "dialects," among the most 
prominent of which, according to Cornel West, are religious dialects.”  To argue 
that such "dialects" lose their validity as an expression of broadly held ethical 
values, and thus a potential source of moral authority, because they are religious 
and therefore partial assumes the existence of an impartial, objective expression of 
such values and raises the specter of yet another objection to this inquiry's goal to 
construct a concept of teacher which does not exclude religious orientations: the 
indoctrination problem}*
The Indoctrination Problem
Perhaps the strongest objection to this inquiry's proposition of a new
’®Nord makes just such an argument in Religion and American Education.
” West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, p. 234.
’*Note that I am here claiming space for religious expressions of broadly 
held ethical values as one expression of those values, not the expression of those 
values. I do not mean to suggest that any one religious expression of such values is 
superior to another religion's expression of them, nor am I suggesting that religious 
expressions of them are superior to non-religious expressions. I am merely 
claiming that religious language—myth—is one common means of expressing 
ethical ideals which warrants respect.
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concept teacher for a renegotiated relationship between religion and public 
education is the fear of indoctrination. This concern over the indoctrination 
problem stems from both the history of religious involvement in education where 
teachers were conceived of as spiritual prophets and schools were used as 
instruments for inculcating the tenets of particular faiths. It also stems from the 
undeniable tendency of many, particularly fundamentalist, religious groups to 
express their moral values in absolutist and all-encompassing terms. Given these 
absolutist claims and a supposedly divine mission for many denominations to 
evangelize, many critics of a more open relationship between religion and 
education justifiably fear that such a relationship may simply open the door to 
indoctrination by those who may not have any commitment to open dialogue and 
negotiation. This is one of the concerns behind Dewey's (1934) and Swidler's
(1990) assertion that such groups must surrender their absolutist claims before 
dialogue is possible.”  Pending such a "surrender," it is best to avoid discussion of 
religion in public education, as well as the moral and ethical questions that might 
lead inexorably to such discussion, in order to avoid controversy and to preclude 
the indoctrination problem to which such discussions may provide an opening.
The problem with this response to the indoctrination problem is that it 
does not really solve the problem. At its best it preserves the discussion and
*®Dewey, A Common Faith, op. cit.; Swidler, After the Absolute, op. cit.
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inculcation of ethical values in education via teachers but privileges non-religious 
language, thus running up against the diversity problem by ignoring the fact that 
ethical language is religious language for huge segments of our society and our 
school populations and thus excluding these segments of society from the ethical 
discourse in schools. Warren Nord (1995) claims this constitutes a form of 
indoctrination.*® Thus the effort to avoid the indoctrination problem by banishing 
the concept of teacher as spiritual prophet and avoiding religion may well run right 
back into the indoctrination problem. At its worst, this response to the 
indoctrination problem posits ethical relativism as the only acceptable response to 
ethical absolutism; Since our ethical dialects differ, we have different ethical 
values. Therefore, each should leave the other to his or her own values. But the 
relativist response quickly runs into cases where ethical and religious questions are 
unavoidable and which demonstrate its inadequacy: religiously sanctioned child 
abuse, for instance, or female circumcision.** Therefore, if secular indoctrination is 
as unacceptable as religious indoctrination and ethical relativism is equally 
problematic, we must find a path between the horns of this dilemma that enables 
teachers to address and promote ethical values while remaining open to the various
*®Nord, pp. 160-90.
**For a more detailed discussion of both of these challenges see Susan 
Laird, "Spiritual Education in Public Schools?" op. cit. and Milligan, "Gender and 
the Limits of Inclusion, op. cit..
34
expressions of those values and avoiding the indoctrination problem. We must find 
a way for teachers to be undogmatic moral prophets. In short, we need to do what 
this inquiry proposes to do.
The Epistemological Problem
Yet another powerful objection to a reconception of teacher and a 
renegotiated relationship between religion and education rests upon important 
assumptions about the nature of knowledge. We can call this objection the 
epistemologicalproblem. It rests upon the belief, widely held since at least the 
middle of the nineteenth century, that scientific method is the most accurate, 
reliable, and verifiable source of true knowledge. As Dewey (1934) wrote, "there 
is but one sure road of access to truth—the road of patient, cooperative inquiry 
operating by means of observation, experiment, record, and controlled 
reflection."®  ^Religion, on the other hand, is a body of myth and superstition. It is 
belief rather than knowledge. Therefore, since the purpose of the teacher and 
education is to convey knowledge, and since the introduction of competing 
unverifiable supernatural claims which can never be resolved can only yield 
perpetual disagreement, religion should be excluded from education except as a 
social and historical artifact. The diversity problem is solved by making the 
transmission of "knowledge," rather than culture or faith, the role of teacher and
®^ Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 20.
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the object of education.
It is the unshakable faith of this view that science can provide knowledge 
of the laws of nature which govern not only the natural world but the world of 
individual and social human behavior as well. As scientists come to understand 
these phenomena they learn to predict and control them as well. These mechanisms 
of prediction and control can then be utilized by teachers, who function as 
technicians using scientifically produced methods to shape students to socially 
defined ends. From this view we derive a concept of teacher as technician and 
education as technology.
In recent years the epistemological assumptions on which this objection is 
based have been thoroughly undermined. Developing alongside multiculturalism, 
and in important ways providing a philosophical foundation for it, has been a 
profound shift in thinking on epistemology. In his essay "The Politics of American 
Neo-Pragmatism" and again in more detail in his book. The American Evasion o f 
Philosophy, Cornel West (1985, 1989) tells a story of the origin and evolution of 
an anti-foundationalist epistemology in American pragmatic philosophy from 
Emerson through Dewey.“  This epistemic anti-foundationalism. West contends, 
rests on two key insights of American pragmatism. The first recognizes the theory-
“ Comel West, "The Politics of American Neo-Pragmatism" in John 
Rajchman and Cornel West, eds., Post-Analytic Philosophy, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985, pp. 259-272; West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, op. 
cit.
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laden character of our observations of the world and hence the futility of using the 
"real" world as the final court of appeal for truth claims: "We cannot isolate 'the 
world' from theories of the world, then compare these theories of the world with a 
theory-free world. The second insight is what West calls the "historicist turn" of 
American pragmatism, the recognition that truth and knowledge claims are 
historically conditioned. The result of these insights is a philosophy that eschews 
the search for epistemological foundations, places ethics rather than epistemology 
at its core, and yields an epistemic pluralism which recognizes different ways of 
knowing rather than a single way of knowing whose claims are grounded by 
appeals to the unmediated experience of reality.®* This plucks the teacher out of his 
clean and comfortable role as the educational technician who transmits objective 
knowledge and utilizes scientific methods and drops him right back into the 
diversity and authorization problems with all their messy and uncomfortable 
disagreements over ethical questions and the languages in which they are 
expressed.
This later view, which West attributes to post-war analytic philosophy, is 
dealt a "deathblow" by Richard Rorty's (1979) description of the "emergence, 
development, and decline of its primary props: the correspondence theory of truth.
®^ Ibid.
®*West, American Evasion, op. cit.
the notion of privileged representations, and the idea of the self-reflective 
transcendental subject. West's description of Rorty’s "deathblow to modem 
North Atlantic philosophy" has much in common with the story Lorraine Code
(1991) tells.*’ Code demonstrates how what she terms "traditional" epistemology 
conceals behind a mask of objectivity a subjective knower who is white, male, 
propertied, and thoroughly educated in the assumptions of post-Enlightenment 
epistemology. In privileging this admittedly powerful way of knowing the world as 
the way of knowing, she argues, we have perpetuated the privileged position of a 
particular class as well as the oppression—albeit in a more subtle form—of women 
and, by implication, others. Code's response to this discovery of subjectivity within 
modernist epistemology is to explore the way we know other people as an 
alternative epistemological paradigm that would displace what she calls 
"malestream" epistemology from its position as the way of knowing to a new 
position as a way of knowing, thus making room for other perspectives in an 
interdependent network which she describes as a kind of epistemic ecosystem.** 
Thus Code reveals knowledge claims as social constructions, which in turn reveals
**West, "Politics of American Neo-Pragmatism," p. 263. West is referring 
here to Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979.
*’Code, op. cit.
**Code, pp.269-284.
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the epistemological problem's claim of clean and clear distinctions between 
knowledge and belief as a mask for responses to the diversity and authorization 
problems designed to privilege particular groups.
Philosophical moves like those described by Rorty (1979), West (1989), 
and Code (1991) toward epistemic anti-foundationalism or epistemic pluralism 
obviously undermine the knowledge and truth claims of many religions because 
they are foundational claims; the supernatural aspect of religion Dewey criticized 
was precisely their claim that the things they believe are "really real." However, 
these philosophical moves also challenge the truth claims and epistemic 
assumptions which have often been deployed to dismiss religious faith as an 
irrational, mythological relic of less enlightened times; namely, the argument that 
they were contradicted by science, whose claims about the "real" world were 
"true." If all truths, religious and scientific as well, are local products of 
historically, culturally, and politically conditioned discourses and objectivity is 
simply a fiction concealing the will to power of particular individuals or groups, 
then many of the traditional justifications for excluding religious questions from 
secular education are as discredited as religious faith itself. Therefore, if religious 
groups and sub-groups constitute distinct and in some cases marginalized cultures, 
and if, as post-analytic epistemological assumptions suggest, there are multiple, 
perhaps even equally valid ways of knowing rather than one correct way of 
knowing, then does not religion have some claim to space in public education as an
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aspect of marginalized culture, an alternative epistemology, as one of the voices of 
the Other? Thus post-analytic philosophy drags both the concepts of teacher as 
spiritual prophet and as technician out of their comfortable refuge in foundational 
epistemologies and drops them right back into the contingent, ethically messy, 
non-foundational world of the diversity and authorization problems.
The Ontological Problem
The epistemological problem is closely related to another common 
objection to the proposition that our concepts of teacher and education should 
include religion. This objection is rooted in assumptions regarding the nature of 
reality and the process of education as framework for learning via direct 
experience with that reality. Again, science is held up as the surest means of access 
to truth about reality. The data we receive through our senses and the logical 
extrapolations from that data by means of scientific method define what we can 
know of reality. Since it is this reality with which we must deal in our day-to-day 
lives, education should be directed toward the fullest understanding and control of 
that reality, which is encountered in experience. Much of religion, however, is 
premised on supernatural claims which are, by definition, non-"real" or beyond 
"reality" as we know it at any one moment. However, since science is open to 
revision, it is open to the possible expansion of our concept of reality to include 
what was previously "supernatural," but the most it can say about such claims is 
that we can "know" nothing about them at this particular moment. When they
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become known, they will become part of reality and are no longer supernatural. 
Therefore, since the role of the teacher in this view is to facilitate the student's 
understanding and control of his experience of reality, the supernatural claims of 
religions are not educationally relevant except as social and historical artifacts.
The ontological problem, however, does not present a compelling 
objection to the proposition of this inquiry that our concepts of teacher and 
education should be more open to religious points of view. Religious experience 
is, after all, a real experience even if many of its claims are not.®’ It has an immense 
influence on the day-to-day lives of billions of people. Therefore, one can argue 
that it has a legitimate place in education as a form of real human experience. This 
is the argument made for study about religion as opposed to the study o f religion.
Though he was suspicious of traditional religion's impact on education, 
Dewey's (1916) philosophy of democratic education placed great emphasis on 
experience as the foundation and method of human learning and the diversity of 
experience as not only conducive to greater learning, but essential to democracy as 
well.
A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a 
mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The 
extension in time and space of the number of individuals who participate 
in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, 
and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his
®’William James, of course, made just this argument in The Varieties o f 
Religious Experience, New York: Collier Books, 1961.
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own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, 
race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full 
import of their activity. These more numerous and more varied 
points of contact denote a greater stimuli to which an individual 
has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation in 
his action.™
Would religious experiences or religious points-of-view in the "interest" we call
education provide still more "numerous points of contact" and "greater stimuli" to
which students and others must respond and thus, perhaps, enrich the educational
experience of students? Does the current widespread practice of ignoring religion
in public education and often seeking to limit religious expression—often violating
constitutionally permissible forms of expression—mean fewer points of contact and
fewer stimuli, thus impoverishing educational experience?^*
The two points...by which to measure the worth of a form of social 
life are the extent to which the interests of a group are shared by all 
its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts 
with other groups. An undesirable society, in other words, is one 
which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse 
and communication of experience. A society which makes provision 
for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and 
which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through inter­
action of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic.™
Clearly, Dewey's description of an "undesirable society" is applicable to
’“Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 87.
’’Carter, op. cit.; Nord, op. cit.
™John Dewey, Democracy and Education, New York; The Free Press, 
1916, p. 99.
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many religious groups. It might be quite persuasively argued that fundamentalist 
groups that put often severe constraints on women and children do not constitute 
groups where interests are equally shared. Also, the common tendency of many 
religious groups to segregate themselves from other groups contradicts Dewey's 
call for "interaction of the different forms of associated life" in "fullness and 
freedom." Many religious groups are "undesirable societies" by Dewey's definition; 
perhaps most others include some undesirable tendencies and thus, to the extent 
they do, fall short of his democratic ideal. However, might not public education's 
segregation of itself from religion and religious experience implicate it as well in 
Dewey's definition of an undesirable society? Ought not public education, if it is to 
meet Dewey's democratic ideal, change any such undesirable aspects and thus 
"make provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms 
and... secure flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the 
different forms of associated life?"”  This is a powerful argument for the inclusion 
of studying about religion in school curricula and knowledge of it in our concept 
teacher. But this is the easiest part of the argument. It does not necessarily follow 
that studying about religion as a social and historical artifact means that we must, 
as Nord (1995) asserts, take it seriously as a living contender for truth.”
” lbid.
” Nord, Religion and American Education, pp. 213-16.
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The argument against religiously inclusive concepts of teacher and 
education on the basis of the ontological problem is also undermined by the 
arguments of post-analytic philosophy which undermined the epistemological 
problem. If we cannot have an encounter with reality unmediated by theory, then 
we cannot separate "reality" from our theories about it. Our theories become 
stories we tell about reality in order to render our experience of it meaningful and 
to enable us to direct future experience. Clearly, some of the stories we tell are 
more useful in this regard than others: Darwinian evolution is a more useful story 
than the creation story in Genesis in making a broad range of our experiences 
meaningful and in directing the course of future experience. But the stories science 
tells us are not always completely adequate in making all experiences meaningful 
or enabling us to direct the course of future experience in all instances because 
science does not offer us answers to normative questions: What should we do? 
How shall we live?
One could argue that religion meets the first part of Dewey's definition of 
education—"that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the 
meaning of experience"—but that it falls short on the second part—"and which 
increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."’* However, might 
one not also argue that public education today, with its often narrow focus on
"Ibid., p. 76.
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skills needed in the job market, fails the first part of Dewey's definition even as it 
succeeds in the second? Rendering human experience meaningful is, after all, one 
of the central roles of religion. West (1982) has pointed out, for instance, the 
importance of Afro-American protestant Christianity in contributing conceptions 
o f human nature, history, the good society, and loving relationships which not only 
made life meaningful for many African-Americans, even in a context of 
overwhelming oppression, but which provided a basis for resistance of that 
oppression as well.’® Thus, though religion has a long and inglorious history of 
oppression, it has also provided hope, sustenance, and resistance to oppression as 
well.”
West's discussion of the positive contributions of religious faith highlights 
public education's limitations in meeting the first part of Dewey's definition of 
education—making experience meaningful. For we live. West (1993) contends, in a 
contemporary American civilization marked by two distinctive characteristics; the 
"sacred cow" of "economic growth by means of corporate priorities" and endemic 
racism, patriarchy, and homophobia.’* The consequences of this include the 
commodification of American culture and the reification of the individual as an
’®Comel West, Prophesy Deliverance!, op. cit.; Cornel West, Keeping 
Faith, p. 132.
” See, for instance. Brown, op. cit..
’*West, Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times, pp. 60-61.
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object whose relationships are governed by the paradigm of the market. Thus we 
live in a "market culture" or "culture of consumption."™ When such a culture is 
combined with the natal alienation of Afncan-Americans—"the loss of ties at birth 
of ascending and descending generations"—the product is "the highest levels of 
forms of self-destruction known in black history."*” For the larger community, the 
combination of the "spiritual sterility" of the culture of consumption with economic 
decline since 1973 yields right-wing, potentially fascist politics.*' This corrosive 
and potentially explosive situation is exacerbated by the lack. West argues, of 
"viable institutions and structures in black America (and, one could argue, 
American society in general) that can effectively transmit values like hope, virtue, 
sacrifice, risk;" namely, "religious institutions and schools engaged in oppositional 
and transformative roles against class subordinations in American capitalist social 
relations."*^
Clearly, religion is by no means the only source for resistance and 
ameliorative social action in such a culture. Both West and the African-American 
novelist Toni Morrison have attributed similar powers of sustenance and resistance
19.
™Ibid., p. 148.
*”Ibid., pp. 149-50.
*'Ibid., p. 194.
* I^bid., p. 151; Cornel West, Race Matters, Boston: Beacon Press, 1993, p.
46
to African-American music, particularly jazz, and to secular political and 
philosophical movements.*^ Other scholars have also noted this power of the 
aesthetic.*'* And philosophical and political movements such as Marxism, feminism, 
democracy and others have long been sources of critique and resistance of social 
oppression. But religion has been and is at least as important a source of 
ameliorative social action as any of these other movements; it is an art in which 
people live, an inhabited aesthetic.
It is, at best, an open question as to whether or not public education in the 
United States does now or has ever been effective in making the existential facts of 
human experience meaningful to students, let alone in articulating a response to 
tragedy—both natural and man-made—or hope and sustenance in their resistance of 
it. Perhaps public education's aversion to religion, for all its practical justifications 
noted above, is in fact an aversion to any "faith," any "unification of the self 
through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to 
which human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices"
*^West, Race Matters, p. 105; Cornel West, Prophetic Reflections: Notes 
on Race and Fewer in America, Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism, 
Volume 2, Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1993, p. 25; Toni Morrison, quoted 
in Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and K.A. Appiah, eds., Toni Morrison: Critical 
Perspectives Past and Present, New York: Amistad, 1993, pp. 371, 394.
*"*See, for instance, Jim Garrison, "The Crossroads of Poetry and Prophecy: 
A Response to Milligan," Philosophy o f Education 1997, Urbana: Philosophy of 
Education Society, 1997. See also Jim Garrison, Dewey and Eros, op. cit.
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except capitalism.** This would appear to be the case since public education seems 
to be as aversive toward feminism, Marxism, and cultural criticism as it is toward 
religion. If this is true, might not Dewey’s definition of education and the 
democratic society. West's analysis of the "culture of consumption," and the ethical 
imperative inherent in the diversity problem require public education to take 
religion seriously as a live contender for truth by making room for a "religious" 
orientation in our concept of teacher and education that is not defined by but 
rather includes traditional religion as one valid way in which people make their 
existence meaningful and find hope and sustenance in the face of tragedy?*® 
Criteria for a Religiously Inclusive Concept Teacher
In the last section of this inquiry I attempted to address some of the likely 
objections to the basic proposition of this inquiry, which is that the 
misunderstandings and disagreement over the relationship between religion and 
education calls for a new concept teacher which can both negotiate and re­
negotiate that contentious relationship. Though the objections reviewed above—the 
pragmatic problem, the diversity problem, the authorization problem, the
**Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 33.
*®Following Dewey, I am using the term religious as distinguished from 
religion to suggest that movements like Marxism, feminism and others have 
"inclusive ideal ends" which they think worthy of "controlling our desires and 
choices" and are, therefore, religious even though they are not religions. See 
Dewey, A Common Faith, pp. 1-28.
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indoctrination problem, the epistemological problem, and the ontological 
problem—do not exhaust all possible objections to the basic proposition of this 
inquiry, they do represent some of the most important and common challenges to 
it. And while I have argued that these challenges do not constitute a compelling 
reason for abandoning the aim of this inquiry—a concept teacher which is more 
sensitive to and inclusive of religious points of view, they do identify important 
criteria by which the success of any such concept should be judged. The next step 
in this inquiry, therefore, will be an explicit accounting of the ethical criteria which 
follow from the objections reviewed in the previous section and which will frame 
the remainder of this inquiry. These criteria will include:
Affirmation o f Diversity
Given the racial, ethnic, religious heterogeneity of public schools as well as 
important gender and sexual orientation differences, the concept teacher must 
avoid imposing any single, authorized, definitive structure to the relationship 
between religion and public education. It should affirm diversity as one way of 
avoiding the indoctrination problem. More importantly, it should enable actual 
teachers to understand and negotiate that diversity rather than construct some 
"unifying" conceptual superstructure designed to contain it. It should equip 
teachers with navigational skills, not a ready-made road map.
Social Authorization
The new concept teacher which this inquiry will construct cannot rest upon
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foundational epistemic claims, whether such claims are grounded in the authority 
of "objective" science or the word of gods. For, as Rorty (1979), West (1989), and 
Code (1991) have argued, such claims are, to some degree, social constructions 
because they are always mediated by the subjectivity of the individual knower.
Thus the teacher conceptualized here should recognize the revisability and 
contingency of knowledge claims. It should recognize the element of social 
construction in knowledge claims, not in the sense that knowledge is whatever one 
believes, but rather in the sense of knowledge as a theory about reality which can 
be judged by its consequences, by its usefulness in meeting socially defined ends.
In recognizing the socially constructed nature of knowledge claims, 
however, this conception of teacher should not settle for the constrained authority 
which derives from a least-common-denominator social consensus about the 
meaning and value of particular topics or techniques. The fact that there is a social 
consensus on the value of "reading, writing, and arithmetic" does not mean that the 
teacher's authority should be limited to instruction in those subjects. Rather, the 
concept must recognize the teacher's responsibility to ground teaching practice in 
the authority of socially recognizable ethical ideals rather than the limited roles 
defined by the political status quo or supernatural authority. Dewey (1934) has 
shown that such ideals are possible without appealing to philosophical idealism or 
divine edicts, and West (1989) reminds us that, once we eschew foundational 
epistemic claims, such ethical ideals become the primary means of adjudicating
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truth claims.*’
Non-"realist" Ontology
Given the epistemic anti-foundationalism of the social authorization 
criterion, this concept teacher cannot rest upon or assert absolutist claims about 
the nature of reality because it has no relationship with reality unmediated by 
socially constructed theories about that reality. To assert such absolutist epistemic 
and ontological claims would render teachers susceptible to the indoctrination 
problem. However, to reject, ignore, or silence those who may assert such claims 
would violate the criterion of affirming diversity by imposing one socially 
constructed conception of reality on another.
Moral-Ethical Idealism*^
Empowered by authority claimed on the basis of socially recognizable 
ethical ideals, the new concept teacher must affirm the possibility of individual 
moral growth toward ideals which are, in keeping with the criteria of social 
authorization and non-"realist" ontology, posited by the individual and the society 
of which the individual is a part yet open critique and revision. The concept should 
enable and encourage moral growth while eschewing both strong ethical relativism
*’Dewey, ^  Common Faith, pp. 21-28; West, American Evasion, p. 213.
**My use of the term "idealism" here is not meant to refer to philosophical 
idealism but rather the more general understanding of the term as holding to a 
flexible sense of justice and right and wrong that informs behavior and provides an 
orientation for moral growth.
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and ethical absolutism.
Love Ethic
The concept must define a teaching ethic that affirms the transcendent 
worth and dignity of each individual as well as that individual's desire and ability to 
grow toward his or her own understanding of ethical ideals. The individual should 
not be construed as a means to some externally defined end but rather as an 
imperfectly realized ideal end in him/herself. The student is not an object to be 
shaped to fit "reality" but an autonomous subject fit to participate in the shaping of 
that reality. 
hAeanin^-full
Consistent with the affirmation o f diversity criterion and the social 
authority and ontological criteria, the new teacher concept should not only be 
open to but also conducive to the construction of existentially meaningful accounts 
of the widest range of human experiences. This openness to meaning-making 
should not be limited to explanations of the natural world but should include 
"mythic" narratives that provide some rationale for social ideals and propose 
meaningful answers to the great existential questions: Why do we exist? How shall 
we live? WTiy does tragedy occur and evil exist?
Conclusion
Thus far in this inquiry I have attempted to show that the current social 
conflict over the relationship between religious beliefs and public education
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threatens the Deweyan ideal of the school as a laboratory of democratic culture. I 
have suggested that the calls for school choice, vouchers, and public support for 
private schools as well as the phenomenal growth in home schooling which this 
conflict fuels threatens a "balkanization" of education along racial, cultural, and 
religious lines which reconstructs "the barriers of class, race, and national territory" 
that democracy, as a "mode of associated living. . . of conjoint communicated 
experience," is supposed to break down.*® I have proposed that, in order to 
mitigate that conflict and respond to Dewey’s call for more inclusive plans of 
operation, we begin to renegotiate the relationship between religion and public 
education by re-thinking the concept teacher in a way that is more sensitive to 
religious points of view without surrendering the Deweyan ideal of democratic 
education. I have suggested that Cornel West's prophetic pragmatism offers the 
most useful philosophical framework for this new concept, which I have named the 
prophetic pragmatist.
As a preliminary step to the articulation of this concept of teacher as 
prophetic pragmatist, this chapter has addressed some of the most common and 
important objections to the proposition of a new relationship between religion and 
public education and used those objections to generate criteria by which a concept 
of teacher which attempts to contribute to such a relationship may be judged. It
*®Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 87.
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has not been my intent to suggest that the problems articulated here identify all 
potential challenges confronting this inquiry's proposal to define a concept teacher 
which is more sensitive to and inclusive of religious orientations. Nor do I mean to 
assert that the criteria listed above exhaust all possible criteria that could be drawn 
from the challenges I have addressed. I am merely claiming that these challenges, 
and the criteria they suggest, offer a necessary and sufficient basis for 
demonstrating the inadequacy of traditional concepts of teacher for a renegotiated 
relationship between religion and education as well as some of the shortcomings of 
a number of more contemporary efforts at re-defining that relationship. In addition, 
I am claiming that these criteria will also be useful in determining whether the 
teacher as prophetic pragmatist is more useful than traditional concepts of 
teachers in negotiating a new relationship between religion and public education 
for a diverse society.
In the following chapter I will address the first and second of these three 
claims, that these criteria can be used to demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional 
concepts of teacher as well as the shortcomings of several recent and 
contemporary efforts to re-define the relationship between religion and education. 
The last of these three claims, that these criteria can be used to demonstrate the 
superiority of the concept of teacher as prophetic pragmatist^ will then constitute 
the focus of the remainder of this inquiry.
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Chapter II 
Centers that Cannot Hold:
Paradigmatic Teachers and Contemporary Re-Visions
Introduction
Chapter 1 of this inquiry advanced two basic claims regarding the current 
historical moment in U.S. education. First, our deep disagreement over the proper 
relationship between religion and education threatens a "balkanization" of 
American education along racial, cultural, and/or religious lines which endangers 
the school as a laboratory of democratic culture. Secondly, in order to avoid this 
danger, we must, on the advice of John Dewey (1934), "indicate a plan of 
operations proceeding from a level deeper and more inclusive than is represented 
by the contending parties" by constructing concepts of teacher which can negotiate 
and re-negotiate the complexities of this relationship.* Chapter 1 then advanced the 
thesis that Cornel West's (1989) notion of prophetic pragmatism offers a useful 
philosophical framework for such a concept.^ Finally, as a preliminary step to the 
testing of this thesis, I explored a number of common objections to the proposition
*John Dewey, Experience and Education, New York; Collier/Macmillan, 
1938, p. 5.
^Cornel West, The American Evasion o f Philosophy: A Genealogy o f 
Pragmatism, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, pp. 211-243.
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of a more inclusive relationship between religion and education and used those 
objections to formulate a set of necessary and sufficient—but not necessarily 
exhaustive-criteria by which this thesis might be judged.
Clearly, however, the call for a more "inclusive plan of operations"—a new 
concept reac/ier—assumes the validity of an underlying claim; namely, that 
traditional and existing concepts of teacher and visions of the relationship between 
religion and education are inadequate. Chapter 2 will examine the validity of this 
underlying claim. Whether explicitly articulated or not, various positions in the 
debate over the relationship between religion and education are founded upon 
basic assumptions about human nature, knowledge, the educated person, and the 
good society. These assumptions in turn give form and substance to explicitly 
educational concepts, among them teacher. In this chapter I will articulate and 
critique three broad concepts of teacher which have emerged from different 
positions in the debate over the relationship between religion and education. I will 
argue that these concepts of teacher~ds prophet, as technician, and as pragmatist, 
as well as more recent attempts to revise this relationship, are inadequate to the 
contemporary challenge to negotiate a role for religious faith in education and a 
concept teacher which meets the criteria formulated in Chapter 1.
Contemporary Revisions
In recent years a number of scholars in the philosophy of education have 
begun to re-envision the relationship between religion and public education by
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challenging the long-held assumption that religion has no place in the public 
school. Nel Noddings (1993), for instance, has argued that religion and religious 
questions should be a part of public school education because they have long been 
at the very center of human experience.^ She would make both an important part 
of the school curriculum. This would require, however, a profound shift in the way 
we conceive of the school curriculum since the questions religious beliefs address 
and raise are not confined to one discipline; they cut across disciplines and will 
thus require that teachers be trained to venture outside their disciplinary boxes, to 
recognize the relevance of existential and religious questions to their own 
disciplines and be able to follow their connections to other disciplines. Such a 
program of study, she maintains, can only be carried oft" if teachers adhere to strict 
pedagogical neutrality.^
Noddings' justification for such study in public education is that it liberates 
students from the constraints of a narrowly functionalist curriculum and exposes 
them to a wider variety of cultural, intellectual, and spiritual ideas, thus 
strengthening their ability to negotiate diversity and strengthen democracy.’ Thus 
the criterion identified in Chapter 1 as affirmation o f diversity is apparently met in
’Nel Noddings, Educating fo r Intelligent Belief or Unbelief New York. 
Teachers College Press, 1993.
"Ibid., pp. 136-139.
’Ibid., pp. 16-18.
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Noddings' revision of the relationship between religion and education. However,
discussion of these issues should take place according to the "methods of
intelligence."® By this she apparently means what Dewey called critical intelligence,
the idea that all truth claims should be subjected to "patient, cooperative inquiry
operating by means of observation, experiment, record, and controlled reflection."^
In making critical intelligence the non-negotiable basis for conversations in the
school on religious issues, she necessarily excludes, as did Dewey, religious groups
like conservative fundamentalists and evangelicals. She says to them;
You are free to practice your religion as you see fit, but when you 
enter the public arena, your commitments and recommendations 
must be and will be subjected to the methods of intelligence. The 
public school is committed to these methods, and your children 
will necessarily encounter them.*
Ironically, these are the very groups with whom dialogue and a concept teacher
capable of negotiating rather than dictating the relationship between religion and
education is most urgently needed. They are necessarily excluded by Noddings' and
Dewey's insistence that critical intelligence is the only legitimate basis for dialogue.
®Ibid., p. 143.
^John Dewey, A Common Faith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934,
p. 32.
*Noddings, p. 143. Dewey argued that religious groups had to 
"surrender... the whole notion of special truths that are religious by their own 
nature, together with the idea of peculiar avenues of access to such truths." 
Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 33.
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Thus Noddings' revision of the relationship between religion and education actually 
founders on the diversity problem. Nor does she articulate the concept teacher 
which her revision would require.
More recently, Warren Nord (1995) has sought a resolution of the conflict 
between religion and education by pointing out the ways in which public education 
excludes religion and arguing that public education should take "live" religious 
options seriously as contenders for the truth.® Nord suggests that we should teach 
as fact those areas where we agree, but where we disagree, where religious and 
secular ways of knowing offer competing conceptions of history, nature, etc., we 
should teach the conflicts; we should present both sides carefully and neutrally to 
enable students to understand the disagreements. In this way the schools can be 
fair and avoid the indoctrination problem.
Underlying Nord's arguments for fairness is a guiding metaphor: the school 
as a marketplace of ideas." Nord's argument is, in a sense, economic: religion has 
been unfairly excluded from the marketplace; free and fair trade in ideas requires 
that it be allowed to compete. Part of Nord's critique of secular education's 
hostility toward religion and his argument for the inclusion of "live" religious ways
®Warren Nord, Religion and American Education: Rethinking a National 
Dilemma, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
‘“Ibid., pp. 187-89, 258-59, 342, 379.
"Ibid., p. 246.
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of knowing in public education are premised on notions of cultural diversity and 
knowledge which are consistent with three of the criteria for a new concept 
teacher identified in Chapter 1 : affirmation o f diversity, social authorization, and 
anti-"realist" ontology. However, these assumptions, as well as his marketplace 
metaphor, raise the specter of ethical relativism.
Nord responds to the danger of ethical relativism by rejecting both moral 
absolutism and strong relativism and endorsing a weak relativism that postulates a 
shared core of moral values which can guide ethical decisions in the school's 
marketplace of ideas.Though Nord is perhaps correct in his notion of a common 
core of values—murder, gratuitous violence, rape, theft and other acts probably are 
generally condemned as immoral—he is less clear on how such "core" values 
become ethical behavior or enable students to make ethical decisions. For the 
problem is surely not the lack of a shared core of values but the lack of a 
consensus on what those values mean and how those meanings are put into 
practice in human experience. For surely ethics are given form and meaning in 
behavior, and behavior is in part culturally conditioned. It is unclear, therefore, 
how this abstract shared core of values avoids both strong relativism and moral 
absolutism in a context of cultural and epistemic diversity and meets the criterion 
of moral-ethical idealism identified in Chapter 1 as necessary for a concept
*^ord, pp. 340-343.
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teacher that can negotiate and renegotiate the relationship between religion and 
public education. And like Noddings, Nord fails to conceptualize the teacher his 
revision of American education would clearly require.
Ignacio Gotz (1997), however, has explicitly addressed the role of teachers 
in his call on teacher education to develop the spiritual life of teachers." He argues 
that spirituality entails self-transcendence, the pursuit of high ideals, a sense of the 
infinite possibilities of human potential, and qualities of openness and transparency 
which make individuals better teachers. Gotz' description of the ideal qualities of a 
teacher's spiritual life suggest a concept teacher that would afiirm the criteria of 
moral-ethical idealism and recognize the sanctity of the individual. However, he is 
less clear—in this admittedly brief essay—on how such "spiritual" teachers would 
respond to the diversity problem or whether the basic philosophical assumptions of 
the teachers he envisions would enable them to steer clear of the indoctrination 
problem.
Like Gotz, Iris Yob (1995) explores the possibility that public education 
may have something to learn from religious education inquiring into the 
possibilities of a culture of education infused with spirituality." Yob calls her
"Ignatio L. Gotz, "On Spirituality and Teaching," Philosophy o f Education 
1997, Urbana; Philosophy of Education Society, 1997.
"Iris M. Yob, "Spiritual Education: A Public School Dialogue with 
Religious Interpretations," Religious Education, 90, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 104-17.
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revision of the relationship between religion and public education "spiritual 
education." Critical of the materialistic focus of so much of public education. Yob 
argues the necessity of a paradigm shift that would make the spiritual metaphors of 
"quest, enlightenment, troth" central to public education. In effect, she is calling 
for a revision of public education that would seem to require a concept teacher not 
unlike that proposed by Gotz in his call for teacher education to develop the 
spiritual life of teachers. However, as Laird (1995) points out. Yob does not 
address how spiritual education will respond to what I have called the diversity 
problem. Nor does she articulate how spiritual education might meet the criterion 
of moral-ethical idealism, how it meets the challenge of condemning religiously 
sanctioned child abuse or patriarchal oppression without succumbing to moral 
absolutism and the indoctrination problem.
And neither Gotz nor Yob discusses the political response of a "spirituality 
of teaching" or "spiritual education" to injustice and man-made tragedy. Barry 
Kanpol's (1996) suggested revision of the relationship between religion and 
education, however, directly addresses this issue by calling for an alliance between 
critical pedagogy and liberation theology as a tool for social transformation.
"Susan Laird, "Spiritual Education in Public Schools?" Religious 
Education 90, no. 1 (Winter 1995); 118-132.
"Barry Kanpol, "Critical Pedagogy and Liberation Theology: Borders for a 
Transformative Agenda," Educational Theory A6, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 105-18.
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Kanpol suggests such an alliance would envision education as a cultural critique 
supported and guided by spiritual idealism in the tradition o f African-American 
protestant Christianity's involvement in the Civil Rights Movement. He envisions 
critical pedagogy's concept of teacher as transformative intellectual through the 
lens of such traditional forms of spiritual idealism, suggesting we consider the 
possibility of teacher as prophet. Kanpol's vision, however, is a political agenda, 
not a framework for negotiating the relationship between religion and education. 
While it may meet the criteria which call for moral-ethical idealism and 
recognizing the love ethic, it runs afoul of the diversity problem  and raises the 
specter of the indoctrination problem in its implication that religious or political 
difference is equal to ethical error.
These attempts to re-envision the relationship between religion and 
education testify to a growing recognition among philosophers of education that 
the social conflict over this relationship calls, as Dewey said, for a "new order of 
conceptions leading to new modes of practice."’’ While some of them imply a 
different concept teacher for the relationship they envision, they do not fully 
articulate that concept or how it deals with the problems discussed in Chapter 1. 
Others fail to address the concept at all. In both instances the new relationships 
between religion and education these philosophers envision fail to challenge the
’’John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 5.
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paradigmatic concepts of teacher which dominate and have dominated popular 
educational thought and practice and which are inadequate to the task of 
negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion and education. The 
remainder of this chapter, therefore, will demonstrate the inadequacies of three of 
the most prominent of these paradigmatic concepts teacher—Has. prophet, the 
technician, and the pragmatist~hy exploring the evolution, the underlying 
philosophical assumptions, and the consequences of those assumptions for a 
concept teacher faced with the challenge of negotiating the relationship between 
religion and education.
The Paradigm of the Teacher-Prophet 
Evolution o f the Teacher-Prophet
Historically, education and religion have made common cause. The ancient 
Hebrews, Greeks, Christians and many other groups typically saw the education 
of the young as an aid to religiously defined goals." In ancient Hebrew society, for 
instance, key aspects of the teacher's role evolved fi"om the religious and social 
functions of the classical Hebrew prophets through the hakimim and sopherim to 
the responsibilities of the parent-tutor to educate the child in the tenets of the
"Edwin Scott Gaustad, "Church, State, and Education in Historical 
Perspective" in James E. Wood, Jr., ed.. Religion, the State and Education Waco: 
Baylor University Press, 1984.
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faith.*’ In the Christian tradition, Jesus and his use of the art of parable as an 
instructional method has provided a model seen as worthy of emulation by 
teachers.^’ From the time of Constantine to the Enlightenment education and faith 
were intimately connected. The rise of scholasticism, the university, and the 
teaching orders particularly fixed the stamp of religion on the concept teacher}^ In 
both traditions the concept teacher was founded on the need to transmit both 
divine and authoritative received knowledge to younger generations.^ In short, the 
concept teacher was an integral component of prophecy.
This concept of teacher as an instrument of prophecy is readily apparent in 
the writing of some of the most prominent contributors to the history of western 
educational thought. Martin Luther, for instance, saw the teacher as second in 
importance only to the minister in the defense and propagation of the faith and 
charged the teacher with helping to bring about Christian community. “  John 
Calvin too conceived of the teacher as a lay preacher to whom much of the success
'’The hakimim were wise men possessing wisdom, justice and 
understanding and charged with transmitting knowledge and discretion to the 
young. The sopherim-cdiXeA rabbis-were teachers and leaders. E.B. Castle, The 
Teacher, London; Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 7-11.
“^Robert Ulich, History o f Educational Thought, New York: American 
Book Company, 1968, pp. 61-71.
^'Gaustad, p. 13.
^ c h ,  p. 91.
^Castle, pp. 101-102; Ulich, 122.
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of Calvinism could be attributed/^ Ignatius of Loyola, who founded the Jesuit 
teaching order in part to defend and propagate the faith in the face of 
Protestantism, offered Jesus as a teaching model worthy of emulation and saw "the 
salvation and perfection of one's soul...and of one's neighbor" as the primary goal 
of teaching.*^ The educational thought of Erasmus, the religious reformer who 
sought to reconcile faith and reason, was directed at the spiritual reform of 
Christian life.“  And Comenius, whose Great Didactic aimed to foster a great 
Christian human community, espoused a basic philosophy which was mystical and 
religious and placed God as the source of moral standards. In his view, teaching 
had three tasks: the development of erudition, morality, and piety.’’ Clearly, 
religious faith and prophetic agency are central to the concept teacher in the 
development of educational thought in the West at least up to the Enlightenment.
This historical affinity between religion and the concept teacher is not 
confined to Western societies, however. The role of teachers in many other 
cultures has evolved out of religion and continues to be influenced by religious 
goals. In Islamic societies Mohammed is revered as the last of the prophets who
’■‘Castle, p. 104.
“ Ibid., p. 106; Ulich, pp. 150-51. 
“ Ulich, p. 138.
“ Ibid., 190-192.
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imparted divine knowledge to the people, a fundamentally pedagogical task.^' Al- 
Farabi, referred to as the "Second Teacher," is honored for his efforts to create 
harmony between reason and faith. ^  And the tenets of Islam are the primary topics 
of education for ordinary Muslims.”  Teaching in Buddhist societies can also trace 
its history to the arrangement of scenes from the Buddha's ï\ÎQ~jataka—on temples 
for the instruction of the illiterate and to the organization o f schools taught by 
monks on temple grounds to impart the rudiments of reading, writing, and the faith 
to the young.^' And traditional education in China and Vietnam was centered on 
the thought of Confucius.”  Clearly, across cultures, and particularly in the 
evolution of Western educational thought from Plato through the Christian fathers 
and the Calvinists to Rousseau, the concept teacher names a role charged with the
Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, Prophethood in Islam, Lahore: Islamic 
Publications Limited, 1968, p. 35.
"^ehd i Amin Razabi, ed.. The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia, 
Surrey: Cuazon Press, 1996, pp 59-62.
” See, for instance, Raden Adjeng Kartini, Letters o f a Javanese Princess, 
Hildred Geertz, ed.. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1964 or J.S. 
Fumival, Netherlands India: A Stucfy o f a Plural Economy, Cambridge: The 
University Press, 1944.
‘^See, for instance, David K. Wyatt, The Politics o f Reform in Thailand: 
Education in the Reign o f King Chulalongkom, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1969 and Paul Strachan, Imperial Pagan: Art and Architecture o f Burma, 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989.
” See Alexander B. Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A 
Comparative Study o f Nguyen and Ch’ing Civil Government in the First H alf o f 
the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
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prophetic task of transmitting divinely sanctioned moral values to the young and/or 
"uneducated."”
The evolution of the concept teacher in the history of American 
educational thought and practice has also evinced a close relationship between 
religion and education. During the colonial period, the alliance of church and state 
was a general rule which had an inevitable impact on the concept teacher}* The 
first American schools were explicitly religious and required religious orthodoxy 
of their teachers.^* In the 18th century state support of the schools of established 
religions was common.”  In short, religion dominated education in the colonial 
period and was thus central to the concept teacher.
The 19th century saw the gradual evolution of an increasingly secular 
concept of teacher and education as the constitutional principle of the separation 
of church and state was increasingly applied across the nation.^* Despite this
^^Castle, p. 109.
” Gaustad, p. 15.
“ James E. Wood, "Religion and Education in American Church-State 
Relations" in Wood, Religion, the State and Education, p. 26 and R. Freeman 
Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education, Boston: Beacon Press, 
1950, p. 114.
“ Butts, p. 115.
’^Gaustad, p. 18.
^*Butts, p. 112; Wood, pp. 28-30.
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movement, however, Christianity continued to play an important role in the 
concept of teacher in such institutions as dame schools and even in the colleges.^® 
The education of African-Americans after the Civil War, for instance, was inspired 
to a significant extent by religious motives and carried out by teachers with solid 
Christian credentials "called" to their work by their religious convictions in the 
manner of the prophets “
Gradually, however, the principle of the separation of church and state as 
applied to education spread with the common schools. Horace Mann, for instance, 
recognized that sectarian religious instruction in publicly supported schools was 
likely to provoke conflict in a religiously diverse society, so he argued against such 
instruction in the common schools.^* However, Mann also believed that the Bible 
contained a general body of widely accepted moral and religious truths which 
could be tapped, through Bible reading in school, as a form of moral education.
In this way Mann hoped to get around the diversity problem by trading the 
traditional concept of teacher as religious prophet for a more general concept of
’^S.E. Frost, Jr., Historical and Philosophical Foundations o f Western 
Education, Columbus, Charles E. Merrill Books, 1966, pp. 403,410.
^Joe M. Richardson, Christian Reconstruction: The American Missionary 
Association and Southern Blacks, 1861-1890, Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1986, pp. 164-167.
*‘Butts, pp. 116-17; Frost, p. 395.
^^Frost, pp. 396-399; Gaustad, p. 20.
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teacher as moral prophet. Catholics and Jews, however, vigorously resisted 
scripture reading in the public schools, seeing it for what it was, an expression of 
an essentially Protestant version of Christianity.^^ Meanwhile, the expansion of 
science and trade, as well as the growth of religious diversity in the United States, 
exacerbated conflict over the implicit and explicit sanctioning of Protestant 
Christianity in the public schools and the concepts of teacher as religious or moral 
prophet which made it possible.*”
Mann’s assumptions about the relationship between religion and moral 
education and the underlying concept of teacher as moral prophet were 
characteristic among many prominent educational thinkers of the 19th century. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson's thought, which has been described as a secularized version 
of Christianity, stressed the existence of a universal spirit transcending the physical 
wor ld .He  viewed the role of the teacher as one who guides the student from 
individuality to an experience of community that is not only social but religious. 
And he saw the function of teaching as deepening man’s sense of imbeddedness in 
the transcendent.”  Catharine Beecher, one of the most prominent proponents of 
women’s education in the 19th century, even more explicitly shared Mann’s
” Butts, p. 133.
” Wood, p. 27.
” Ulich, pp. 293, 314. 
” Ibid., pp. 293, 295, 305.
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assumptions regarding religion and the role of teachers as moral prophets. She too 
advocated religious education and Bible reading in schools as the best forms of 
moral education.*’ And in the late 19th century, Anna Julia Cooper, a powerful 
voice for the rights and education of African-Americans, particularly women, 
continued to advocate protestant Christian values as the moral basis for education 
and bible reading as the best means for affecting moral education.** Clearly, though 
American education had evolved from the unabashed inculcation of sectarian 
religious beliefs under a concept of teacher as religious prophet toward an 
increasingly secular approach to education under a concept of teacher as moral 
prophet, a non-sectarian protestant Christianity still exercised a profound influence 
on the concept teacher at the close of the 19th century.
Though the principle of the separation of church and state is widely 
accepted in schools in the late 20th century, the meaning of that principle in
*’See Catharine Beecher, "Essay on the Education of Female Teachers" in 
Shirley Nelson Kersey, ed.. Classics in the Education o f Girls and Women, 
Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1981; Susan Laird, "Beecher, Catharine Esther" in 
J.J. Chambliss, ed.. Philosophy o f Education: An Encyclopedia, New York; 
Garland Publishing, 1996 and Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation: 
The Ideal o f the Educated Woman, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 
103-138.
**Anna Julia Cooper, A Voice From The South, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, p. 302.
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practice and the role of teachers as agents of moral prophecy are still debated/’ As 
late as the 1950's many states either did not prohibit or actually encouraged Bible 
reading in schools and organized school prayer was widespread.”  And many 
contemporary critics of the public schools, in their call for school prayer and Bible 
reading in schools as a response to the real or perceived moral decay of 
contemporary society, evince nostalgia for a public school system founded on 
protestant Christian moral values like that created by Horace Mann. Implicit in this 
nostalgia is a concept of teacher as an agent of moral prophecy, as a transmitter of 
divinely sanctioned knowledge and moral behavior from one generation to the 
next, which, if adhered to, guarantees the good society. Whether they recognize it 
or not, they are drawing on a long tradition of educational thought which has 
conceived teacher as prophet.
The Conceptual Consequences o f the Teacher-Prophet
In order to understand the relevance of the prophetic model to the concept 
of teacher implicit in this long tradition of common cause between religion and 
education it is necessary to more fully understand the concepts prophet and 
prophecy. These terms are most often defined in reference to religious figures like
’^See, for instance, Barbara B. Gaddy, I . William Hall, and Robert J. 
Marzano, School Wars: Resolving Our Conflicts Over Religion and Values, San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996.
’"Butts, 191-92.
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the Hebrew prophets—Moses, Elijah, Elisha, and Amos among others, Christian 
prophets such as John the Baptist, and the prophet of Islam, Mohammed.” 
However, prophetic religious figures and other religious specialists are also found 
in other cultures, such as the Native American prophets Wevoka and Handsome 
Lake.”  Such figures are often described as "the man to whom it is given to speak 
the words given him by God...What he says is true and can be totally relied 
upon."”  Prophets tend to appear in times of great crisis when people feel 
vulnerable and without control of their social environment. Their messages 
generally offer an explanation of the crisis at hand and a call for a new order
” See, for instance, Bernhard W. Anderson and Walter Harrelson, Israel's 
Prophetic Heritage: Essays in Honor o f James Muilenberg, New York; Harper & 
Brothers, 1962; Martin Buber, The Prophetic Faith, New York: Harper & Row, 
1960; Michael Cook, Muhammad, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983; 
Isma'il R. A1 Faruqi, Islam, Niles: Argus Communications, 1984; B.D. Napier, 
"Prophet, prophetism" in George Arthur Buttrick, ed.. The Interpreter's 
Dictionary o f the Bible, Vol. 3, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962; Neal Reimer, 
Karl Marx and Prophetic Politics, New York: Praeger, 1987; M.H. Shepherd, 
"Prophet in the NT" in Buttrick; and Bruce Vawter, The Conscience o f Israel: 
Pre-exilic Prophets and Prophecy, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961.
”  Lester L. Grabbe, Priests, Prophets, Diviners, Sages: A Socio-Historical 
Study o f Religious Specialists in Ancient Israel, Valley Forge: Trinity Press 
International, 1995, p. 212. See also L. Spence, "Prophecy (American)" in James 
Hastings, ed.. Encyclopedia o f Religion and Ethics, New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1961, pp. 381-82; and Thomas W. Overholt, Channels o f Prophecy: The 
Social Dynamics o f Prophetic Activity, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989, pp. 27- 
40, 62-67.
” James Barr, Beyond Fundamentalism: Biblical Foundations fo r  
Evangelical Christianity, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984, p. 20.
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designed to address it.^
Prophecy has been seen as having three defining characteristics: 1) an 
individual who is conscious of having received a special call from his god, 2) 
revelatory experiences, and 3) the proclamation of the revealed message to the 
people.”  It also involves interaction among a minimum of three separate actors: 
the supernatural, the prophet, and an audience.”  This interaction, however, is not a 
one way transmission from the divine to the prophet to the people. Prophecy is not 
prediction. It is rather a communication loop which can be modified by feedback 
from the audience or prophet or subsequent revelations.*’ The basic pattern of 
prophetic speech presupposes the intervention of God in history and typically 
consists of a moral critique and judgement of a prevailing situation, a threat or 
prediction of the consequences of that situation, and a call for radical change in 
accordance with divinely sanctioned ideal principles.** The prophet's message 
must include enough of the old, traditional beliefs of the people to be meaningful 
and authoritative to the them, but it must also be suflBciently novel to provide an
*'*Overholt, pp. 113-14.
**Johannes Lindblom, Prophecy in Ancient Israel, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1962, pp. 216-19.
*®Overholt, p. 15.
*’lbid.; Barr, pp. 21-32.
**Ibid., pp. 21-32; Napier, p. 899.
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explanation for and remedy to the crisis which the traditional beliefs have been 
unable to provide.
Some sort of supernatural or symbolic confirmation of the prophet's 
authority is an important characteristic of the paradigmatic religious prophets. 
Though this divine confirmation is perhaps the prophet's most obvious claim to 
authority, another important source is his audience's acknowledgement of his 
authority, their sense that the prophet conforms to the cultural expectations o f the 
role and his ability to articulate what they have already begun to feel. Thus the 
prophet's authority comes fi'om both revelation and his audience's recognition that 
he is performing a culturally recognized role.”  Prophecy ends, interestingly 
enough, not when supernatural revelation is absent but rather when the prophet's 
audience no longer recognizes him as performing an accepted social role.“
Though claims of divine revelation are often seen as the hallmark of the 
prophet, a number of scholars argue that claims of such revelation are not a 
necessary component of prophetic activity. According to this view, prophets can 
be any individual with a compelling vision of a changing social order or some one 
who "speaks forth for God in the spirit which animated Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah,
’'Ibid., pp. 69-73, 87-89.
"Ibid., pp. 155-59, 183.
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and Jesus. Other religious figures who, while they make no claims to speak the 
literal words given them by God, nevertheless articulate social critiques and recipes 
for change premised on the will of God or a transcendent ideal are also described 
as prophets.^ These individuals can be appropriately described as moral prophets. 
To view them as such assumes a judgement that they are inspired by the same 
spirit that moved the classical prophets even if they do not claim direct revelation 
from God. In this sense, Martin Luther King, Jr. could be called a moral prophet.
The name of prophet may also be applicable to figures who, though they 
make no appeal to divinely sanctioned or spiritually transcendent ideals, 
nevertheless generally conform to the prophetic model. They may appear in times 
of crisis with cultural critiques premised on the inadequate and unacceptable 
realization of existing social ideals, with predictions of the dire consequences of 
society's failure to live up to those ideals, and with a specific plan of action for 
realizing them. Such ideological prophets may even include historical figures, such 
as Karl Marx, who explicitly reject religious paradigms.®
All three types—the religious, the moral, and the ideological—shsxt two
®Ibid., 167.
“ Shepherd, p. 919 and Karl Jaspers, Socrates, Buddha, Confitcius, Jesus: 
The Paradigmatic Individuals, San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1990.
“ Neil Reimer, Karl Marx and Prophetic Politics, New York: Praeger,
1987.
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fundamental characteristics; prophetic speech and social authorization. The 
prophet and his prophesy can exist "only in a dynamic interaction with an 
audience," an audience that bears the responsibility of identifying the truth and 
authorizing the prophet in relation to his conformity to a culturally defined role.^ 
Thus a claim of divine authority is not a necessary or sufficient condition for the 
existence of prophecy or the title prophet. Such claims are the hallmark of the 
crank or lunatic unless a meaningful aspect of their society authorizes them as 
prophets. Therefore, individuals and movements are prophetic in that they engage 
in a sustained moral critique of actually existing conditions, point out the 
consequences of those conditions, and offer existential or programmatic 
prescriptions based on ideal conceptions of truth or human society which are 
meaningful to that society. Thus, the concept of the prophetic may be defined as a 
mode of speech and action aimed at transforming social reality in accordance with 
recognizable social ideals.
In the literature on the prophetic and prophecy, the role of the prophet is 
frequently and explicitly defined as that of a teacher or clearly implied to the extent 
that "prophets were concerned with individual and social behavior, the perennial 
concerns of teachers."*’ Their goal, like many of the major figures in the history of
*"Ibid., 183.
*’Castle, p. 7, writes "If education is primarily concerned with what sorts of 
persons people become, we cannot exclude the Hebrew prophets from the
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educational thought as well as ordinary teachers, was the creation of "righteous 
men and the just society. This tradition of the religious prophet as teacher can 
be seen most explicitly in the Old Testament account of Ezra, who "had prepared 
his heart to seek the law of the Lord, and to do it, and to teach in Israel statutes 
and judgements" and who "read in the book in the law of God distinctly, and gave 
the sense, and caused them to understand the reading."®’ It is also apparent in 
Jeremiah, where a pedagogic intent is evident in the sense that "something is 
presented as a paradigm for the purpose of instructing students and inducing 
insights...in order to transform."®* The religious prophet, then, is in important 
respects a paradigmatic teacher.
If prophets have functioned as teacher in and of their contemporary 
societies, it should be no surprise that educational theories closely allied with 
religious beliefs would see their teachers as performing the role of moral prophet. 
Indeed, in the Jewish cultural tradition the prophetic role appears to have evolved 
into teaching; "The prophetic teachings, in diluted form but still retaining their 
strong moral emphasis, were mediated through the sopherim (rabbi) and hakimim
community of teachers."
®®Ibid., p. 9. Plato's Republic is, perhaps, the most famous example of these 
goals in educational thought.
King James Bible, Ezra 7:10.
®*Timothy Polk, The Prophetic Persona: Jeremiah and the Language o f 
the Self, SheflSeld: Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Press, 1984, p. 171.
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(wise man) to the Jewish father and much later to the schoolmaster and his 
pupils."*'' And in the early Christian church the gift of prophecy was evidently 
suppressed and absorbed into the missions of preachers and teachers.^* Teachers in 
the long history of common cause between religion and education are prophetic 
not in the sense that they have received some divine revelation, but rather in the 
sense that their teaching is motivated and given direction by a body of ethical or 
theological absolutes that are perceived to have divine sanction. In short, they are 
moral rather than religious prophets. And those non-religious teachers who are 
motivated by some compelling vision of the just society-Paulo Freire, for instance- 
might also be considered morally prophetic.’* One of the most eloquent 
contemporary exponents of this ideal of the moral prophet as teacher is David 
Purpel.’^
Purpel draws explicitly on the tradition of the Hebrew prophets for his 
formulation of an approach to education which has as its primary point of
*®Castle, p. 13.
’“Mitchell, ibid.
’*Paulo Freire, Pedagogy o f the Oppressed, New York; Continuum, 1990.
’^ See David E. Purpel, The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education: A 
Curriculum fo r Justice and Compassion in Education, Massachusetts: Bergin & 
Garvey Publishers, 1989.
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departure "the reality of immense and unacceptable human suflfering.^ Purpel's 
response to both the inevitably tragic elements of human experience as well as the 
avoidable oppression and injustice inflicted on many in contemporary society is to 
seek "ways in which our schools can be energized with images and language that 
have force and meaning" and to examine "the possibility that theological language 
might have for this effort."’^  His work, then, can be seen "as an attempt to 
sacralize the educational process, to imbue it with a spirit of what is of ultimate 
significance and meaning."^® For Purpel, the Hebrew prophets provide a powerful 
model for this integration of theological and critical language into education 
focused on amelioration of tragedy and social injustice. "The most powerful source 
for Western culture of this integration of religion and criticism is... the biblical 
prophets. I see in his [Abraham Heschel] interpretation of the prophets intriguing 
possibilities for an educational framework which combines a sense of the sacred 
and a sensitivity to cultural realities with a strong emphasis on the development of 
critical consciousness."’®
’^ David E. Purpel, "Extending the Boundaries of Moral Education" in 
Wendy Kohli, ed.. Critical Conversations in Philosophy o f Education, New York; 
Routledge, 1995, pp. 150, 156.
’^ David E. Purpel, Moral and Spiritual Crisis, p. 77.
"Ibid.,p. 78.
’®Ibid., p. 80. Purpel is referring here to Abraham J. Heschel, The Prophets, 
New York: Harper & Row, 1955.
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Though he does not make the distinctions between religious, moral, and 
ideological prophets made here, Purpel's concept of teacher is constructed around 
the figure of the moral prophet. "Educators themselves need to be "prophets" and 
speak in the prophetic voice that celebrates joy, love, justice, and abundance and 
cries out in anguish in the presence of oppression and misery."”  The educator 
should work "within the prophetic tradition that seeks to remind us of our highest 
aspirations, of our failures to meet them, and of the consequence of our responses 
to these situations" in order to develop "skills and knowledge that enhance the 
possibility of justice, community, and joy."’* Purpel's call to teachers to assume the 
role of moral prophet unifies both religious and secular manifestations of prophetic 
activity by correctly locating the moral prophet's authority in the power of socially 
recognizable ethical ideals rather than claims of supernatural revelation. This 
enables him to merge contemporary streams of liberation theology and critical 
pedagogy into a potentially powerful voice which not only names and challenges 
injustice but offers a transformed vision of the good society as well.”
” lbid., p. 110.
’*Ibid., pp. 104-5.
’% id., pp. 85, 102-3. For a fuller account of liberation theology and 
critical pedagogy see Robert McAfee Brown, Liberation Theology: An 
Introductory Guide, Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993 and Henry 
Giroux, Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy o f Learning, 
Hadley, Bergin & Garvey, 1988. For another discussion of their significance for 
education and the teacher as prophet see Kanpol, "Critical Pedagogy," op. cit..
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This unification of the moral vision which occupies the place divine 
revelation held in the religious manifestation of prophetic activitj' is to be 
articulated, Purpel asserts, in a reconstituted "overarching mythos," the lack of 
which is one important aspect of our "cultural and educational crisis."*® Purpel 
calls on colleagues to "celebrate certain religious and moral principles" and 
transcendent values which cut across ethnic lines and which "amount to elements 
of a broadly held common heritage."** This overarching mythos yields educational 
goals based on values which "are in a sense 'non-negotiable,' even though we are 
simultaneously convinced of their 'truth' and nervous about their problems."*^
Purpel clearly recognizes the potential dangers of his concept of teacher as 
prophet. He reminds us that, even as we act on his advice to "celebrate certain 
religious and moral principles," we cannot endorse any one religion or 
denomination. He further states; "It is vitally important not to overstate the value 
of this particular tradition to the development of an educational framework. What 
we value is his [the prophet's] passion and commitment to justice."*^ He is aware 
of the problem of potential indoctrination and dogma but is simultaneously critical 
of the amorality, moral relativism, "vulgar pragmatism," or "sterile non­
*°Purpel, Moral and Spiritual Crisis, pp. 70, 106.
**Ibid., pp. 67, 70.
*"lbid., p. 113.
*"lbid., pp. 67, 80.
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commitment" that is so often assumed to be the only alternative to moral 
absolutism and indoctrination." "The challenge," he writes, "is formidable; 1) we 
must find ways to avoid paralytic and wishy-washy responses to the conflicting, 
strident, and self-righteous demands of narrow interest groups; 2) at the same time 
we need to be responsive to the legitimate concerns of our pluralistic, multicultural 
nation; 3) we need not have to choose between one and two but can strive to re­
examine our traditions and seek language and images that give us common 
direction and purpose."*’
Inadequacies o f the Teacher-Prophet
Purpel's articulation of the crisis in contemporary education is very similar 
to the challenge I suggested in Chapter 1 which faces any system of public 
education which attempts to do justice to the role of religion in history and the 
lives of students in our multi-religious, multicultural society while adequately 
responding to social injustice and tragedy. There is clearly much in the prophetic 
tradition which is attractive and even useful in formulating a response to these 
challenges: the passion, the compelling moral vision, the sense of outrage at moral 
failure, the tireless struggle toward not just improvement but social redemption 
constitute an inspiring vision for the concept teacher. As I have argued here, this
"Ibid., pp. 99, 119.
*’Ibid., pp. 93-94.
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concept of teacher as prophet is perhaps the oldest and most common concept of 
the teacher in the history of educational thought. However, it is does not imply, by 
itself, a concept teacher which can negotiate the relationship between religion and 
education while preserving the school as a laboratory of democratic culture. In 
spite of Purple's efforts, it runs afoul of the indoctrination and authorization 
problems identified in Chapter 1 and thus fails several of the criteria defined by 
those problems.
The indoctrination problem remains because it is so deeply imbedded in 
the prophetic tradition. Integral to the prophetic tradition is the assumption either 
of divine revelation or a set of transcendent moral values which give voice and 
direction to prophetic activity. This is clear from the analysis of prophecy and the 
prophet offered in the previous section as well as the long history of correlating 
and mingling the concepts teacher and prophet. The prophet has an explicit moral 
framework to which he is absolutely committed. Purpel implicitly recognizes this 
fact in his call for an "overarching mythos" to guide education in the prophetic 
voice. While it may well be true that the various peoples who constitute our 
multicultural society have some common moral values, what this might mean in 
actual practice is far from clear and not without controversy. As the 19th century 
controversy over Bible reading as moral education attests: one man's common 
moral heritage is another's religious or political indoctrination. It is just this sort of 
conflict at the level of actual practice that the gradual secularization of the schools
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in the late 19th and 20th centuries was designed to avoid. Purpel's suggestion of an 
overarching mythos is a form of weak relativism meant to forge a passage between 
the horns of moral absolutism—the indoctrination problem—and moral relativism— 
a failure of the moral-ethical idealism criterion. But the conceptual model he 
chooses for teaching—prophecy—leaves his project vulnerable in actual practice to 
the first horn of the dilemma, the horn that the prophetic model has historically 
embraced as a pedagogical tool for bringing society into conformity with particular 
ideal ends. And thus the indoctrination problem, to which the whole tradition of 
teacher as prophet is vulnerable, collides with the diversity problem in a 
multicultural society such as our own. Therefore, the prophetic model by itself is 
perhaps more likely to produce conflict than meaningful progress toward the just 
society.
However, by deploying the conceptual model of prophetic speech and the 
distinctions among categories of prophet—distinctions implicit in Purpel but never 
articulated or analyzed—we can clarify the exact source of the indoctrination 
problem in the notion of teacher as prophet. It is not the religious content of 
prophetic speech per se that produces the indoctrination problem. As we have 
seen in the previous section, explicitly religious content is a defining characteristic 
of only one kind of prophet, the religious prophet, and it is surely possible that one 
may hold religious beliefs without indoctrinating others in those beliefs. It is, 
rather, a misunderstanding of the source of prophetic authority that leads the
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prophet into the indoctrination problem. For when the prophet, and his audience, 
assume his authority derives from God or absolute, transcendent ideals rather than 
the consistency of his message with the imperfectly realized but recognizable 
values of his society, he becomes an absolutist who runs afoul of the 
epistemological and ontological problems. The indoctrination problem is then 
inevitable.
If, on the other hand, the prophet and his audience recognize the social 
basis of his authority, then the prophet runs the risk of becoming a moral politician 
juggling the competing assertions of various ethical constituencies: he becomes an 
ethical relativist and thus loses the direction and moral passion of the prophet. The 
prophetic tradition by itself is simply an inadequate model for a concept teacher 
capable of negotiating and re-negotiating the relationship between religion and 
education because it is incapable of steering teachers between the Scylla of moral 
indoctrination and the Charybdis of ethical relativism. In a sense, it lacks a 
conceptual rudder capable of steering us to where we know we want to go.
Finally, there is another, more practical, problem confronting the concept 
of teacher as prophet which follows from the sources of prophetic authority. As 
mentioned above, that authority comes not from the prophet's claim of divine 
revelation, but rather from his audience's acceptance of that claim and their 
recognition of his action as conforming to a culturally defined role named
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prophet.** Thus, for the teacher to assume the role of prophet as he has in the past 
and as Purpel suggests he should do now, the teacher's audience must authorize 
him in that role; they must at some level accept and afRrm his articulation of 
guiding moral values—whether divine or not—and recognize his actions as fulfilling 
the prophetic role. Without this authorization, the prophet is a crank, a nut, a kook 
whose actions are likely to be perceived as indoctrination and who is unlikely to be 
tolerated for long in the classroom. In a society as diverse as ours any such broad 
authorization of teachers as prophets is unlikely.
There is much useful and inspiring in the prophetic tradition of the concept 
teacher and in Purpel's contemporary revision of the concept of teacher as 
prophet. The sense of moral purpose and outrage against injustice should inspire 
any concept of teacher in a society, like ours, marred by man-made evils. And the 
recognition, made explicit by applying the conceptual distinctions of religious, 
moral, and ideological prophecy to Purpel's thesis, that the indoctrination problem 
is not a necessary consequence of religious claims is useful to the construction of a 
concept teacher capable of negotiating the relationship between religion and public 
education. However, neither the tradition of teacher as prophet nor Purpel's 
revision of that tradition meets the criteria established in Chapter 1 for a concept 
teacher capable of negotiating the relationship between religion and education
**Overholt, pp. 69-73.
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while preserving the school as a laboratory of democratic culture. We must look 
elsewhere for a more suitable concept teacher for a multicultural, multi-religious 
system of democratic education that includes religion, avoids indoctrination, and 
responds to existential tragedy and social injustice.
The Paradigm of the Teacher-Technician 
The Banishment o f the Teacher-Prophet
By the second half of the 19th century and into the 20th the concept of 
teacher as moral prophet came under increasing attack and was generally rejected 
by those advocating a more scientific approach to education. This rejection is, 
perhaps, most clearly stated in a famous speech by Max Weber, a seminal influence 
on the modem conception of the academic vocation, particularly at the university 
level.*’ "The prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the academic 
platform...To the prophet and demagogue, it is said; Go your ways out into the 
streets and speak openly to the world, that is, speak where criticism is possible...In 
the lecture room we stand opposite our audience, and it has to remain silent. It is 
irresponsible to exploit this situation."**
*’Wolf Heydebrand, "Introduction" to Max Weber, Sociological Writings, 
New York: Continuum, 1994, p. vii. For an account of Weber’s influence on the 
academic vocation see Mark R. Schwehn, Exiles from  Eden: Religion and the 
Academic Vocation in America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. See 
also J.E.T. Eldridge, ed.. Max Weber: The Interpretation o f Social Reality, 
London: Michael Joseph, 1971.
**Weber, p. 293.
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Unlike Overholt (1989), Weber saw the prophet as "an individual bearer of 
charisma who proclaims a religious doctrine or divine commandment" and is 
"never to be found where the proclamation of a religious truth of salvation through 
personal revelation is lacking. In our view, this qualification must be regarded as 
the decisive hallmark of prophecy."*’ While he saw some relationship between the 
prophet and the teacher of ethics, he maintained that philosophical ethicists, such 
as the great teachers Confucius or Plato, and religious figures like Luther and 
Calvin were not prophets because they either claimed no new revelation or lacked 
"that vital emotional preaching which is distinctive of prophecy.”  The enterprise of 
the prophet, " he argued, "is closer to that of the popular orator (demagogue) or 
political publicist than to that of the teacher."’* And the demagogue, Weber 
asserts, has no place in the classroom because students, who he assumes are there 
to listen, have no opportunity to challenge or disagree with the professor.
Weber’s banishment of the teacher-prophet signaled the rise of a new 
concept teacher for a new period indelibly marked by the growth of science and 
the technologies it made possible. According to Weber, "the fate of our times is
*’Max Weber, "The Prophet," in S.N. Eisenstadt, ed.. Max Weber on 
Charisma and Institution Building, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 
pp. 253, 261.
” Ibid., pp. 259-60.
’*Ibid., pp. 261.
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characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 
disenchantment of the world," where, "in spite of theology, the tension between 
the valuespheres of science and the sphere of the holy is unbridgeable.’’ Science 
today," he writes, "is a vocation organized in special disciplines in the service of 
self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of 
seers and prophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does it partake of 
the contemplation of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe."’  ^
Since science does not and can not address ultimate questions, students are in error 
who come to the lecture to hear something more than "mere analyses and 
statements of fact." They seek a leader rather than a teacher, "but we are placed on 
the platform solely as teachers. Fellow students!" Weber admonishes, "You come 
to our lectures and demand from us the qualities of leadership, and you fail to 
realize in advance that of a hundred professors at least ninety-nine do not and must 
not claim to be football masters in the vital problems of life, or even to be leaders 
in matters of conduct."’* Thus Weber dispenses with the ancient concept of 
teacher as moral prophet and replaces it with a newly ascendent ideal, an ideal 
which splits the traditional teacher's role into two: the researcher-scientist who
’^ Ibid., pp. 301-02 
’^Ibid., p. 300.
94Ibid., pp. 296-97.
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discovers knowledge and develops new technologies, and the teacher-technician 
who applies that knowledge and technology to eflfect learning.
Though he acknowledges they often fall short of the ideal, Weber demands 
that teachers be objective in the treatment o f subject matter. The teacher's task is 
to "serve the students with his knowledge and scientific experience and not to 
imprint upon them his personal political views."®* In addition, the useful teacher 
teaches students to recognize facts that are inconvenient for their "party opinions" 
as well as their teacher's. While the teacher who takes a scientific approach to 
education cannot promote one or another fundamental position, he can deploy 
scientific thought to "contribute to the technology of controlling life by calculating 
external objects as well as man's activities, contribute methods of thinking," and 
foster intellectual clarity by identifying the most effective means and likely 
consequences of chosen ends as well as the practical stands and final conclusions 
which are logically consistent with one or another ultimate position. Insofar as the 
teacher exercises these responsibilities and no more, he is in the service of moral 
forces.®^
Though Weber is referring in this speech to the professor as scientist and 
never explicitly denies the title teacher to those who do engage "fundamental
®*Ibid., p. 293. 
®^ Ibid., pp. 298-99.
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positions" in their teaching practice, his estimation of such teachers and his own 
ideal conception of teachers are clear. "We are destined to live in a godless and 
prophetless time...It is weakness not to be able to countenance the stem 
seriousness of our fateful times...To the person who cannot bear the fate of the 
times like a man, one must say: may he rather return silently...simply and plainly. 
The arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for 
him...One way or another he has to bring his 'intellectual sacrifice'-that is 
inevitable."®’ The ideal teacher, however, does not sacrifice his intellectual integrity 
to such weakness because "in the lecture rooms of the university no other virtue 
holds but plain intellectual integrity."®* Weber's ideal teacher is objective, 
dispensing scientific knowledge and analysis and studiously avoiding any answer to 
the question Tolstoy claimed was most important to us: "What shall we do and 
how shall we live?"®® He serves science, the most important factor in the process of 
intellectualization which has been going on for thousands of years, "a belief that 
there are no incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in 
principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is 
disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to
®’lbid., pp. 300, 296, 303. 
®*Ibid., p. 303.
®®Ibid., p. 290.
92
master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers 
existed. Technical means and calculation provide the service. This above all is what 
intellectualization means.
According to Schwehn (1993), these ideals have shaped the academic 
vocation in America at the university level since World War H. And to the extent 
that concepts of the ideal teacher at the university level influence those at the lower 
levels of public education—particularly through teacher training—they have shaped 
prevailing conceptions of teachers at elementary and secondary levels as well.
These ideals, however, are not Weber’s alone. For Weber is but one significant 
voice in the process of "intellectualization" he describes, a process that, among 
other things, has sought, with considerable success, to make education scientific, 
to bring to it the understanding and control of educational phenomena that science 
has increasingly exercised over natural phenomena. Thus the scientist becomes the 
model for the university professor who discovers facts and formulates "laws" of 
individual and social human behavior and tests techniques that hinder or facilitate 
learning. The teacher at the elementary and secondary levels, then, becomes ideally 
an educational technician who deploys these techniques to eflfect learning in her 
students.
'“ Ibid., p. 286.
""My use of the pronoun he/him to refer to scientists and university 
professors and she/her to refer to schoolteachers deliberately reflects the language
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Evolution o f the Teacher-Technician
The evolution of the concept of teacher as a technician, an outgrowth of 
the idea that education is or ideally should be a science, can be traced back at least 
to the middle of the 19th century. In that time, roughly corresponding with the 
gradual secularization of public education in the U.S., figures like James and John 
Stuart Mill, Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spencer, G. Stanley Hall, Edward L. 
Thorndike, B.F. Skinner and others made important contributions to the study of 
science in the education of the time as well as the study of education as a science 
by turning the methods and results of science to educational problems. Their 
seminal influence shaped the development of education into the 20th century. 
Though the long-idealized concept of teacher as moral prophet did not and has not 
disappeared from American classrooms, their contributions gave rise to a new ideal 
of education as a technology built upon and governed by the laws of science and 
new concept teacher as the trained technician who operates the educational 
machine.
The mid-nineteenth century saw the first attempts to develop a completely 
scientific education. James Mill, for instance, deployed the sense empiricism of
and assumptions about gender exhibited in much of the literature on education as a 
science.
Cavenagh, ed., James and John Stuart M ill on Education, 
Cambridge; The University Press, 1931, p. xi.
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Locke and the psychological theory of association in his plan of education for his 
son, John Stuart, whose own empiricist ideas of a universe of causal regularities 
had a profound impact on what would come to be seen as a scientific approach to 
research on teach ing .T hus the elder Mill's detached and objective application of 
educational techniques derived fi’om scientific theories may well be one of the first 
instances of the concept of teacher as technician }°* And Thomas Huxley, an 
outspoken critic of religious control of education and influential proponent of 
science instruction in English schools, claimed for science the power to improve 
not only practical life, but moral life as well, and envisioned the teacher’s role as 
bringing students' minds into direct acquaintance with the knowledge of scientific 
fac ts .H e rb e rt Spencer, a fiiend of Mill and Huxley and "intellectual linchpin 
between Britain and America," also exerted an enormous influence on education
'“ Ibid., p. xii-xxiv; John H. Chambers, Empiricist Research on Teaching: 
A Philosophical and Practical Critique o f its Scientific Pretensions, Boston. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 109-10. The psychology of association 
anticipated key aspects of behavioral psychology. James Mill claimed that it was 
essential to education to create associations that will result in right habits, habits 
"that will be stamped in by pleasure and pain," so that each individual could fit 
himself to become "the instrument of the greatest possible benefit to his fellow 
men."
*“ J.S. Mill's nervous breakdown would later be attributed in part to his 
father's system of education, a less-than-auspicious debut of the notion of teacher- 
technician. See Cavenagh.
'“ Frost, p. 423; Cyril Bibby, ed., T.H. Huxley on Education, Cambridge: 
The University Press, 1971, pp. 12-14, 26, 40-43, 99-105, 209.
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through his boo\i Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical (1861), which 
became a widely popular text in normal schools and university teacher training 
departments. In it he advocated a theory of education, heavily influenced by 
Darwinian evolution, in which the child was seen as a complex organism governed 
by the same stimuli of "cause and consequence" which governed the evolution and 
behavior of other animals. Science, he concluded, was the knowledge "of most 
worth" to mankind, and scientific culture should underlie all educational 
activities.
Thus, by the turn of the century, many of the key assumptions underlying 
the concept of teacher as technician had already assumed a prominent place in the 
cutting-edge educational theories of the time. The child was less likely to be seen 
as an imperfect but improvable image of a living God; he was, rather, a complex 
animal inhabiting a universe of discernable "causal regularities" and governed by 
the same forces of stimulus, response, and natural selection that shape the 
experience and behavior of other animals. Education was less a process of moral 
growth toward conformity to an ethical ideal embodied in the idea of a
‘“ Frost, p. 422; Andreas M. Kazamias, ed., Herbert Spencer on 
Education, New York; Teachers College Press, 1966, p. 22,31-35, 49, 56; Edward 
J. Power, Educational Philosophy: A History from the Ancient World to Modem  
America, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996, p. 117.
“”lbid., p. 30; Herbert Spencer, Education: Intellectual, Moral, and 
Physical, New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1914, p. 46.
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transcendent God; it was increasingly seen as a technology of control whereby the 
isolation and manipulation of appropriate stimuli yield predictable responses in 
human behavior. The ideal teacher of "modem" educational theory was no longer 
the moral prophet, the ideal teacher was the rational, objective, efficient technician 
applying the knowledge and techniques of the researcher-scientist to education. In 
the 20th century these assumptions would receive further elaboration and more 
sophisticated application to education in the seminal research of G. Stanley Hall, 
Edward L. Thorndike, and B.F. Skinner.
G. Stanley Hall, for instance, was an instrumental figure in focusing the 
scrutiny of educational science on the child and redefining the concept teacher 
along the lines of the laboratory technician. So profoundly influenced by 
evolutionary and psychological theory that he defined education as "conscious 
evolution" and its goal as "fitness for life," Hall believed that physical evolution 
had been so firmly established as fact that it should be applied to mental evolution 
via psychology.*"* Hall's analysis of human behavior in the context of evolutionary 
theory led to the development of what he called "genetic" psychology, the notion 
that the human mind evolved in the same manner and in tandem with the evolution 
of the body, and his "Law of Recapitulation," a belief that the mental development
*°*Frost, p. 426; G.E. Partridge, Genetic Philosophy o f Education: An 
Epitome o f the Published Educational Writings o f President G. Stanley Hall o f 
Clark University, New York: Sturgis and Walton Company, 1912, pp. 15-31, 91- 
98.
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of each individual human being progressed through the same evolutionary stages 
as the "race."*”  Applied to religions, cultures, sexualities and gender. Hall's "law" 
could locate any individual or group on a spectrum which was defined by the 
pinnacle of intellectual, physical, and cultural evolution: white, western, male, 
Christian culture.*"* Hall believed that this psychological theory could provide 
settled answers to educational questions and a solid scientific foundation for 
teaching: "This new educational science has already passed judgements upon many 
of the most important questions of both matter and method of teaching in all 
grades—verdicts, which, when still further confirmed by genetic evidence, will be 
final, and will give education what it has so long lacked, a truly scientific basis."*** 
The role of the teacher in Hall's theory of education as natural and 
conscious evolution was to facilitate the natural biological "unfolding" of the child 
by deploying knowledge of the child's psychological evolution to consciously 
direct that evolution in desired directions.**  ^For this task the teacher required 
training in psychology rather than philosophy, though it need not be overly analytic 
or systematic but rather practical, for "she"--the teacher—"tends to magnify rules.
*” Partridge, pp. 15, 21, 27, 31.
**°G. Stanley Hall, Educational Problems, Vol. II, New York: D. Appleton 
and Company, 1911, pp. 69-72.
***Ibid., p. 98.
**%id., pp. 99-103.
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Give her a few simple and easily taught rules and a few dozen inspiring lessons on 
the history of education, and as many on the nature of childhood In other 
words, the teacher need not fiilly understand, let alone participate in, the scientific 
underpinnings of her craft, she need only apply the knowledge science dispenses to 
her fi"om "the fountainhead of the educational system... the university". Thus 
Hall's biological model of education suggests a concept of teacher as a laboratory 
technician manipulating natural processes in the laboratory of the school to 
achieve ends determined elsewhere.
In the first several decades of the 20th century schools in the U.S. came 
under increasing criticism by proponents of greater educational efficiency."* 
Drawing on the work of Fredrick Taylor in the scientific management of industry 
and the pioneering work of Joseph M. Rice in quantitative educational research, 
reformers seized upon techniques of measurement and inferential statistics as well 
as the model of industrial organization to create a new and efficient system of 
schooling in which teachers assumed the role of trained factory technicians. Aided 
by the growth of educational psychology, this new movement promised a more
"% id., pp. 339-40. 
‘"Partridge, p. 337. 
"^Chambers, p. 101.
99
rational and scientific approach to the technology of education."* Edward L. 
Thorndike was one of the seminal figures in this movement."’
Like Spencer and Hall before him, Thorndike's theory of education and 
implicit concept teacher were deeply influenced by Darwin's theory of evolution. 
He credited Darwin with bringing a naturalistic approach and the evolutionary 
view to psychology, a consequence of which was the conclusion that "the 
intellectual difference between a monkey and a child is not in nature but in 
degree... In mind, as in body, man is a part of nature.""* The psychological insights 
that grew out of Thorndike's research on animals refined the associationist 
psychology of Spencer and Hall's genetic psychology by identifying the mechanism 
by which mental development takes place—stimulus and response."’ Thorndike 
claimed that learning is a matter of forming connections between stimuli and 
responses, connections which can be "stamped in" if rewarded or "stamped out" if 
punished. Mind was nothing more than the sum total of such connections."" Based
"*H. Warren Button and Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr., History o f Education 
and Culture in America, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983, pp. 219-21, 231- 
34, 241.
" ’Ibid., p. 9.
"*Ibid., pp. 41-42; Edward L. Thorndike, Education: A First Book, New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1923, p. 4.
" ’Ibid., p. 10; Power, p. 149.
""Ibid., p. 247; Geraldine Joncich, Psychology and the Science o f 
Education, Selected Writings o f Edward L  Thorndike, New York: Bureau of
1 0 0
on these conclusions he formulated two "laws of learning:" the "Law of Exercise" 
and the "Law of Effect," which would prove an important contribution to the 
development of learning theory in psychology and the basis for a more explicit 
technology of education.'^*
Thorndike was also at the forefront of the measurement movement in 
education, asserting that everything which exists, exists in some quantity and is, 
therefore, measurable/^ Even questions of quality and values could be restated, he 
believed, in quantitative terms and thus measured/^ Then, by employing statistical 
procedures promoted and developed by Mill and Francis Galton, such 
measurements could be used to quantify intelligence or to determine the 
superiority of one educational method over another by quantifying and comparing 
educational outcomes/^^ In this way education could become more rational and
Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1962, pp. 10-11.
Joncich, pp. 25, 79-80. The Law of Exercise state that "the oftener or 
more emphatically a given response is connected with a certain situation, the more 
likely it is to be made to that situation in the future." The Law of Effect states that 
"the greater the satisfyingness of the state of affairs which accompanies or follows 
a given response to a certain situation, the more likely that response is to be made 
to that situation in the future. Conversely, the greater the discomfort or 
armoyingness of the state of affairs which comes with or after a response to a 
situation, the more likely that response is not to be made to that situation in the 
future."
'“ Ibid., p. 17; Button and Provenzo, p. 242-43.
'“ Joncich, pp. 9, 18.
’“ Ibid., pp. 12, 64; Chambers, pp. 97-98, 100-01.
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eflBcient through the application of "the same general technique...which has 
serviced the physical sciences for the last two hundred years. His development 
of this technique had a profound impact on the development of standardized 
testing and modem educational research. Thus Thorndike's laws of learning and his 
techniques for measuring educational outcomes provided the essential tools for the 
teacher-technician working within a technological theory of education. Like a 
factory technician, the teacher-technician applied a specific procedure to the "raw 
material" of the educational process—the students—and then evaluated the success 
of the procedure by reading the "gauges" provided by Thorndike's measurement 
techniques.
According to Thorndike, the task of educational science was to "know the 
effect of everything than any teacher can do upon every person to whom anything 
can be done."*^ ® The task of the teacher was to produce and prevent change, to 
control behavior by preserving desirable qualities and getting rid of undesirable 
qualities. "The art of teaching," Thorndike wrote, "may be defined as the art of 
giving and withholding stimuli with the result of producing or preventing certain 
responses. He conceived of the teacher and her relation to administration as
'“ Quoted in Chambers, p. 101.
'^®Edward L. Thorndike and Arthur I. Gates, Elementary Principles o f 
Education, New York; Macmillan Company, 1930, p. 236.
'“ Joncich, pp. 60-61.
102
being "like that of the builder who is told to make the best house he can." Higher 
educational authorities decide what goals the schools will try to achieve, then it 
becomes "the special problem of the teacher to make these changes as 
economically and as surely as possible under the conditions of school life."''*
Again the teacher has little say in methods or goals; methods are formulated and 
tested by educational science taking place in the university while administrators set 
goals. The teacher’s task is to implement the methods and goals of others, to 
operate the machinery of education, as efficiently as possible. Thus, from 
Thorndike's theories, with their themes of measurement and control, emerges a 
concept of teacher as factory technician.
Later in the 20th century, amid yet another round of criticism of schools, a 
new behaviorist psychology emerged claiming empirical support and promising 
more effective and efficient technology of education in which teachers would 
function as programmers.^^ B.F. Skinner's restatement of Thorndike's "Law of 
Effect" as "operant conditioning" introduced a "technology of teaching" which 
significantly effected the methods if not the goals of education.'^® Like Hall and 
Thorndike, Skinner saw human beings as products of their environmental
'^*Ibid., pp. 56-59.
‘^ ®Power, p. 149; B.F. Skinner, The Technology o f Teaching, Englewood 
Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 94.
'^“Ibid., pp. 10, 61-61; Power, p. 150; Button and Provenzo, p. 292.
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conditions, shaped by the process of stimulus and response."' Understanding this 
fact was useful in achieving one of the central objectives of education-control. 
Skinner writes, "By arranging appropriate contingencies of reinforcement, specific 
forms of behavior can be set up and brought under control of specific classes of 
stimuli.""^ What was needed, he believed, was "an effective technology of teaching 
derived not from philosophical principles but from a realistic analysis of human 
behavior." Behavioral psychology, operant conditioning, and contingencies of 
reinforcement constituted such an effective technology of teaching "from which 
one can deduce programs, schemes and methods of instruction."'"
The application of Skinner's operant conditioning to teaching required that 
"terminal behaviors" be identified and broken down to isolate the small 
intermediate behaviors that are necessary to the achievement of the terminal 
behaviors. The act of teaching then becomes the "arrangement of contingencies of 
reinforcement under which behavior changes" and the role of the teacher as being 
"directly concerned with conditioning and extinguishing respondent behavior."'" 
Skinner maintained, however, that the teacher, "as a mere reinforcing mechanism,"
'^'Powers, p. 149. 
'"Skirmer, pp. 32-33. 
'"Ibid., pp. 84, 59. 
'"Ibid., pp. 113, 196.
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is "out of date.""^ This is why the teacher needed teaching machines; to take over 
those aspects of the "technology of teaching" which could be carried out more 
efiBciently by machines while she concentrated on other responsibilities. This 
technology of teaching in which both machines and human teachers played key 
roles was absolutely essential to the improvement of education. "Nothing short of 
an effective technology will solve the problem."*^®
In Skinner's theory of education we see the most explicit formulation of the 
concept teacher as technician. Teaching is in fact, in his view, a technology which 
can be carried out either by machines, or by teachers, or by both. The role of the 
teacher is to manipulate that technology—devised and refined by psychologists and 
engineers—in order to bring about learning. Here we have a concept of teacher as 
programmer, for, like the computer programmer, Skinner's teachers write 
programs—achieve terminal behaviors—by identifying and isolating each 
intermediate step required to carry out the desired behavior and reinforcing or 
extinguishing intermediate behaviors as necessary to achieve the desired terminal 
behavior. In this way the student—who has no more influence on the selection of 
terminal behaviors than the computer disk has on the programs written upon it—is 
programmed to behave in certain ways when presented with particular stimuli.
•"'Ibid., p. 22. 
‘"®Ibid., p. 258.
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The Conceptual Consequences o f the Teacher-Technician
The dictionary defines a technician as an individual who is "trained or 
skilled in the technicalities of . . .  the practical application of knowledge," a 
technology.'^’ The definition implies at least two parties in the act of application; a 
subject, the technician applying the knowledge, and an object, the person or thing 
to whom/which the knowledge is applied. The technology is what mediates 
between the subject and object, what the technician does to someone or 
something. The definition also implies purpose, which takes two related forms: the 
purpose of the technology and the purposes of the technician. The purpose of the 
technology is control of some aspect of the object to which it is applied; the 
purposes of the technician include that same control as well as some larger purpose 
which such control is needed to achieve. Two key elements, therefore, in the 
underlying conceptual geography of technician are control and a purpose defined 
by the subject—the technician—rather than his object. Applied to the concept of 
teacher as technician, this suggests that the underlying purpose of the concept is 
control in the interest of achieving ends determined by the teacher, or someone 
else in authority, but not by the student, the raw material of this factory model of 
education.
The conception and exercise of education as a technology of control
Random House Dictionary, cons. ed. (1980). s.v. "technician" and 
"technology."
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implies several basic philosophical assumptions regarding the relationship between 
teacher and student, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of reality. The 
concept of the teacher-technician assumes a subject-object relation between 
teacher and student. The teacher acts; the student is acted upon. The teacher 
determines ends or accepts the ends defined for the teacher by those in authority; 
the student passively allows himself or herself to be shaped to those ends. This 
control is justified by the further assumption that those determining the ends have 
access to objective knowledge about a concrete reality independent of the desires 
of any of the parties involved—society, teachers, or students—to which the parties 
must conform in order to survive. That reality is represented in the current 
experience of the parties involved. Therefore, the basic philosophical assumptions 
of the teacher-technician concept assume a functionalist philosophy of education 
in which the purpose of education is to shape students to the needs of existing 
society.
The technician can be distinguished from the artist, at least in part, by the 
fact that the artist creates something new while the technician applies what already 
exists, by the relative importance of poiësis, calling something into existence, and 
technë, method or technique."' The artist obviously must have mastery of some
"*My understanding and use of these terms, as well as application of them 
to teaching leans heavily upon Jim Garrison's discussion of these concepts in 
Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art o f Teaching, New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1997.
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technique, some technology, which mediates between that which already exists and 
the achievement of his or her creation of something new."^ The technician, 
however, has no room for poiësis, for something new, whether it comes in the 
form of the desire of his object (the student in our context) or in the form of some 
new order of reality because it undermines the fundamental purpose of the 
technician and technology; control. Though both are driven by desire, by eros, they 
desire different things. Thus the concept of teacher as technician can function only 
within a theory of education closed both to the desires of its students and to the 
creative possibilities of alternative theories of reality since both inevitably 
undermine the control which is the heart of the concept.
The desire for control is explicit in the educational theories which advance 
the concept of teacher as technician and education as technology. They tend to 
view the student as a passive, though complex, animal whose desires are either to 
be extinguished or re-directed toward ends which are not determined by the 
student. Ends are determined by those who claim authority on the basis of their 
objective knowledge of a reality which is independent of human desires. Therefore, 
this desire and these assumptions disqualify the concept teacher as technician as a
' ’^This obviously suggests another concept of teacher as artist, a concept 
which I have chosen not to address in this inquiry since I do not believe it to be as 
common in actual practice as the concepts addressed here. My purpose here is 
merely to clarify and then critique the consequences of the concept teacher- 
technician.
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concept teacher capable of negotiating and re-negotiating the relationship between 
religion and public education because if fails many of criteria, formulated in 
Chapter 1, which such a concept can be reasonably expected to meet.
Inadequacies o f the Teacher-Technician
While educational scholars continue to articulate a scientific basis for 
teaching, it seems clear that the conception of teacher as technician implicit to the 
notion of education as a science-based technology is an inadequate response to the 
challenge posed in Chapter I ; namely, to formulate a concept teacher for our 
multicultural, multi-religious society that acknowledges the importance of religious 
faith in people's lives, promotes social justice, and responds to the tragic dimension 
of human experience.'^ It simply falls short on many of the criteria which Chapter 
1 argued such a concept must meet. Though Spencer, Hall, Thorndike and others 
believed that science and "true religion" could be reconciled, their writing clearly 
rejected faith as most people experience it and contains concepts o f the person, 
society, reality, and knowledge which are often clearly hostile to those contained in 
many religiously-inspired interpretations of the world and experience."' This does 
not, of course, mean that one set of assumptions or the other is correct; it does
'^°See, for example, N.L. Gage, The Scientific Basis o f the Art o f 
Teaching, New York; Teachers College Press, 1978.
'■"For a much more complete elaboration of this argument see Nord, op.
cit..
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mean, however, that neither position is an adequate framework for a concept 
teacher which can negotiate both positions since, to some extent, they define 
themselves in opposition to one another.
There are strong essentialist tendencies, for instance, in the way the 
proponents of a science of education conceive of the p e rso n .T h e  individual 
human being is, essentially, a higher animal different, perhaps, in complexity and 
possibility but not in kind from the lower animals. Educational procedures rooted 
in this assumption, then, operate by manipulating those aspects of human behavior 
which we share with animals and utilize strategies of categorization which have 
been borrowed from science and which tend to naturalize racial and gender 
hierarchies. Thus they tend to objectify human "subjects" and contain possibly 
dehumanizing tendencies. Therefore, the concept of teacher as technician betrays 
a potentially devastating weakness in regard to the criterion which demands a love 
ethic, the affirmation of the transcendent worth and dignity of each human being. It 
is also ineffective in contributing to the ideal of school as a laboratory of 
democracy because it undermines the humanity of the individual and minimizes his 
or her participation as an agent in the educational process. Again, whether the 
conception of the person as a higher animal is correct or not, it has potentially
‘^ ^This may be a general tendency of the science of their times. For a 
discussion of this argument see Joyce Eastlund Gromko, "The Development of 
Scientific Thought as a Metaphor for Educational Practice," Educational Theory 
45, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 519-524.
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important ethical consequences and is anathema to religiously-inspired conceptions 
of man as created in the image of God. Therefore, it is inadequate to the task of 
negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion and public 
education.
The concepts of society and change implicit in the notion of education as a 
technology and the concept of teacher as technician contain a functionalist view of 
society as the natural product of evolutionary forces. This focus tends to be on 
explaining why things are as they are and fitting the student to the status quo 
rather than changing the social status quo. Where there is an interest in change, it 
tends toward the assumption that society should be brought more into line with 
scientific principles and aspire to a notion of efficiency borrowed from business 
and industry. The more scientific and business-like the schools become, this 
position suggests, the better they will be. In this respect the concept teacher as 
technician fails the criterion of moral-ethical idealism in that it is not oriented 
toward what ought to be but rather what is and thus truncates the potential for the 
moral growth of the individual.
Finally, the explicit epistemic and ontological assumptions of the advocates 
of a scientific basis for education and teaching are foundational; knowledge 
consists of facts about the world as it really is independent of knowers which are 
discovered and verified by scientific procedures. Anything outside this is opinion, 
"unmanly" supernatural myth, superstition, mere cultural conventions; it is not
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knowledge. Thus the concept teacher as technician fails the criteria of social 
authorization and non-"realist" ontology by positing absolutist notions of 
knowledge and reality which necessarily exclude competing or contradictory 
notions. Thus the concept is not only vulnerable to the indoctrination problem, it 
embraces it and calls it teaching.
Weber claimed that science has no response to the normative questions 
Tolstoy claimed were the only questions important to us; "What shall we do and 
how shall we live?"*"*^  However, the proponents of efficiency and education as a 
technology do have an answer: Follow the model of science and business. And 
Weber, who Schwehn (1993) argues has had the most influence on the conception 
of the academic vocation in higher education, suggests that sociology—the science 
of society-cannot address "meaningless" phenomena, that is phenomena "that 
cannot be related to action in the role of means or ends but constitute only the 
stimulus, the favoring or hindering circumstances. In this sense, human 
mortality is m eaningless.Y et death—the tragic—and Tolstoy's existential 
questions are precisely the fundamental concerns most central to us, concerns 
teachers cannot ignore without ignoring their students' humanity, concerns which
'""Weber, p. 290. 
'""Ibid., p. 231-232. 
'""Ibid., p. 237.
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religion traditionally addresses. The teacher-technician, implementing the 
procedures of education as a technology, is not equipped to address these concerns 
because they are scientifically "meaningless" phenomena; science simply does not 
address them. Thus the concept fails the criterion of meaningfulmss in that, even 
as it successfully explains natural phenomena, it fails to address the major 
existential questions and experiences which occupy and have occupied individual 
human beings subject to both natural and man-made tragedy.
Therefore, as useful and powerful a tool as the scientific approach to 
education is, and as effective as the concept teacher as technician may be in many 
vital aspects of teaching, they do not by themselves constitute an adequate 
framework for a concept teacher capable of negotiating and renegotiating the 
relationship between religion and public education in a multicultural society marred 
by social injustice, confronted by the tragic, and made meaningful, for so many of 
its citizens, by religious faith. We must, again, look elsewhere for such a concept. 
The Paradigm of the Teacher-Pragmatist 
Evolution o f the Teacher-Prasmatist
Though the concepts of teacher as prophet and as technician have had a 
long and profound influence on the ways American education has conceived of the 
role of teachers, their actual classroom influence pales in comparison to what is 
likely the most pervasive orientation of teachers toward their work, an "orientation
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toward practical action or thought" which I will call common seme pragmatism}*^ 
While this orientation does not represent a systematic philosophical point of view, 
it does represent a set of values which has long held a dominant place in American 
cultural history.*'*  ^It can be readily seen in the cultural icons of American literature 
and popular culture, which are replete with characters who eschew philosophical 
or ideological purity in favor of practical approaches to the down-to-earth tasks of 
carving a farm out of the wilderness, building a business, or creating a 
democracy.'^*
Applied to the concept teacher, common seme pragmatism names the 
tendency among teachers to forego the systematic philosophical and 
methodological approaches to education taught them in teacher training programs
^*^Random House Dictionary, cons. ed. (1980). s.v. "pragmatism."
intend to make a distinction here between what I am calling common 
sense pragmatism and the philosophy pragmatism as articulated by Charles 
Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. I will address this aspect of 
pragmatism in the following section.
’■**1 am referring here to figures like those found in the novels of James 
Fenimore Cooper and Mark Twain or the poetry of Walt Whitman. In asserting 
that there was and is a pervasive cultural value which eschews philosophical and 
ideological purity, I do not mean to suggest that American authors did not have 
clear philosophical or ideological orientations. I do mean to suggest, however, that 
their writing, which both reflected and shaped existing cultural values, popularized 
the ideal of the anti-intellectual, practical, rugged individual governed by good 
common sense. For an extended discussion of this element of American literature 
see Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, From Puritanism to Postmodernism: 
A History o f American Literature, New York. Viking, 1991.
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in favor o f "what works" in the "real world" of their classroom, school, or 
community. "What works," or success, is defined by the teacher’s ability to 
produce students who meet the expectations of the community he or she serves. 
Thus the concept of teacher as common sense pragmatist represents an adaptation 
of the teacher’s charge to educate students to the value systems which dominate 
the particular culture in which any individual teacher teaches. In this way teachers 
achieve "results" that are recognized and valued by their community.
This concept of teacher is problematic, however, where the surrounding 
culture is characterized by diverse or morally objectionable value systems. In such 
a context, the common sense pragmatist can either conform to the dominant value 
system and promote it at the expense of other value systems or avoid controversy 
by avoiding topics which represent points of conflict between value systems. Such 
has been the response of common sense pragmatists to the current conflict over 
the proper relationship between religion and public education; active or passive 
endorsement of the dominant religious values of the local culture or careful 
avoidance of any topic that touches upon religious values. Neither response meets 
the challenge of a concept of teacher capable of negotiating and renegotiating the 
relationship between religion and public education. The first represents 
acquiescence to the indoctrination problem while the second fails the criteria of 
moral-ethical idealism and meaningfulness which Chapter 1 argued were critical 
for a concept teacher capable of negotiating that relationship.
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Though perhaps not as influential at the level of classroom practice as 
common sense pragmatism, philosophical pragmatism has had a tremendous 
influence on educational thought through its "classical" articulation in Peirce, 
James, and Dewey, though the contemporary genres of neo-pragmatism and 
prophetic pragmatism are also relevant to education. Influenced, like the scientific 
movement in education, by Darwinian evolutionary theory and the rise of science, 
philosophical pragmatism arrived at quite different conclusions about the nature 
of man, knowledge, education, and the teacher.
Charles Sanders Peirce articulated no systematic theory of education or 
concept teacher}*'^  However, his contributions to philosophical pragmatism did 
have a profound effect on educational thought through John Dewey. According to 
Cornel West (1989), Peirce's contributions to pragmatism highlight "the centrality 
of contingent and révisable social practices in acquiring knowledge," thus 
undermining the pillars of "modem" Cartesian philosophy while simultaneously 
affirming and limiting the power of science and preserving space for religion."'*® 
Peirce applied the experimental methods of the natural sciences to philosophical 
problems via a pragmatic method that located meaning in the practical
‘^ ’Israel Schefifler, Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, 
James, Mead, and Dewey, New York: Humanities Press, 1974, pp. 76, 87.
'*°Comel West, The American Evasion o f Philosophy: A Genealogy o f 
Pragmatism, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, p. 45.
116
consequences of particular truth claims, thus introducing a sense of contingency to 
such claims.**’ This sense of the inevitable contingency of truth claims allowed 
Peirce to be critical both of "pseudo-scientific" proofs of religious tenets and 
dogmatic rejections of religious beliefs. He had the "highest disdain for the 
positivist followers of Compte and Spencer who tried to replace religious yearning 
by dubious sociological laws and a mechanical philosophy of evolution, 
respectively."**' However, he was also critical of theologians and others who drew 
doctrinal lines tighter and tighter until the "spark of religious experience" was 
extinguished.*** Peirce hoped for a union of traditional religious institutions with a 
"progressive purification and universalization" of the religious sentiment through 
science that would strive for an organic "wholeness of spirit," a goal in keeping 
with his notion of reasonableness as a resolution of dualisms, "the bringing 
together of items into an organic whole."**'* Thus the idea of the contingency and 
revisability of all truth claims enables Peirce to suggest a resolution to the 
religious-scientific dichotomy, a significant contribution to the development of a
***Ibid., pp. 44-46, 50.
**^ Philip P. Wiener, ed.. Values in a Universe o f Chance: Selected Writings 
o f Charles S. Peirce, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 345.
***Ibid., pp. 354, 356.
**^Scheffler, p. 91; Wiener, p. 332. In fact, Peirce argued for the existence 
of God on the basis of "sound pragmatism." Vincent G. Potter, Peirce's 
Philosophical Perspectives, New York: Fordham University Press, 1996, pp. 155, 
157.
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concept teacher capable of negotiating the relationship between religion and 
secular education.
William James too saw pragmatism as a mediator that worked toward the 
resolution of dualistic extremes, a way of "unifying science and religion, since the 
test of all truth is in experience, and the religious experience of the individual 
person is surely a phenomenon that needs to be acknowledged as a fact."'”  This 
mediating aspect of pragmatism is evident in his conception of truth, which he saw 
as a value-laden, contingent, transitory category of knowledge which bridges the 
old and the new, tradition and the novel, thus minimizing disruption and promoting 
gradual individual and social change.*”  He also conceived of teachers as 
mediators. Teaching, he contended, is an art, rather than a science, which grows 
out of the "inventiveness and sympathetic concrete observation" of teachers who 
are creative, inventive, intelligent, discerning intermediaries between the theories 
of science and the goals and practices of education.*”  Though James' emphasis on 
behavior in his psychology echoes some of the language of Thorndike and Skinner, 
he is much more careful in his estimation of the power of science to explain and
***Scheffler, p. 97; West, pp. 57, 64. For James' analysis of the psychology 
of religious experiences see William James, The Varieties o f Religions Experience, 
New York: Collier Books, 1961.
156'West, p. 65.
**’William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983, pp. 3, 15.
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control human behavior and learning."' He was, in fact, opposed to the necessities 
of mechanism in philosophy and psychology, recognizing that science cannot be 
absolutely helpful in education because education deals with thinking, responsive 
minds endowed with free will."® Thus James begins to make explicit a concept of 
teacher as pragmatist by applying to teachers Peirce's insights into the contingency 
and revisability of truth claims and the mediating role of pragmatism.
John Dewey’s thought represents the most explicit application of the 
Peircean and Jamesian themes of the contingency and revisability of truth claims, 
the application of scientific method to thought, and the resolution of religious- 
scientific dualisms to a theory of education and a concept teacher. He also 
highlights the socially and historically conditioned nature of philosophical 
reflection, thus undermining key assumptions of Enlightenment philosophy in his 
development of the anti-foundationalist, non-realist epistemological and 
ontological assumptions implicit in pragmatism.Every proposition regarding 
truth, he argues, is hypothetical and provisional, even those that have been verified 
so often by experience that we treat them as absolute truths, because we inevitably
"'Thorndike was a student of James' at Harvard. His doctoral research on 
the psychology and learning of chickens was carried out in the basement of James' 
home. See Joncich, p. 29.
"®SchefBer, pp. 97-98; James, Talks to Teachers, pp. 16, 24.
'“ West, American Evasion of Philosophy, pp. 69, 98-99, 111.
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bring theories dictated by human purposes to the inquiry.Knowledge, then, cut 
away from any foundation in absolute truth is socially constructed, consisting of 
"that which has been organized into our disposition so as to enable us to adapt the 
environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in 
which we live."*“  Truth and knowledge claims are justified by their consequences, 
by their efficacy in achieving desired ends: "Here we have the whole of pragmatism 
in embryo," Dewey wrote.
Dewey was critical of the absolutist tendencies of traditional religion; 
however, he was not willing to reduce the religious dimension of human 
experience to the materialist explanations implicit within science.'^ The choice, he 
argued, was not between "absolutism and subjective relativism, authority or 
anarchy.'”®* He advocated the reconception of religion along more naturalist lines
•®’John Dewey, "The Sources of a Science of Education," John Dewey: 
The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 5, 1929-1930, Jo Ann Boydston, ed., 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984, p. II.
'®^ John Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," John 
Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 2: 1925-1927, Jo Ann Boydston, 
ed., Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984, p. 12; John Dewey, 
Democracy and Education, New York: The Free Press, 1916, p. 344.
‘“ Dewey, Later Works, Volume 2, p. 16.
‘“ Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 27. See also Neil Goughian, Young John 
Dewey: An Essay in American Intellectual History, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975, pp. 1-53.
‘®*Steven C. Rockefeller, John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic 
Humanism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, pp. 545-46.
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as a way to free religious experience from the dogma of traditional religion and 
enable it to find new expression in the values of science and democracy, an 
expression of democratic humanism that would make central the concern of 
traditional religions with human suffering and evil but reject their reliance on 
supernatural solutions in favor of an emphasis on humanity's responsibility for its 
own advancement/^ His democratic ideal is, in effect, "a radical reconstruction of 
Christianity" and his philosophy of education is religious, as he defined that 
term/®^ Thus his philosophy of religion and education is in part an attempt to 
resolve the secular-religious duality.’®* As with Peirce, the intersubjectivist and 
historicist turn of pragmatism provided philosophical grounds to demythologize 
science and take religion seriously even as they attempted to update it.’®’
’®®Ibid., pp. 264, 547; Siebren Miedema, "The Beyond in the Midst; The 
Relevance of Dewey's Philosophy of Religion for Education," in Jim Garrison, ed.. 
The New Scholarship on Dewey, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, p. 
67.
’®’Rockefeller, p. 549. Dewey defined religious activity as "any activity 
pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of 
personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value." Common 
Faith, p. 27.
’®*Miedema, p. 69.
’®’Miedema, p. 61. See also Cornel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and 
Race in America, New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 107-142.
Dewey had a life-long interest in the philosophy of religion. See, for 
example, John Dewey, "The Obligation to the Knowledge of God, ""The Place of 
Religious Emotion,""Soul and Body,""Christianity and Democracy" and "The 
Relation of Philosophy to Theology," John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898. 
Also "Religious Education as Conditioned by Modem Psychology and Pedagogy,"
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Deweyan pragmatism emphasizes the conditions, possibilities, and 
necessity of ameliorative social change governed by critical intelligence, the 
application of the process of scientific method to thought, which for Dewey 
constituted the only authentic means of understanding the significance of human 
experience.'™ The object of Dewey's emphasis on critical intelligence—and thus his 
life-long preoccupation with education—is a "culture of democracy, of ways of life 
guided by experimental method, infiised with the love of individuality and 
community...rooted in the Emersonian theodicy" and focused, not on 
epistemology, but rather on the ethical ideal of ameliorative individual and social 
growth.
Given Dewey's views on the social production and verification of epistemic 
claims and his ethical ideal of positive individual and social growth, it is, perhaps, 
inevitable that he would make education the focus of much of his thought. He 
defined education as "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which
"Religion and Our Schools," "Early Group Life,""From Custom to Conscience," 
"Customary and Reflective Morality," "The Hebrew Moral Development," "Social 
Absolutism," and "Education as Religion," John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899- 
1924. And "Bishop Brown; A Fundamental Modernist," John Dewey: The Later 
Works, 1925-1953. See also Rockefeller, John Dewey: Religious Faith and 
Democratic Humanism.
' ’“Rockefeller, p. 563; Dewey, Experience and Education, pp. 86, 88 and 
Democracy and Education, p. 163.
^^ '^WesX, American Evasion, p. 103.
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adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course 
of subsequent experience."'^ To Dewey it was both science and art because it 
employs the "scientific" procedure of careful, systematic reflective thought to 
create, like the artist, "something that is not the exact duplicate of some previous 
creation."'^ Though he affirmed the idea of education as a science, he was careful 
to note that it did not become such by passively accepting the results of other 
scientific disciplines but rather by using scientific method to address educational 
questions raised in the context of educational experience in the pursuit of 
educational ends.'’“ Education is not subordinate to science but "an activity which 
includes science within itself."'’® Learning, Dewey contended, is a dynamic 
continuum of experience in which the learner is an active, creative participant; it 
cannot be reduced to a mechanical process without failing to know what education 
is as an "ongoing process."'’®
Dewey used a variety of analogies to describe the role and importance of
'’’Dewey, Later Works, Volume 5, p. 39; Democracy and Education, p.
76.
'’’Dewey, Later Works, Volume 5, p. 20; Early Works, Volume 5, p. 94 
and Later Works, Volume 9, p. 198 cited in Douglas J. Simpson and Michael J.B. 
Jackson, Educational Reform: A Deweyan Perspective, New York; Garland 
Publishing, 1997, p. 146.
'’^Dewey, Later Works, Volume 5, pp. 9, 15.
'"Ibid., p. 40.
'’®Ibid., p. 38; Simpson and Jackson, p. 127.
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teachers, including two that echo concepts of teacher discussed earlier in this 
chapter; teacher as prophet and engineer.’^  Dewey saw a prophetic role for the 
teacher in terms of social progress; however, he opposed the promotion of religion 
in education .A nd he saw a definite technical aspect to the teacher’s role, but it is 
not the mindless, machine-like application of a technology of education devised by 
science. It is, rather the use of science in the service of art in the manner of the 
engineer.D ew ey wrote:
Teachers should not be clerks filling out the recipes that are prescribed by 
others. They should not be like cooks in the kitchen, who take a cook-book 
and mix ingredients in the proportion called for by the recipe in the book, 
not knowing why they do this or that, or with any expectation that they are 
going to make any discoveries or improvement. . .if education is going 
to live up to its profession, it must be seen as a work of art which requires 
the same qualities of personal enthusiasm and imagination as are required 
by the musician, painter, or artist. Each one of these artists needs a 
technique which is more or less mechanical, but in the degree to which he 
loses his personal vision to become subordinate to the more formal rules of 
the technique he falls below the level and grade of the artist. He becomes 
reduced again to the level of the artisan who follows the blue prints, 
drawings, and plans that are made by other people.
Dewey's teacher-pragmatist is as an active, creative participant in a
'^Simpson and Jackson, pp. 129-148.
'’*Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882- 
1898, Volume 5, Jo Ann Boydston, ed., Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1972, p. 95; Experience and Education, pp. 17-18; Later Works, Volume 5, 
p. 5; Rockefeller, p. 262.
*^^ewey. Later Works, Volume 5, pp. 5-6, 20 and Volume 15, p. 180; 
Democracy and Education, p. 5.
**°Dewey, Later Works, Volume 15, p. 186.
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learning community who engages in research and reflective inquiry and 
participates in the governance of education. *** She is an intellectual leader of the 
social group—whether classroom, school, or community—who provides, organizes, 
orchestrates, and participates in experiences for her students which stimulate 
thinking and enable growth.’*^  And she fulfills this role not as a dictator or prophet 
or technician, but as a worker in a cooperative spirit of give and take and dialogue 
in the production of a higher standard of intelligence in the community.*”  In short, 
the teacher is a strategically placed, vital, transformative agent charged with 
organizing experience in such a way that enables not only individual growth, but 
which promotes a culture of creative democracy as well.*”
Though obscured to a degree by the dominance of positivism and analytic 
philosophy, pragmatism after Dewey was characterized in part by "a greater sense 
of the tragic, by the problem of the willful self in a context of limiting, fateful 
circumstance and an inability to any longer accept the notion that the world is
***Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 44; Democracy and Education, p. 
160; Later Works, Volume 5, pp. 23-24, 327; Later Works, Volume 15, p. 185.
*” Simpson and Jackson, p. 125; Dewey, Experience and Education, pp. 
38,76 and Democracy and Education, p. 160.
*” Dewey, Experience and Education, pp. 59, 72; Later Works, Volume 11, 
pp. 158-59.
*” Dewey, ibid., p. 161 mà Later Works, Volume 5, p. 7.
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somehow congenial to human. . aspiration."*** This tragic vision of pragmatists 
like W.E.B. DuBois and Reinhold Niebuhr stemmed from their disillusionment 
with middle class notions of perfection and progress in a context of endemic 
racism and other moral shortcomings.’*® The recent resurgence of neo-pragmatism 
among philosophers such as Richard Rorty has revived pragmatist notions of 
theory as a "basic unit of empirical significance" and "fitness" as the test of truth 
claims.’*’ Rorty, for instance, argues that the theory-laden character of observation 
precludes appeals to reality as a foundation for epistemic or ontological 
propositions. He takes, according to West (1989), the historicist directive; "to 
eschew the quest for certainty and the search for foundations."’** However, Rorty 
and many other neo-pragmatists have not returned to the classical pragmatists' 
interests in religion and education.
Cornel West, however, does make religion central to his philosophy, 
though he does not specifically address education or the concept teacher. West's
’**Miedema, p. 62; Gomel West, "The Politics of American 
Neopragmatism," Post-Analytic Philosophy, John Rajchman and Gomel West, 
eds.. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 259-272 and American 
Evasion o f Philosophy, pp. 112, 123, 159-60; Nel Noddings, Philosophy o f 
Education, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 41-57.
est, American Evasion o f Philosophy, 128, 148, 161-64. See also
W.E.B. DuBois, The Semis o f Black Folk, New York: Signet, 1903.
American Evasion of Philosophy, 183, 185, 191.
’**Ibid., pp. 197, 200.
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social and cultural analysis is informed by a radical historicism inspired by the 
pragmatic tradition but governed by religiously inspired moral and ethical norms. 
His historicism is rooted in Marx's and Dewey's claims that truth and knowledge 
are socially constructed and, therefore, historically conditioned.'*® As a result of 
this radically historicized view of truth and knowledge, the focus of philosophy, 
according to West, becomes ethical rather than epistemological since epistemic 
claims are grounded in the teleological assumptions of the community and its 
conceptions of what it means to be human.'”  Within these historicist and ethical 
parameters. West's thought essays a powerful critique of postmodemity and racism 
and re-envisions the pragmatic tradition through the twin lenses of progressive 
Marxism and Afro-American protestant Christianity as a mode of cultural critique 
that responds to the plight of the "wretched of the earth" in a late capitalist culture 
marred by racism, sexism, homophobia and economic exploitation.'®'
'*®Ibid., pp. 226-39; Gomel West, The Ethical Dimensions o f Marxist 
Thought, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1991, pp. 1-3.
'®°West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, pp. 66, 99-100.
'®'For West's genealogy of racism see Gomel West, Prophesy Deliverance! 
An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1982. Further analysis of race can be found in Prophetic Reflections: Notes on 
Race and Power in America, Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism, Volume 
Two, Monroe. Common Courage Press, 1993 and Race Matters, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1993. Some of West's analysis of postmodemity can be found in Prophetic 
Thought in Postmodern Times, Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism, 
Volume One, Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1993.
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West articulates his own location within the pragmatic tradition and his 
contribution to it by identifying several key weaknesses in that tradition. While 
pragmatism recognizes the relevance of culture to conceptions of truth, 
knowledge, and the possibility of democratic culture, it fails. West argues, to 
adequately appreciate the significance of political and economic forces. West 
particularly faults Dewey's lack of understanding of Marxism and Rorty's failure to 
follow through on the economic and political implications of this thought in this 
regard.*®^  With the exception of DuBois, he argues, the pragmatists fail to 
understand or adequately address the problem of racism and display a general 
distrust of the masses as historical agents.*®^  Most importantly. West argues, 
pragmatism lacks an adequate understanding of the tragic, "the irreducible 
predicament of unique individuals who undergo dread, despair, disillusionment 
disease and death and the institutional forms of oppression that dehumanize 
people."*®'* "I believe," West writes, "that a deep sense of evil and the tragic must 
infuse any meaning and value of democracy."*®*
West's understanding of his own project's contribution to the pragmatic 
tradition rests on these failures of pragmatism. It combines pragmatic philosophy
*®^ West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, pp. 106-111, 208.
*®*Ibid., pp. 178-181.
*®‘*Ibid., p. 228; West, Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times, p. 32. 
*®*West, Keeping Faith, pp. 107-18. Quotation is fi’om p. 114.
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with the analytical tools of progressive Marxism and the moral and ethical norms 
of the prophetic wing of the black protestant church in a mode of cultural criticism 
which West names prophetic pragmatism}^ Progressive Marxist theory— 
particularly Marx himself and Antonio Gramsci—provides the powerful analytical 
tools for understanding political and economic forces and the process of 
commodification in late capitalist society. Yet while West describes Marxist theory 
as indispensable, he also claims it is inadequate because of its failure to theorize 
culture as powerfully as it does the economic and political, thus West's rationale 
for combining pragmatism with Marxist theory: they complement each other.
The prophetic wing of the black protestant church makes two key 
contributions to West's prophetic pragmatism: first, a source of moral and ethical 
norms which provide a framework for analysis and lend direction to pragmatic 
experimentalism and second, a fully developed tragic sense which both preserves 
hope for a better future and requires struggle to realize that hope. The moral and 
ethical norms of protestant Christianity, according to West, are grounded in the 
notion that all individuals are created imago dei—m the image of God—and are, 
therefore, equal before God. The tragic sense, which West argues both pragmatism 
and Marxism lack, stems from what he calls the Christian dialectic of human
'^Ibid., p. 104; American Evasion o f Philosophy, pp. 211-13, 226-39.
Prophesy Deliverance!, pp. 135-37, 141-43 and Ethical 
Dimensions o f Marxist Thought, pp. xiv, xxvii, 87.
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nature; the recognition of the dignity and fallenness of human beings who are 
called upon to struggle toward an ethical ideal which, because of their fallenness, 
can never be attained within history.’®* This, according to West, is what Afro- 
American protestant Christianity has done for African-Americans. Combining the 
philosophical perspective of pragmatism with this prophetic orientation of Afro- 
American protestant Christianity creates a form of cultural criticism which 
"analyzes the causes of unnecessary forms of social misery, promotes moral 
outrage against them, and organizes different constituencies to alleviate them, yet 
does so with an openness to its own shortcomings."’®®
Unlike the classical pragmatists, whose faith In scientific methods was 
central to their thought. West's Christian faith is central to his. "I follow the biblical 
injunction to look at the world through the eyes of its victims," he writes, "and the 
Christocentric perspective which requires that one see the world through the lens 
of the Cross-and thereby see our relative victimizing and victimization.
However, he does not ignore the failures of the Christian church or valorize 
Christianity over other religious traditions.^”’ He explicitly acknowledges the
Prophesy Deliverance!, pp. 15-20.
’®®Ibid.
Keeping Faith, p. 133.
Prophetic Reflections, pp. 74-75, 137.
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potential of prophetic orientations in other religious traditions.^- In fact. West's 
philosophy of religion, emerging, as does Dewey's, from the philosophical 
breakthroughs of pragmatism-the "golden age" of philosophy of religion—shares 
certain important afBnities with Dewey's philosophy of religion: rejection of the 
foundational truth claims of religious absolutism and positivist science and an 
emphasis on social and individual struggle toward the realization of socially 
defined ideals, for instance. West differs from Dewey in his sympathy for 
traditional expressions of religiosity, his recognition of their historic importance as 
sources of resistance for oppressed communities, and his refusal of the impulse to 
attempt a resolution of the scientific-religious dichotomy. West recognizes that 
science and religion have different purposes.^”^
West's prophetic pragmatism is overtly Christian because it is the tradition 
in which he is grounded. Furthermore, West argues, "the culture of the wretched 
of the earth is deeply religious. While it is not necessary to be religious or 
accept religious narratives to work on their behalf, their religiosity must be 
respected.
“ ^West, Keeping Faith, pp. 132-34,
“ ^West, Prophetic Fragments: Illuminations o f the Crisis in American 
Religion and Culture, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988, pp. 260-70.
*^”West, Keeping Faith, p. 132.
°^’West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, p. 233.
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Since the Enlightenment most of the progressive energies among 
the intelligentsia have shunned religious channels. And in these 
days of global religious revivals, progressive forces are reaping 
the whirlwind. Those of us who remain in these religious channels 
see clearly just how myopic such an anti-religious strategy is. The 
severing of ties to churches, synagogues, temples and mosques by 
the left intelligentsia is tantamount to political suicide.
Conceptual Consequences o f the Teacher-Pragmatist
Paradoxically, pragmatism has been described as a peculiarly American
"evasion" of philosophy which has rejected the epistemology-centered conception
of philosophy characteristic of post-Enlightenment European philosophy. This
rejection of the epistemological focus of philosophers such as Descartes and Kant
is based on the recognition of the "theory-laden" character of all observations
which shapes the knower's perception of the universe, thus undermining dualistic
notions of the knower and the known and problematizing the search for epistemic
foundations. Because we cannot apprehend reality except through socially
constructed intermediary structures like our theories of the way reality operates or
language, "reality" cannot serve as the foundation or guarantee of epistemic
propositions.^®  ^Severed fi’om the possibility o f any firm foundation in the "really
real," knowledge becomes a function of historically conditioned social practices
"®"Ibid., p. 234.
°^’West, The American Evasion of Philosophy, pp. 99, 201.
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designed to achieve particular ends and truth becomes a species of the good.^°* 
Therefore, pragmatism tends to be driven more by ethical rather than epistemic or 
ontological questions, and philosophy is no longer seen as an ultimate tribunal for 
the adjudication of epistemic claims but is rather a form of cultural criticism.^”
Thus, without arguing that knowledge is subjectively "made up" 
independent of any reality separate from the knower, pragmatism dispenses with 
the rigid dualism of knower and known and postulates a theory of knowledge as a 
contingent product of a socially and historically conditioned dialogue among 
purposive human agents and objective reality.^ *® Ideally, this dialogue is governed 
by the method of scientific inquiry, a process whereby human agents bring theories 
to their inquiry which suggest courses of action which then can be evaluated in 
terms of their consequences/" The object of this process is not settled facts or 
truth but rather contingent truths which are useful for negotiating future 
experience and insuring growth.
Pragmatism postulates a knower who is actively engaged in the 
construction of knowledge, rather than passively receiving it through the senses,
^®*Ibid„ pp. 66, 99-100.
'°nbid.
" “Ibid., p. 503; West, p. 111.
"'J.J. Chambliss, Philosophy o f Education: An Encyclopedia, New York; 
Garland Publishing, s.v. "Pragmatism" by Sandra Rosenthal. See also John Dewey, 
How We Think, Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991.
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and whose mind and sense of self are a product of the individual's relationship to 
others in community, rather than solely the product of environmental stimuli and 
responses. He makes meaning rather than discovering it.-'^ Thus pragmatism 
rejects the implicit dualities of a foundational, spectator theory of knowledge and 
many of the assumptions that follow from it—behaviorism and the reduction of 
human experience to quantitative terms, for instance—as well as the teleological 
assumptions of many, particularly western, religions.^"
In/Adequacies o f the Teacher-Pragmatist
Of the three concepts teacher examined in this chapter—propAef. 
technician and pragmatist—\i would appear that the last, the teacher-pragmatist, 
holds the most promise for a concept teacher which is capable of doing justice to 
the place of religious faith in people's lives, responds in an ameliorative fashion to 
the tragic, and avoids indoctrination while respecting the cultural and religious 
differences of our diverse society. The philosophical contexts of the concepts 
teacher-prophet and teacher-technician both rest upon foundational 
epistemologies and a correspondence theory of truth: they both assume the 
existence of absolute truths independent of the knower, known procedures of 
objective access to those truths, the desirability of individual human beings coming
Chambliss, ibid.
^"Ibid., pp. 500, 503. See also Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 169 
and A Common Faith.
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into conformity with those truths, and education as a process of achieving that 
conformity. These assumptions, which pragmatism reveals as historically 
contingent social constructs, make individual human freedom contingent within the 
parameters established by these truths, thereby diminishing the existential freedom 
of the individual and the fullest potential of democratic culture.
The pragmatic tradition, on the other hand, eschews such foundational 
epistemology and correspondence theories of truth in favor of anti-foundationalist 
epistemology and a coherence theory of truth; it assumes that knowledge is a 
product of the theory and experience of human individuals in community and that 
the truth of such knowledge claims is validated by their consequences vis a vis the 
attainment of socially defined ends. It too assumes rigorous methods for 
constructing such truths, but it differs in its assumption of the radical contingency 
of those truths and the active role of theory in creating them. Education becomes, 
therefore, a process of learning to negotiate that contingency, of learning to 
participate in the determination of social ends and the means of achieving them via 
critical intelligence. Thus truth and knowledge are contingent upon human 
freedom. This expands the existential freedom of the human individual and extends 
the possibilities of democratic culture.
The concept teacher as pragmatist then appears to satisfy most of the 
criteria established in Chapter 1 for a concept teacher capable of negotiating and 
renegotiating the relationship between religion and public education. Its epistemic
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and ontological assumptions correspond to the criteria of social authorization and 
anti-”realist" ontology thus enabling pragmatism to avoid the indoctrination 
problem and meet the expectation established in Chapter I for any new concept 
teacher that it affirm diversity. Because pragmatism recognizes the historical and 
social contingency of epistemic and truth claims it is incapable of formulating the 
absolutist notions which indoctrination requires. And in recognizing such claims as 
social constructions, it places a premium upon the widest possible participation in 
the construction of them by scrutinizing not only their practical but their ethical 
consequences as well. Ethics, rather than epistemology, becomes the basis for 
adjudicating truth claims.^’* Therefore the concept of the teacher-pragmatist also 
meets the criterion which demanded moral-ethical idealism of any new concept 
teacher capable of negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion 
and education.
But what of the place of religious faith? Does it necessarily require the 
subordination of individual freedom implicit in foundational epistemic claims and 
the correspondence theory of truth? Is religious faith compatible with the 
existential freedom central to pragmatism? Among the classical pragmatists, all of
‘^^ West, American Evasion o f Philosophy., pp. 66, 99-100. Jim Garrison 
argues that Dewey's pragmatism is also prophetic because this evaluation of 
epistemic and truth claims on the basis o f their ethical consequences is a 
mechanism for critiquing the status quo and calling something better into 
existence. Garrison, Dewey and Eros, op. cit..
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whom were vitally concerned with religion, Dewey clearly thought faith and 
freedom were compatible. Their compatibility, however, required the sacrifice of 
traditional religion, the separation of the religious from religion and attaching it to 
the social practices and ideal ends defined by pragmatism. Thus Dewey resolves 
the religious-secular dualism, and education and democracy become fundamentally 
religious activities.^** While such a conclusion may well be philosophically 
attractive to those disillusioned with or mistrustful of traditional religion, it is 
unlikely to be attractive to those who find comfort and meaning in it. And while 
Dewey may be correct in his assertion that modem western civilization is and 
should be evolving toward such a common faith, there is little evidence that we 
have made much progress toward it in the half-century since he wrote A Common 
Faith.^^^
Classical pragmatism postulates as an ethical ideal a religious orientation 
toward scientific thought, education and democracy while rejecting traditional 
religion for its ethical shortcomings of moral and epistemic absolutism. However, 
according to West (1989) a major shortcoming of this traditional pragmatism is its
^**Garrison highlights this religious/spiritual quality of education and 
democracy in Dewey's work. See Garrison, Dewey and Eros, op. cit.
*^*See, for instance, Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching o f 
America, 1776-1990: Winners and Losers in our Religious Economy, New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press, 1990 or Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the 
United States, Washington, CQ Press, 1992 for accounts of the growth of 
organized religion.
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optimistic theodicy, its failure to put forth an adequate conception of the tragic 
which has long been a central component of the meaningfulness of traditional 
religious narratives in many people's lives."*’ Thus this traditional pragmatism falls 
short on the criterion of meaningfulness because it does not, according to West, 
offer an adequate conception of the tragic, the natural and man-made evils that 
beset individual human beings. It is also a less-than-ideal philosophical framework 
for a concept teacher capable of negotiating and renegotiating the relationship 
between religion and public education because its response to the religious- 
scientific dichotomy which underlies much of the tension in that relationship is to 
imbue scientific narrative and democracy with a religious sentiment and cast off the 
traditional religious narratives that have long given form to the religious sentiment, 
made tragedy meaningful, and served as a source of ethical ideals that can inspire 
individual behavior. The concept of teacher as traditional pragmatist does not 
provide a philosophical framework for negotiating the relationship between 
religion and education; it provides a framework for rejecting traditional religion as 
an epistemic and ethical failure inadequate for contemporary society.
The object of this inquiry, however, is not to develop a specific philosophy 
of religion which resolves religious-secular dualisms or settles religious-scientific 
debates but to develop a particular component of a philosophy of education—a
’*’West, American Evasion, pp. 226-27.
138
concept teacher—xhdX recognizes religious faith as an aspect of human experience 
with educational significance that should be included in public education rather 
than excluded fi'om it—as is the current practice—or suppressed in favor of a 
common faith. We are looking for a concept teacher which negotiates the 
relationship between faith and school. Within the pragmatic tradition. Cornel 
West's prophetic pragmatism seems to offer the most conducive philosophical 
framework for such a concept. While West himself says very little about education 
and nothing about the kind of teacher this inquiry is focused on, he does 
"highlight(s) the structural background conditions of [such] pedagogical efforts."^'* 
Unlike Dewey, he explicitly preserves a role for traditional religious expression 
even as he affirms a philosophical perspective on religion not unlike Dewey's. He 
does this by refusing the compulsion to resolve religious-secular, religious- 
scientific dualisms. '^® In addition, he sharpens and heightens Dewey's prophetic 
social criticism and ameliorative value orientation into a more radical and vigorous 
response to the tragic while eschewing—because of his pragmatic philosophy—the 
absolutism of the traditional prophets. Thus a Deweyan concept of the teacher- 
pragmatist, re-interpreted through the lens of Cornel West's prophetic 
pragmatism, appears to offer a useful response to the challenge this inquiry set out
^"West, Keeping Faith, p. 137. 
’^®West, Prophetic Fragments, p. 260.
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to address; a concept teacher that responds to the religious aspect of people's lives 
and the tragic with an orientation toward social justice and is sensitive to the range 
of values in our multicultural, multi-religious society; in short, a concept teacher 
which can negotiate and renegotiate the relationship between religion and public 
education.
Conclusion
In Chapter I of this inquiry I argued that a heightened social tension over 
the appropriate relationship between religion and public education is an important 
motivating factor behind much of the current dissatisfaction with public schools as 
well as the frequent calls for school choice, vouchers, public support for private 
schools and other educational reforms. I argued that such trends threaten the 
Deweyan ideal of the public school as a laboratory of democratic culture. 
Responding to John Dewey’s challenge to philosophers of education confronting 
such social conflicts to "indicate a plan of operations proceeding from a level 
deeper and more inclusive than is represented by the contending parties," I 
suggested that public education renegotiate the relationship between religion and 
schools by reconceiving the role teacher in a way that is more sensitive to the 
important place of religious faith in many people’s lives but which avoids the very 
real dangers of indoctrination and bias for our multicultural and multireligious
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society.^® Chapter I concluded with a list o f necessary and sufRcient—but not 
exhaustive—criteria for any such new concept of teacher.
In Chapter III have applied those criteria to several contemporary attempts 
to re-envision the relationship between religion and public education, noting their 
failure to address the concept teacher or to adequately confront the important 
challenges to such projects posed in Chapter I. Chapter H then applied these 
criteria to three paradigmatic concepts of teacher which have dominated much of 
educational thought in the U.S.: the teacher-prophet, the teacher-technician, and 
the teacher-pragmatist. Each concept was found wanting, to one degree or 
another, as an adequate philosophical framework for a concept teacher capable of 
negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion and public 
education in a democratic, multicultural, multireligious society still marred by 
social injustices.
One contemporary revision of the pragmatic tradition, however. Cornel 
West's prophetic pragmatism, seemed to offer a suitable philosophical framework 
for a new concept of teacher which might meet the challenges posed in Chapter I. 
In the remainder of this inquiry I will use West's philosophical framework to 
construct a conceptual portrait of the teacher as prophetic pragmatist and then 
evaluate that portrait against the criteria generated in Chapter I.
“ “Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 5.
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Chapter III 
Toward a More Inclusive Concept of Teacher:
Source, Approach and Ethics of the Embodied Critic
Chapter 1 of this inquiry offered a general survey of the current social 
debate over the proper relationship of religion and public education, noting in 
particular the threats posed by this highly polarized disagreement to the survival of 
common public education as a necessity for democracy. In that chapter I suggested 
that the philosophy of education take up John Dewey's challenge to construct an 
"intelligent theory of education" by ascertaining the "causes for the conflicts that 
exist and then, instead of taking one side or the other, to indicate a plan of 
operations proceeding from a level deeper and more inclusive than is represented 
by the practices of the contending parties. In accepting Dewey's challenge. 
Chapter 1 noted that there were some reasonable complaints regarding the place of 
religion in public education, once one sorted through the "secular-humanist" 
conspiracy theories and the assertions that "putting God back in our schools" 
would solve all our social problems, that an "intelligent" democratic system of 
education should address. It also addressed a number of important challenges to 
the proposition that the relationship between religion and education may need to
'John Dewey, Experience and Education, New York: Macmillan/Collier 
Books, 1938, p. 5.
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be renegotiated in order to preserve public education. Those objections were 
answered in Chapter I and then used to define criteria by which an attempt to 
formulate a concept teacher capable of negotiating and renegotiating the 
relationship between religion and public education may be evaluated.
Chapter II reviewed literature on the history of educational thought in 
order to identify previous "plans of operations" which have attempted to define the 
relationship between religion and education and the formulation of one specific 
educational concept—/eacAer—implicit in them. I then traced the evolution of three 
concepts of teacher~as prophet, as technician, and as /jragw7a//5/~which represent 
three key formulations of the role of the teacher vis a vis the relationship of 
religion and education in the history of American educational thought. On the basis 
of this analysis I suggested that these conceptions of the teacher did not represent 
a "more inclusive plan of operations" which could meet Dewey's challenge amid 
the conflicts that exist over religion and education because they fail one or more of 
the criteria formulated in Chapter 1.1 concluded by suggesting that Cornel West's 
prophetic pragmatism might provide a more useful philosophical framework for a 
new conception of the teacher-as prophetic pragmatist-vjhich. might better answer 
Dewey's challenge and thus suggest a new "plan of operations" for the teacher 
which might reduce—though not entirely resolve-some of our conflicts regarding 
the relationship between religion and public education in the U.S.
In this chapter, I will identify the source and methods I intend to employ in
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constructing a new concept teacher within the philosophical framework of 
prophetic pragmatism, a concept I will call the prophetic pragmatic teacher. In it I 
will explain and justify my selection o f a literary text as a source and my 
deployment of a hybrid literary-philosophical analysis as an approach to this 
educational inquiry.
Fiction as Source
If, as I have suggested above, the conceptions of the teacher as prophet, 
technician, and pragmatist do not offer a suitable conceptual framework for an 
understanding of the teacher which might resolve some of the tension between 
religious faith and public education, and if, as I point out in Chapter II, West's 
prophetic pragmatism has not yet been applied to concepts of teacher, it should 
prove most instructive, if not in fact necessary, to turn to a source outside the 
mainstream of the philosophical canon on education in order to more fully 
demonstrate the potential negative consequences of these existing notions of 
teacher and to construct an alternative concept of teacher as prophetic pragmatist. 
I propose, therefore, to study a relevant work of African-American fiction which 
will provide the "data" needed to carry out the purpose of this inquiry: to critique 
existent concepts of teacher and suggest a more useful alternative. My source for 
this crucial data will be Nobel-laureate Toni Morrison's Pulitzer Prize-winning
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novel Beloved}
My selection of this text rests on certain assumptions regarding the power 
and relevance of literature and takes place within a framework of decisions about 
what source to draw upon, the approaches to take, and the consequences of these 
choices. Deanne Bogdan (1992), in her analysis and defense of literature 
education, has named this framework, composed of the interrelation of problems 
of justification, censorship, and response, the metaproblem} Though Bogdan 
articulates the metaproblem in the context of literature education, her analytic 
framework is relevant to educational inquiry in general because it foregrounds the 
fact that, in any inquiry, a particular inquirer makes choices on the basis of his or 
her assumptions that have ethical, political, and epistemological consequences. In 
doing so, she eschews the "god trick. . .  the illusion that scientific or ethical 
objectivity is achieved through the totalizing vision of abstraction which refuses to 
locate itself anywhere and is thus able to remain unaccountable.'"* Thus the
^Toni Morrison, Beloved, New York; Plume, 1987.
^Deaime Bogdan, Re-Educating the Imagination: Toward a Poetics, 
Politics, and Pedagogy o f Literary Engagement, Portsmouth. Boynton/Cook, 
1992, p. xxiv.
^Bogdan, p. 218. Lorraine Code calls this malestream epistemology and 
claims it as a common characteristic of epistemology since the Enlightenment 
which has been used to disempower women and minorities. See Lorraine Code, 
What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction o f Knowledge, 
Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1991.
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limitation of the inquiry as an interested point of view rather than an objective, 
disembodied statement of unassailable facts is acknowledged and the danger of 
slipping into the "god trick" is thereby lessened/
Bogdan's defense of literature education challenges three prevailing 
premises regarding literary criticism which are relevant to the selection of source 
and approach for this inquiry. She challenges the assumption of the logical priority 
of criticism over direct response, the sharp distinction between the literary and the 
political, and the separation of ordinary and imaginative experience. She counters 
these assumptions with three premises of her own: that literary experience is a 
form of real experience, that "literary response is an embodied form of knowledge, 
in which the capacity for aesthetic experience is shaped by the reader's situation in 
the world," and that "the ethical import of literature education is associated with 
the transforming function of poetic power."® Bogdan's defense of literature as a 
form of real experience that has the power to teach for good or ill and thus 
transform reality is an assumption that underlies my selection of a literary text as a 
source for this inquiry. And her recognition that the subjectivity of the reader— 
what she calls the "feeling, power, and location problems"—means that criticism is
®Bogdan, p. 218. Bogdan describes the "god trick" as "the illusion that 
scientific or ethical objectivity is achieved through the totalizing vision of 
abstraction which refuses to locate itself anywhere and is thus able to remain 
unaccountable."
®Bogdan, p. xxxiii.
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inevitably embodied and demands that I acknowledge the embodied—and, 
therefore, limited and partial—nature of my analysis of Beloved as well as the 
concepts of teacher addressed in Chapter n. The selection of source and approach 
must, therefore, be accountable both to the metaproblem and the feeling, power, 
and location problems of the reader.
The Justification Problem
I justify my selection of a work of fiction as a primary source for this 
inquiry for the reasons outlined above—the apparent inadequacy of existing 
conceptual fi-ameworks and the neglect of West's prophetic pragmatism in 
educational discourse—and the premises Bogdan articulates regarding the 
relevance of literary experience and the power of literature to transform reality. 
Furthermore, much of the traditional canon of educational discourse either ignores 
or is tainted by the racism and sexism which prophetic pragmatism aims to resist as 
well as by the widely-held assumption that religious faith has no legitimate formal 
place in public education.’ In the creation of a work of literary art which portrays
’For discussion of the racism in culture and education see, for instance, 
Cameron McCarthy and Warren Crichlow, Race, Identity and Representation in 
Education, New York: Routledge, 1993; Christine Sleeter, ed.. Empowerment 
Through Multicultural Education, Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1991; Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1979 or Franz 
Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1967. For 
analysis of the sexism of traditional educational, cultural, and philosophical 
discourses see, for instance, Jane Roland Martin, Changing the Educational 
Lxmdscape: Philosophy, Women and Curriculum, New York: Routledge, 1994; 
Lorraine Code, What Can She Know? op. cit. or Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas,
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educational figures and which educates in itself, the author is often engaged in the 
realistic reproduction of actually existing teachers or, more significantly, in the 
creative re-imagining of what it might mean to be an ideal or a terrible teacher. 
Thus, the author’s characterization of teaching figures may be read as a thought 
experiment which articulates what the teacher ought and ought not to be.* Though, 
perhaps, not a traditional or common approach to educational inquiry, the use of 
literary sources is nevertheless well established in the philosophy of education: 
Maxine Greene (1978) has been a pioneer of this approach used by philosophers of 
education such as Jane Roland Martin (1985) and Susan Laird (1988). And Laird 
has established a precedent for hybrid literary-philosophical methods in educational 
inquiry.’
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1938. For discussions about 
the relationship between religion and education see, for instance, Warren A. Nord, 
Religion and American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma, Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995; Stephen L. Carter, Culture o f Disbelief: 
How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, New York: 
Doubleday, 1993 or Nel Noddings, Educating fo r Intelligent Belief or Unbelief, 
New York: Teachers College Press, 1993.
*I base my understanding of "thought experiment" on Jane Roland Martin's 
use of the technique in her book. The Schoolhome: Rethinking Schools fo r  
Changing Families, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
’See Maxine Greene, Landscapes o f Learning, New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1978, pp. 22-41; Jane Roland Martin's analysis of Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman's //er/ow</in Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal o f 
the Educated Woman, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985; and Susan 
Laird's analysis of Louisa May Alcott's Little Women and Ntozake Shange's Betsey 
Brawn in Susan Laird, Maternal Teaching and Maternal Teachings: Philosophic
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To the extent that the work of fiction creates a world which its readers 
accept as, in some sense "real," it renders a portrait of a teacher formed fi'om the 
collective desires and fears of ordinary people which the a priori or a posteriori 
ontological, epistemic, and axiological assumptions of various traditional schools 
of educational philosophy often ignore. As feminist philosopher of education Jane 
Roland Martin (1985) has written, "the general expectation that any educational 
theory worth recording is readily accessible in books or academic journals becomes 
unreasonable when the objects or subjects of educational thought are considered 
marginal. Thus... we will have to look to sources of data that the history of 
educational thought regards as far from standard; to personal letters, diaries, 
pamphlets, pieces of fiction, and to oral sources as well."*® Fiction has long been a 
mode of expressing educational ideas and should, therefore, be a legitimate source 
for philosophical inquiry on education." Moreover, the use of literary sources is
and Literary Case Studies o f Educating, Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1988 and 
her "The Ideal of the Educated Teacher: "Reclaiming a Conversation" with Louisa 
May Alcott," Curriculum Inquiry 21, no. 3 (1991).
'"Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation, p. 180.
"Examples of fiction as a mode of philosophical reflection on education 
include such classics of educational thought as Plato"s, The Republic, Allan Bloom, 
trans.. New York: Basic Books, 1968 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau"s Emile, Allan 
Bloom, trans.. New York: Basic Books, 1979. Novels have also been used to 
promulgate educational ideals or have explicitly featured education. Examples 
include Louisa May Alcott, Little Women, New York: Penguin, 1989 (1868) and 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Herland, New York: Pantheon, 1979 (1915). Even 
fiction which is not explicitly focused on education, for instance, Ntozake Shange,
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consistent with pragmatism's assertion of the social and historical contingency of 
knowledge claims: both fiction and knowledge are constructed.
The Censorship Problem
Though, as Bogdan reminds us, the selection of one particular literary 
tradition or work of literature over others constitutes an inevitable act of 
censorship, the fiction of an Afncan-American woman is particularly relevant to 
this inquiry and thus justifies that act of censorship. Largely ignored in the literary 
canon until recently, the fiction of Afncan-American women confronts the twin 
scourges of racism and sexism while exploring the possibilities and peculiarities of 
a sense of historical community.According to Henderson (1990), it is 
characterized by a black female subjectivity which speaks dialogically "from a
Betsey BroH’n, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985 has proven a productive source 
for inquiry. See Susan Laird's "The Concept of Teaching: Betsey Brown vs. 
Philosophy of Education," Philosophy o f Education 1988, Urbana. Philosophy of 
Education Society, 1988. Laird has, in fact, been a pioneer in the use of fiction as a 
source for contemporary educational reflection. See, in addition to those works 
cited above, Susan Laird, "The Ideal of the Educated Teacher," op. cit., and 
"Teaching in a Different Sense: Alcott's Marmee," Philosophy o f Education 1993, 
Urbana: Philosophy of Education Society, 1993. Finally, the relevance of fiction as 
a source for the philosophical reflection on education is reflected in the 1996 
presidential essay of the Philosophy of Education Society, Betty A. Sichel's 
"Beyond Moral Stories" and in Michael S. Katz's response, "Moral Stories: How 
Much Can We Learn from Them and Is It Enough?" Philosophy o f Education 
1996, Urbana: Philosophy of Education Society, 1996.
'4lenry Louis Gates, Jr., "Introduction" and Mae Gwendolyn Henderson, 
"Speaking in Tongues: Dialogics, Dialectics, and the Black Woman Writer's 
Literary Tradition" in Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed., Reading Black, Reading 
Feminist: A Critical Anthology, New York: Meridian Press, 1990, pp. 7, 137.
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multiple and complex social, historical and cultural positionality" with the Other 
across and within racial and gender lines; "Black women writers enter into 
testimonial discourse with black men as blacks, with white women as women, and 
with black women as black women. At the same time, they enter into competitive 
discourse with black men as black women, with white women as blacks, and with 
white men as black women. If black women speak a discourse of racial and gender 
difference in the dominant or hegemonic discursive order, they speak a discourse 
of racial and gender identity in the subdominant discursive order." She names this 
simultaneity of discourses speaking in tongues. Thus African-American women's 
fiction decodes and resists both racism and sexism, giving it a potentially crucial 
insight into any reconception of teacher which seeks to avoid the racism and 
sexism of traditional educational discourse.
Other scholars have also noted the prevalence of religious language, 
themes, and structures in Afncan-American women’s fiction.''* In this vein, and in
'"Ibid., pp. 118-22.
'"‘See, for instance, Dolin Hubbard, The Sermon and the African-American 
Literary Imagination, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1994; Carla F.C. 
Holloway and Stephanie A. Demetrakopoulis, New Dimensions o f Spirituality: A 
Biracial and Bicultural Reading o f the Novels o f Toni Morrison, New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1987; Ann Josephine Adams, Sisters o f the Light: The 
Importance o f Spirituality in the Afra-American Novel, Ph.D. diss., Indiana 
University, 1989; Loretta Ann McGrann, Toni Morrison and the American 
Sermonic Tradition, Ph.D. diss.. State University of New York at Stony Brook, 
1989; Heather Joy Mayne, Biblical Paradigms in Four Twentieth Century 
African-American Novels, Ph D. diss., Stanford University, 1991; and Peter Kerry
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keeping with her analysis of the powerful insight of Afncan-American women's 
fiction, Henderson (1990), for instance, writes "I propose...an enabling critical 
fiction—that it is black women writers who are the modern-day apostles, 
empowered by experience to speak as poets and prophets in many tongues. With 
this critical gesture...! intend to signify a deliberate intervention by black women 
writers into the canonic tradition of sacred/literary texts."'* And, one might add, 
educational texts, as Laird (1988) has demonstrated.'* Resisting both racism and 
sexism in its exploration of historical community via discourse suffused with the 
language of religious faith, African-American women's fiction constitutes a rich 
resource of material for this inquiry as it attempts to redefine the concept teacher 
in a way that takes religious faith seriously while eschewing racially, sexually, or 
religiously hegemonic discourses. For, as Henderson further states, "the objective 
of these writers is not... to move from margin to center, but to remain on the 
borders of discourse, speaking from the vantage point of insider/outsider... To 
maintain this insider/outsider position, or perhaps what Myra Jehlen calls the 
"extra-terrestrial fulcrum" that Archimedes never acquired, is to see the other, but 
also to see what the other cannot see, and to use this insight to enrich both our
Powers, Principalities and Powers: Religion and Resistance in Contemporary 
Ethnic Women's Literature, Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1991.
'^Henderson, "Speaking in Tongues," p. 124.
'*Laird, Maternal Teaching and "The Concept of Teaching," op. cit.
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own and the other’s understanding."’’
I have selected a work of fiction by Toni Morrison as the primary source 
for this inquiry because of her significance as a writer; Cornel West has described 
her as the only great literary intellectual produced by black America, and Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr. has described her as perhaps "the most formally sophisticated 
novelist in the history of Afncan-American literature."’* In addition, her work 
exhibits the characteristics of Afncan-American women's fiction discussed above, 
characteristics relevant to the aims of this inquiry. Numerous scholars have noted 
the significance of religious language, names, and themes in her work as well as 
her deployment of the traditions and structures of Afiican-American sermons.’® 
Morrison herself has described the Afiican-American folklore which much of her 
work draws upon as a point of departure for history and prophecy, she has also 
compared the function of her writing to the preacher's and described it as being in 
the "tragic mode."’® Thus, Morrison's art exhibits one of the key characteristics of
’’Ibid., p. 137.
’*Comel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America, New 
York: Routledge, 1993, p. 73; Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and K.A. Appiah, eds., Toni 
Morrison: Critical Perspectives Past and Present, New York: Amistad, 1993, p. 
be.
’®See, for instance, Jan Furman, Toni Morrison's Fiction, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1996; Gates and Appiah, op. cit.; Powers, op. 
cit.; Mayne, op. cit.; Adams, op. cit.; Hubbard, op. cit.; and McGrann, op. cit..
®^In Gates and Appiah, pp. 372-375.
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Cornel West's prophetic pragmatism: roots in the prophetic tradition of Afro- 
American Christianity.*'
In addition, Morrison's fiction displays a philosophical affinity with the 
pragmatist and neo-pragmatist traditions. Her novels are radically historical, both 
in the sense of being set in various periods of Afncan-American history and in the 
sense of recovering and revising the past in order to enhance the possibilities of 
survival in a tragic present and helping to imaginatively shape a more hopeful 
future.^ They suggest a rejection of the modes of ordering and classification of the 
western philosophical tradition.^ Morrison's fiction "makes clear the futility of 
trying to find absolutes in such a distorted and complex world" and "reveals the 
limits of hegemonic, authoritarian systems of knowledge. And in interviews 
Morrison has alluded to alternative ways of knowing in the Afiican-American 
community and a distrust of scientific data to explain "hopelessly unscientific 
things" as a part of her childhood experience.^ Thus Morrison's fiction suggests a
^'West, Keeping Faith, p. 139.
^Susan Willis, "Eruptions of Funk: Historicizing Toni Morrison," in Gates 
and Appiah, pp. 309-12.
“ Linden Peach, Toni Morrison, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp.
93-111.
“ Trudier Harris, "Escaping Slavery but not Its Images" in Gates and 
Appiah, p. 339.
“ In Gates and Appiah, pp. 414-15.
154
strong aflBnity with the radically historicist orientation and rejection of epistemic 
foundationalism and correspondence theories of truth which characterize 
pragmatism.
Though Morrison's work is not in any way explicitly Marxist, it 
nevertheless deploys a sustained critical mistrust of capitalism and its complicity in 
the oppression and reification of Afiican-Americans and poor whites.^ Racism and 
slavery—the institutions which have inscribed her characters and which they resist 
in their struggle for identity and community—are, after all, socially constructed 
discourses designed largely to monopolize political and economic power. And 
Morrison has remarked upon how the definition of success in a "totally capitalist" 
society as the acquisition of things can lead to the loss of "spiritual things. This 
economic subtext is clear in the characters of Guitar, Hagar and Macon Dead in 
Song o f Solomon (1977) and Jadine, Margaret and Valerian Street in Tar Baby 
(1982). Therefore, in addition to the prophetic traditions of Afro-American 
Christianity and the philosophical assumptions of pragmatism, Morrison's fiction 
also exhibits the third of West's three key components of prophetic pragmatism; 
social and economic insights very similar to those offered by progressive Marxism.
“WUUs, p. 317; Harris, p. 330.
’^In Gates and Appiah, p. 417.
^*Toni Morrison, Song o f Solomon, New York: Signet, 1977 and Tar 
Baby, New York: Plume, 1982.
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Finally, while Morrison's fiction exhibits concerns that suggest a degree of 
affinity between her work and prophetic pragmatism, it exhibits far more material 
on the central concern of this inquiry—teaching—than is displayed in Cornel West's 
thought. While some scholars have noted the presence of educational figures and 
motifs in her work, they have tended to interpret them as representatives of 
"stereotypical repositories of how American society perceives its teachers" or as 
expressions of social ritual and culture or to focus on higher education.^® The 
possibility that these figures may represent an educational subtext in Morrison's 
work which mounts a powerful critique of certain traditional concepts of teacher 
and which provides useful insight into an alternative concept of teacher consistent 
with Cornel West's prophetic pragmatism has not yet been addressed.
Though Morrison is not a pedagogical writer in the sense that her art is 
directly concerned with education or has an explicit pedagogical intent, her 
background, as well as the testimony of her work, suggests that she is indeed a 
potential source of real insight into issues of educational significance. Morrison 
wrote her master's thesis, for instance, on William Faulkner and Virginia Woolf,
^See, for instance, John Howard Hedeman, Images o f Higher Education 
in Novels o f the I980's, Ph.D. diss.. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; 
Joan F. Peterson, The Portrayal o f the Schoolteacher in American Literature 
Based Upon Colonial Types: 1794-1987, Ph.D. diss.. University of San Francisco; 
Linda Krumholz, "Dead Teachers: Rituals of Manhood and Rituals of Reading in 
Song o f Solomon, " Modem Fiction Studies 39(1993): 551-574; Cynthia Dubin 
Edelberg, "Morrison's Voices: Formal Education, the Work Ethic, and the Bible," 
American Literature 58 (May 1986): 217-237.
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one of the most often cited figures by feminist philosophers of education, and 
served as a college-level teacher for seven years at Texas Southern University and 
Howard University before publishing her first novel/" She has also been an 
important mentor of young black writers as a senior editor at Random House and 
has continued to teach, first at State University of New York-Albany and later at 
Princeton University/* In interviews, Morrison has reflected on her own teaching, 
suggesting, perhaps, a professional if not theoretical concern with teaching, and 
she has served on such educational bodies as the New York State Education 
Department's Committee on Adult Literacy/^ She has also contributed to an article 
in an educational journal on the structures of privilege and oppression in schools 
serving Latino and Afiican-American communities/^
While her background and experience as a teacher do not make Toni 
Morrison an explicitly educational thinker, they do offer support for the assertion- 
made largely on the evidence of her novels—that she is a public intellectual whose 
powerful insight into human experience has something of significance to offer to
^"Furman, pp. 1-4. On Virginia Woolfs significance to the philosophy of 
education see Martin, The Schoolhome and Susan Laird, "Rethinking 
'Coeducation,'" Studies in Philosophy and Education.
^*Gates and Appiah, p. ix.
"Ibid., pp. 390, 412.
^^William Ayers, "Can City Schools be Saved?" Educational Leadership 
51, no. 8 (May 1994): 60-63.
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education. Her insight into this topic is clearly displayed in an educational subtext 
which runs throughout her novels. The Bluest Eye (1970), for instance, explores 
the effects of white normative aesthetic values as manifested in elementary school 
readers, teacher values, and popular culture on the self-image of a young black girl 
and black female teachers. In this novel and Sula (1973), Song o f Solomon (1977), 
and Tar Baby (1982) Morrison creates characters whose aspirations for 
acceptance or success are pursued through a university education dominated by 
white, European cultural values. Their failures and perversions constitute a 
powerful critique of Eurocentric education and W.E.B. DuBois' parable of the 
"talented tenth. In Beloved (1987) Morrison specifically critiques a concept of 
teacher named to "reflect the scholarly way in which racism was pursued in 
theology and biology in the Darwinian theory of evolution," a concept clearly 
rooted in the epistemological assumptions Lorraine Code (1991) has named 
"malestream" and which I, in Chapter H, associated with the concept of teacher as 
techn ician .Throughout her novels—including Jazz (1992) and Paradise (1998), 
her two most recent works—we see the marginality of formal education in the lives
‘^‘Toni Morrison, The Bluest Eye, New York: Plume, 1994 (1970) and 
Sula, New York: Plume, 1982 (1973); W.E.B. DuBois, "The Talented Tenth," in 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Cornel West, The Future o f the Race, New York: 
Vintage Books, 1996, pp. 133-158.
^*Toni Morrison, Beloved, New York: Plume, 1987. Morrison quoted in 
Furman, p. 70. For Code's account of "malestream" epistemology see Lorraine 
Code, What Can She Know? op. cit..
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of A&ican-Americans and the central significance of strong black women who 
teach a sense of identity, community, and resistance to evil in the mode of cultural 
criticism West has named prophetic pragmatism.^®
The Response Problem
As Bogdan points out, literary response—and thus literary criticism—is an 
embodied form of knowledge "in which the capacity for aesthetic experience is 
shaped by the reader's situation in the world. Thus this inquiry will be shaped by 
the subjectivity of its author and therefore complicated and, I hope, enriched by the 
fact that it crosses race and gender lines along a path which parallels, in some 
respects, the racist and sexist discourses which have historically been deployed to 
silence and speak for women and peoples of color. As a white, southern male of 
mixed—Anglo-Puerto Rican—ethnicity, my inquiry into the thought of an African- 
American philosopher of religion—Cornel West—and an African-American woman 
novelist—Toni Morrison—runs the risk of repeating the injustices and distortions
^®Toni Morrison, Jazz, New York: Plume, 1992 and Paradise, New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1998. Jazz was the subject of a symposium at the 1997 annual 
meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, an indication, perhaps, of some 
degree of relevance of Morrison's fiction to educational thought.
37Bogdan, p. xxxiii.
^*See Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, New York: Orion 
Press, 1965; Edward Said, Orientalism, op. cit.; Carol Gilligan, In a Different 
Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982; Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: Selected 
Prose, 1966-1978, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979; Franz Fanon, op. cit..
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perpetuated in the past and present by white, Euro-American men writing about 
women and peoples of color, particularly Afiican-Americans. I can claim certain 
common experiences with West—roots in a prophetic Baptist church—and 
Morrison—college English/writing instructor—and some affinity with both their 
experience and interest in Oklahoma/^ However, these experiences are relatively 
superficial in comparison to the gulfs of race and gender which have divided 
American society for so long. There are undoubtedly nuances and themes in their 
thought and aspects of their experience as Afiican-Americans and as a woman to 
which I may not have access given differences of race and gender. I will, therefore, 
make no claims about Afncan-American or Afncan-American women's culture but 
rather attempt to understand the relevant claims they and other Afncan-American 
critics make about themselves and their culture and to apply these insights to the 
way we conceive of the role of teacher. In this way I hope to avoid as many of the 
pitfalls of previous inquiry across race and gender lines as possible and enrich our 
mutual understanding of the possibilities for education in a diverse society.
I undertake such a politically and ethically delicate inquiry on Cornel West's 
(1989) invitation to "all people of goodwill. . .to fight for an Emersonian culture of 
creative democracy in which the plight of the wretched of the earth is alleviated" 
and on Morrison's assurance that one of the characteristics of "black" literature
^^West was bom in Tulsa, Oklahoma and Morrison's novel Paradise is set 
in rural Oklahoma.
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(not necessarily that written by or about Blacks) is its openness to the participation 
of the reader: "I just hold your hand while you're in the process of going there and 
hearing it and sharing it.'"*” It responds to Kal Alston's (1995) challenge to 
philosophers of education to "see the connection of your struggle to the success of 
mine" and to "broaden...logical strategies beyond pure linguistic argumentation...to 
include other forms of intellectual engagement... and submit to the scrutiny of 
prophetic, embodied, pragmatic practice..." and takes seriously Mae Gwendolyn 
Henderson's (1990) assertion that "the objective of these [black women] writers 
is...to see the other, but also to see what the other cannot see, and to use this 
insight to enrich our own and the other's understanding.""" Thus, my approach to 
this inquiry is premised on an invitation, extended in the Emersonian tradition of 
intellectual inquiry, to participate, in a spirit of responsibility and humility, in a 
philosophical discourse with Afncan-American intellectuals in order to promote 
positive social change."*^
“^Cornel West, The American Evasion o f Philosophy: A Genealogy o f 
Pragmatism, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, p. 235; Morrison in 
Gates and Appiah, p. 418.
■"Kal Alston, "Race Consciousness and the Philosophy of Education," 
Philosophy o f Education 1995, Urbana: Philosophy of Education Society, 1995; 
Henderson, "Speaking in Tongues" in Gates, p. 137.
■‘^ West describes Emerson's approach to intellectual inquiry as being 
characterized by personality, provocation, and power. In other words, it highlights 
the creative power of individuals inspired by or reacting to the past to formulate 
new ideas, new "orders of conceptions" rather than simply perpetuating already
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The Source; Beloved
Beloved is a novel which explores the tensions between memory and 
survival where the past is so full of pain that it is never really past, where the tragic 
exists outside of time, visiting evil upon the past lives of women and men and 
threatening their present wherever and whenever memory slips through carefully 
guarded mental doors. It explores this tension in the experience of slaves who, 
brutalized by their captivity and exploitation, escape slavery to a physical freedom 
circumscribed and threatened not only by continuing white racism but by the 
overwhelmingly painful memories of their past. Rooted in the actual experience of 
individual human beings,^  ^the novel concretizes the enormity of the evil suffered 
by the "sixty million and more" African slaves and former slaves to whom the 
novel is dedicated and raises profound questions about who survives and how.^ 
Told from the shifting perspectives of a variety of sometimes contradictory, 
sometimes overlapping narrative voices. Beloved speaks in tongues.**^  It is
existing ideas. For a more complete discussion of this aspect of Emerson's thought 
see West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, pp. 9-41.
Morrison has based her character Sethe on the actual case of a former 
slave, Margaret Gamer, who killed her children rather than allow them to be 
returned to slavery. Jan Furman, Toni Morrison's Fiction, Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1996, p. 68.
** "I'm interested," Morrison says, "in survival-who survives and who does 
not, and why-and I would like to chart a course that suggests where the dangers 
are and where safety might be." Gates and Appiah, p. 402.
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grounded, however, in the experience of Sethe, a former slave who grew up on a 
plantation called "Sweet Home" under a master whose relative benevolence masks 
the vulnerability and oppression of the human beings he owns. When he dies, he is 
replaced by Schoolteacher, a cold and sadistic overseer whose brutal treatment of 
Sethe and the other slaves drives them to attempt a dangerous escape across the 
Ohio River to join Sethe's mother-in-law. Baby Suggs, who had been bought out 
of slavery through the extra labor of her son Halle. Only Sethe and her four 
children—the youngest of whom is bom on the banks of the Ohio—reach Baby 
Suggs' home on the outskirts of Cincinnati.
For twenty-eight days Sethe and her children enjoy the life of the local 
community of free blacks. That life is shattered, however, when Schoolteacher and 
his slave catchers arrive to return Sethe and her children back to Sweet Home. The 
sight of Schoolteacher, and the prospect of her children's return to slavery, 
prompts Sethe to flee with her children to a small shed where she attempts to kill 
her children rather than permit their enslavement. Stunned by her action and
I mean this in the literal sense of describing the variety of voices which 
speak in the novel and in the sense of Mae Gwendolyn Henderson's 
characterization of black women's fiction as being characterized by a black female 
subjectivity which speaks dialogically "from a multiple and complex social, 
historical, and cultural positionality" with the Other across racial and gender lines. 
Mae Gwendolyn Henderson, "Speaking in Tongues: Dialogics, dialectics, and the 
Black Woman's Literary Tradition," in Gates, Reading Black, Reading Feminist, 
pp. 116-144.
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believing all the children dead. Schoolteacher returns to Sweet Home, leaving 
Sethe to a brief prison term for the murder of the one child—a little girl whom she 
had not yet named—who did not survive. Eventually, Sethe returns to Baby Suggs' 
home at 124 Bluestone Road to live out her life ostracized by the black community 
and her own pride and haunted by the ghost of her dead child until the "last of the 
Sweet Home men," the former slave Paul D shows up to precipitate Sethe's and his 
own struggle to survive memory.
I have selected Beloved as the primary source for this inquiry from among 
Morrison's body of work because it most clearly exhibits the prophetic, pragmatic, 
and critical dimensions of her writing and because it offers the most explicit 
characterizations of traditional and prophetic educational figures of any of her 
novels. It has, in addition, been recognized and studied as a work relevant to 
educational thought.'*® Beloved is a powerful narrative account of an escaped 
slave's struggle to survive the grievous psychological wounds of her past set in the 
cultural and historical milieu from which West contends the prophetic tradition of 
Afro-American Christianity evolved. Beloved portrays its central character, Sethe, 
embroiled in "the irreducible predicament of unique individuals who undergo 
dread, despair, disillusionment, disease and death and the institutional forms of 
oppression that dehumanize people.'"*’ It also portrays three teacher-characters—
*®Susan Huddleston Edgarton, "Toni Morrison Teaching the Interminable," 
in McCarthy and Crichlow, pp. 220-235.
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Schoolteacher, Lady Jones, and Baby Suggs—who, in their teaching, either seek to 
perpetuate this oppression, to ignore it in favor of the acquisition of useful 
knowledge, or to actively resist it by deploying the prophetic mode of Afro- 
American spirituality. Morrison's account of Sethe's and her teachers' response to 
evil—a struggle West accused pragmatism of ignoring—is instructive for the 
purposes of this inquiry where many other traditional religious responses to the 
existence of evil are not because it is the account of an oppressed people, a people 
without the power or luxury to formulate and impose a dogmatic or absolutist 
theodicy on others.^* They are forced in their context of oppression and 
powerlessness to accommodate their African spiritual heritage, their Christian 
faith, and their existential reality, to critique one from the perspective of the other 
even as they refuse to reject or embrace either tradition entirely; in short, to 
borrow Henderson's (1990) formulation, they, through Morrison, "speak in 
tongues' as "prophets and apostles.'"*® Thus Beloveds account of African- 
Americans forced by political necessity to articulate a religious expression which 
offers an existential response to the tragic and hope for the future without
’^West, The American Evasion o f Philosophy, p. 228.
‘**Ibid., p. 212, 228 and West, Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times: 
Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism, Volume One, Monroe: Common 
Courage Press, 1993, p. 32.
^®Henderson, "Speaking in Tongues," in Gates, p. 124.
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attempting to supplant other modes of religious expression may have something to 
say to contemporary philosophers of education who would reconceive teacher in 
order to make space for religious faith in public education without ignoring the 
ethical necessity to respect religious and cultural diversity.
Critical Perspectives on Beloved
Since its publication in 1987 Belovedhas received a significant amount of 
critical attention, an unsurprising development for a text Henry Louis Gates, Jr. 
described as "in many ways the Ur-text of the Afiican American experience."*” 
Though there have been a wide variety of critical studies of the novel, including at 
least one Marxist analysis and a wide variety of feminist readings, much of the 
criticism of Beloved has tended to focus on four themes: the trope of memory and 
its implications for history and survival, the discourses of racist and sexist 
oppression, the relation of the novel to the slave narrative genre, and its 
deployment of Afiican and African-American mythological and folk traditions.** In 
what follows I will review some of the critical literature Beloved has inspired 
before offering my own reading of the novel as work of relevance and potential
*”Heruy Louis Gates, Jr., Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 143.
**For a Marxist-inspired reading of Beloved see Doreatha Drummond 
Mbalia's "Beloved. Solidarity as Solution," in her Toni Morrison's Developing 
Class Consciousness Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1991, pp. 87- 
102. For an interesting feminist analysis see Barbara Hill Rigney The Voices o f  
Toni Morrison Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1991.
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significance for any new conception of teachers which means to take seriously the 
place of religious faith in students' lives.
Perhaps the most common theme analyzed in the criticism of the novel is 
Morrison's use of memory as a trope which simultaneously explores the difficulty 
and necessity of remembering the horrors of a painful past in order to explore the 
interior lives of slaves and make healing possible.’^  Morrison's characters— 
particularly her main character, Sethe—work to repress painful memories, to 
disremember, to re-memory as little as possible in the fear that to re-member may 
mean putting past events back together in such a way that they threaten the present 
once again with the horrors of the past. In deploying this trope to explore the 
interior lives of former slaves, Morrison "responds to Fredric Jameson's dictum to 
always historicize by illustrating the dynamics of the act of interpretation that 
memory performs on a regular basis at any given moment."”
Beloved blurs the lines between past and present and seems to suggest a
” Susan Bowers, "Beloved and the New Apocalypse" in David L. 
Middleton, ed., Toni Morrison's Fiction: Contemporary Criticism New York; 
Garland Publishing, 1997, p. 210. On the issue of remembering as healing see 
Patrick Bryce Bjork, The Novels o f Toni Morrison: The Search fo r Self and Place 
Within the Community New York: Peter Lang, 1992, p. 146. On Morrison's 
attempt to explore the inner lives of slaves see Marilyn Sanders Mobley, "A 
Different Remembering: Memory, History and Meaning in Toni Morrison's 
Beloved' in Harold Bloom, ed.. Modern Critical Views: Toni Morrison New 
York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1990, p. 191.
” Mobley, p. 192.
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conception of history as a place rather than a time.”  Sethe tells Denver:
'I was talking about time. It's so hard for me to believe in it. Some things 
go. Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to think it was my rememory. 
You know. Some things you forget. Other things you never do. But it's 
not. Places, places are still there. If a house bums down, it's gone, but the 
place-the picture of it-stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, in 
the world.... Where I was before I came here, that place is real. It's never 
going away. Even if the whole farm-every tree and grass blade of it dies. 
The picture is still there-if you go there and stand in the place where it was, 
it will happen gain; it will be there for you, waiting for you' (36).
In the person of Beloved, history and memory take on a flesh-and-blood reality
which does indeed threaten the present and must be wrestled with in order to
survive the present and preserve some hope for the future. Morrison's is a radically
historicist vision in Beloved, suggesting the power of human consciousness,
individually and collectively, to fashion and re-fashion reality.
The trope of memory also shapes the narrative structure of Beloved.
Characters who repress memories, remember reluctantly, forget, reveal their pasts
in disjointed fragments, and then revise their memories construct patterns of
circularity in the novel reminiscent of the blues, and jazz, and the oral traditions of
African and African-American storytelling.”  The novel is an often dis-harmonious
melody of voices, a "Bakhtinian heteroglossia" of partial points-of-view
”  Mobley, p. 196. See also Rigney, pp. 74-75.
"Philip Page, Dangerous Freedoms: Fusion and Fragmentation in Toni 
Morrison's Novels, Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1995, pp. 134, 142- 
143.
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communicated in disjointed fragments in a call-and-response-like structure which 
dramatizes the power of words and stories to construct and reconstruct lived 
reality.** Thus the educational dialogue of particular interest to this inquiry among 
Baby Suggs, Schoolteacher, and Lady Jones is already implicit within the 
construction of the narrative. The novel, Morrison says, is about "the process by 
which we construct and deconstruct reality in order to be able to function in it."*’ 
And the reader is an active participant in this melody of voices, this social 
construction of reality. The reader is the implied listener. Morrison writes;
...the language has to be quiet, it has to engage your participation...It's not 
just telling the story; it's about involving the reader...My language has to 
have holes and spaces so the reader can come into it...He or she can feel 
something visceral, see something striking. The we...come together to 
make this book, to feel this experience. It doesn't matter what happens...! 
tell you in the beginning...what happen[s]...**
This interaction of storyteller and audience and the influence of the trope of 
memory on narrative structure disrupts the "linear, progressive, monologic 
narrative of the Western tradition" in favor of the "spiraling, unfinished, many­
voiced story of a community, where interest in the progression of plots is
**Page, p. 153; Mobley, p. 193. Tmàx&iYiasns, Fiction and Folklore: The 
Novels o f Toni Morrison, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991, p. 169.
*’ln Elsie B. Washington, "Toni Morrison Now," Essence 18 (October 
1987): p. 58.
**In Claudia Tate, "Conversation with Toni Morrison," Black Women 
Writers at Work, New York: Continuum, 1983, p. 125.
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abandoned in favor of the process of accumulating multiple stories, themselves 
merely indications of a people's lived creativity."*’ Morrison's conception of 
Uterary language, therefore, as well as her construction of the novel, make possible 
a reading of Beloved as a conversation on educational philosophy
Beloveds narrative structure also draws on the genre of the slave narrative 
as well as the myth and folkloric traditions of Africa and African-Americans. The 
novel is "a historical narrative sharing the purpose, thematics, and structure of 
slave narratives" which follow "Judeo-Christian mythic structure," moving from 
idyllic existence to the wilderness and struggle for survival to providential help 
followed by arrival in the promised land.“  However, in a clear affirmation of 
Bakhtin's and Eliot's assertions regarding the relationship of the individual author 
to literary traditions, Morrison significantly revises the generic slave narrative.®' 
One of the characteristics of the classic African-American slave narratives was
*®Wendy Harding and Jacky Martin, A World o f Difference: An Inter- 
Cultural Stu(fy o f Toni Morrison's Novels, Westport; Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 
169.
“ Wilfred D. Samuels and Clenora Hudson-Weems, Toni Morrison Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1990, pp. 95-96.
"Every age re-accentuates in its own way the works of its immediate 
past." Mikhail Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," The Dialogic Imagination, 
Michael Holquist, ed., Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, trans., Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1981, p. 421; T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent," Twentieth Century Criticism: The Major Statements, William J. Handy 
and Max Westbrook, eds.. New York: The Free Press, 1974, pp. 28-34.
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their treatment or non-treatment of particularly horrific experiences in order to 
avoid offending their white audiences.^ This is precisely the point where Morrison 
revises the genre. In attempting to re-construct the interior psychological- 
emotional lives of slaves, she fills in the gaps left in earlier slave narratives.^
In re-constructing the interior lives of Afiican slaves in the U.S., Beloved 
dramatizes the centrality of myth and folk traditions in their lives as well as the 
tension between those traditions and the dominant society. The novel's deployment 
of the trope of memory suggests a cyclical conception of time consistent with 
certain West Afiican beliefs while the haunting and physical return of Sethe's 
murdered daughter. Beloved, is premised on other West Afiican beliefs which 
assert that death is not the end of being. ^  Key characters in the novel resonate 
with stock figures from Afiican mythology, particularly Beloved, who resonates 
with the tradition of the evil woman, the succubus, and the trickster, and Sethe, 
who is understandable within the tradition of the Afiican Great Mother.*’ Baby 
Suggs, Sethe's mother-in-law whose rituals in the Clearing distill and epitomize the 
novel's blend of Afiican myth, Afiican-American folk traditions, and Christian 
religious sensibilities, is cast as the archetypal ancestor-figure and leader, the
*^Samuels and Hudson-Weems, p. 97; Mobley, p. 191. 
“ Samuels and Hudson-Weems, ibid.
“ Bowers, p. 212; Harris, p. 154.
*’Hanis, p. 160; Rigney, p. 69.
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priestess who biends the sacred and secular into meaning-making myths which 
forge and preserve community “  This myth- and meaning-making aspect of Baby 
Suggs' character, and the novel as a whole, assumes the power of storytelling to 
shape reality and requires the active participation of the audience/reader because it 
is founded upon a fundamental premise that cultural affirmation and identity are 
grounded in and attainable through myth and folklore/^ This grounding in folklore 
and myth, however, exists in a very basic tension with the scientific and 
technological assumptions upon which the dominant society—in the person of 
Schoolteacher—is founded. These assumptions deploy a form of power, an imperial 
gaze, which objectifies the other and constitutes a "didactic Western pedagogics" 
fundamentally at odds with the pedagogics of the storyteller.**
One key element of the mythological milieu which Beloved simultaneously 
draws upon and constructs is the prophetic tradition of Afro-American protestant 
Christianity as it both replaced and was shaped by African beliefs. Morrison's 
deployment of Afro-American Christian spirituality recognizes its significance in 
the interior lives of slaves and free African-Americans. The church is, according to
**Harris, pp. 173-174; Harding and Martin, p. 111.
*^Harris, p. 169, 172; Samuels and Hudson-Weems, p. 135.
**Harding and Martin, pp. 95, 98.
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Morrison, "the most pragmatic and realistic institution we have ever had."®® Her 
recognition of the relevance of Afro-American Christianity begins with the 
epigraph to Beloved, a passage from "Romans" in which the apostle Paul 
contemplates the relationship of God to humanity, particularly the evils and 
inequities suffered, which casts the meaning of the novel and the events it relates in 
a mythological context meaningful not only to African-Americans but others as 
well.™
Written in an apocalyptic tradition revised by an African conception of 
cyclical time which views the apocalypse as something to be survived rather than 
as an end to be desired. Beloved looks backward rather than forward for 
inspiration to survive the tragedies of Afro-American experience.’’ It is permeated 
with biblical language and allusions and shaped not only by the Judeo-Christian 
mythic structures of the classic slave narratives, but by the strategies and structures 
of Africanized Puritan sermons.™ In this reading. Baby Suggs is cast in the
®®Toni Morrison, "Behind the Making of the Black Book," Black World 
(February 1974); 86-90.
’“In "Romans 9:25" Paul says "I will call them my people who were not 
my people; and her beloved, which was not beloved." Paul notes how the Gentiles 
are redefined as acceptable and proclaims reconciliation and hope. He continues: 
"And it shall come to pass, that in the place where it was said unto them. Ye are 
not my people; there shall they be called the children of the living God." Noted in 
Margaret Atwood, "Haunted by Their Nightmares," in Bloom, p. 147.
’’Bowers, pp. 209-212.
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tradition of Negro preachers who, though untrained, answer and issue the Call to 
serve God and His people, leading them to the ritual grounds of the Clearing and 
its "exhilarating prospect of community, protection, progress, learning and 
religion."^
The novel also deploys and revises the Eden myth in its characterization of 
Sweet Home, the season of Lent, the "Parable of the Loaves and Fishes" and the 
rites of communion and confirmation in Sethe's twenty-eight days of un-slaved life 
at 124 Bluestone, and the rite of baptism and the Pentecost event in its final 
scenes.”  The Christian religious sensibilities displayed in Beloved strongly suggest 
that any reading of the novel must take into account its biblical and sermonic 
contexts and implies a prophetic role for Morrison: "Like the Puritans, Morrison 
draws fi"om the past and tribal identity to address contemporary threats to the 
community she seeks to preserve. To have such an imagination...allies her with 
those who seek the role of prophet: one who speaks the truth to the health of the
^On the Judeo-Christian mythic structure of slave narratives see Samuels 
and Hudson-Weems, p. 96. On the religious language of Beloved see Linden 
Peach, Toni Morrison New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p. 99. For Morrison's 
use of sermonic strategies and structures see Loretta Ann McGrann, Toni 
Morrison and the American Sermonic Tradition, Arm Arbor: UMI Dissertation 
Services, 1995, p. 3.
"Peach, p. 98. Robert Stepto, From Behind the Veil, A Study o f Afro- 
American Narrative, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979, p. 68.
"Harris, p. 176; Samuels and Hudson-Weems, p. 119; McGrann, p. 109.
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community."^’
Though Beloved does exhibit a significant element of Afro-American 
protestant Christian influence, it is not explicitly Christian. In fact, formal religion 
is largely absent from the novel.’®And while it displays the considerable influence 
of African and African-American mythology and folklore, it is no simple 
valorization of African myth against American racist oppression. Rather, the 
heterogeneity of myths in the novel not only reflect the cultural and spiritual 
hybridity of African-American experience but suggest Morrison's mistrust of any 
single, controlling mythological fi-amework. Just as characters in the novel such as 
Sixo and Baby Suggs engage in the blending of traditional ritual and myth with 
their slave masters' spiritual tradition to formulate adequate cultural responses to 
their current oppressive circumstances, Morrison, in Beloved, is engaged in the 
collection, re-interpretation, and re-evaluation of myths in an attempt to give form, 
coherence, and meaning to African-American experience.”
Morrison's ambivalence toward myth in Beloved is, perhaps, the product of 
a DuBoisian "double consciousness" which simultaneously recognizes the power 
of myth to create and sustain communities against the threat of excessive
” McGrann, pp. 24, 26.
’^ Lawrence David, "Fleshly Ghosts and Ghostly Flesh: The Word and the 
Body in Beloved' in Middleton, p. 245.
” Harding and Martin, pp. 124-125.
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individualism even as it recognizes the oppressive potential of myth and 
community for individual members of society/* Her concern with the discourses of 
racist and sexist oppression are clear in Beloved. As a piece of women's writing, 
the novel challenges the traditional study of religion and literature because it 
transgresses traditionally represented religious boundaries and submerges 
conventions of traditional Christianity without offering utopie alternatives, thus 
eschewing absolutism/® It "subverts the masculinist biases" of religion and 
literature and creates in 124 Bluestone a "feminine world outside male, 
phallocentric logic" and suggests that "if men are going to be opponents to and not 
continuators of oppression, they must eschew the heroic quest pattern.. . [and]. . . 
outlive the delusion of exceptional destinies and participate in the fundamental rite 
of eliminating the principle of violence from society."*® As a piece of African- 
American writing. Beloved also subverts authoritative racist discourses by 
challenging white myths like the benevolent slave master, by illustrating the link 
between the domination of language and the domination of the body in the
’*Denise Heinze, The Dilemma o f "Double-Consciousness": Toni 
Morrison's Novels, Athens; The University of Georgia Press, 1993, p. 5.
” Ann-Janine Morey, "Margaret Atwood and Toni Morrison. Reflections 
on Postmodernism and the Study of Religion and Literature" in Middleton, pp. 
257-251.
*°Morey, 264; Rigney, p. 17; Harding and Martin, p. 80. Milkman is the 
central character of Morrison's third novel. Song o f Solomon.
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character of Schoolteacher and his treatment of the slaves on Sweet Home, and by 
dramatizing the courageous efforts of slaves and former slaves to challenge and 
revise dominant oppressive discourses."
Reading Beloved as Educational Text
Though many readings of Beloved imply some educational significance in 
their discussions of the novel's treatment of memory and history, the power of 
storytelling and myth to shape reality and aSirm cultural identity, and the 
possibility of resistance to racist and sexist oppression, few explicitly address 
Beloved as a novel with something to say about education." But surely a novel 
that places such a creative emphasis on names and naming and then names its 
central villain Schoolteacher is saying something about education and teachers as 
we conceive them. And surely a novel that purports to be about "the process by 
which we construct and deconstruct reality in order to be able to function in it" and 
then portrays at least two other key figures who are either explicitly or implicitly
"Peach, pp. 94, 96.
"One notable exception is Susan Huddleston Edgerton's "Toni Morrison 
Teaching the Interminable" in McCarthy and Crichlow, pp. 220-235. Edgerton's 
focus, however, is on how the novel itself teaches rather than on what the novel 
may have to say about teaching and teachers. Others have analyzed Beloved and 
Morrison's fiction in general for its reflection of cultural stereotypes about teachers 
and education. See, for instance, John Howard Hedman, Images o f Higher 
Education in the Novels o f the 1980s, Ph.D. dis.. University of Illinois at Urbana- 
Champaign, 1993 and Joan F. Peterson, The Portrayal o f the Schoolteacher in 
American Literature based upon Colonial Types: 1794-1987. Ph.D. diss.. 
University of San Francisco, 1994.
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teachers teaching others how to function in reality is worth analyzing for what it 
has to say about education and teachers."
I am not proposing, however, a revision or critique of the analyses of 
Beloved reviewed above; rather, I propose to foreground a neglected sub-text of 
the novel; its explicit and implicit conceptions of teachers. I will analyze the 
characters of Baby Suggs, Schoolteacher, and Lady Jones and pose questions 
designed to tease out their implications for how we conceive of teachers and how 
we might re-conceive them. What are the conceptions of teachers implied by 
Morrison's portrayal of Baby Suggs, Schoolteacher, and Lady Jones? How do they 
challenge or revise contemporary conceptions of teachers and teaching? How 
might they help contemporary educators re-imagine—"deconstruct and 
reconstruct"—our conceptions of teachers in a social context heir to the evils so 
vividly portrayed in violence, racism, sexism, oppression, repression and
despair, and haunted by the flesh-and-blood-real manifestations of past injustices, 
and tom by disagreement over the relevance of scientific-technological versus 
spiritual responses to these problems?
"Washington, p. 58. Note the similarity of Morrison's comment on what 
Beloved is about and John Dewey's definition of education: "It is that 
reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of 
experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent 
experience." From John Dewey, Democracy and Education, New York, NY: The 
Free Press, 1916, p. 76. The two characters I am referring to are Lady Jones, 
Denver's teacher, and Baby Suggs.
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First Approach: "Embodied” Reader-Response Criticism
In order to accomplish this, this inquiry must employ methods which are 
responsive to the conditions of the invitation, which preclude as far as possible the 
hegemonic discursive practices common to past inquiry by white, male, propertied, 
Euro-American men across racial and gender lines. Therefore, the reading I offer 
of Beloved will be rendered from within the theoretical framework of reader- 
response theory while acknowledging its status as the product of an embodied 
critique. I will employ what Bogdan has called embodied criticism—vihxch. is itself 
a form of reader-response criticism—to produce a reading of Beloved which 
foregrounds the educational subtext of the novel and then deploy Cornel West's 
prophetic pragmatism to critique the conceptions of teachers implicit in that 
subtext and point the way to an alternative conception of the teacher as prophetic 
pragmatist.
Reader-response theory is not a conceptually unified critical position but 
rather a name for a range of critical positions which target for scrutiny the reading 
process and the response the experience of reading elicits in the reader. *■* Though 
reader-response critics differ considerably, they generally affirm the notion that the
*^Jane P. Tompkins, "An Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism" in 
Jane P. Tompkins, ed., Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post- 
Structuralism, Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, p. ix. See also 
Bill Corcoran and Emrys Evans, Readers, Texts, Teachers, Upper Montclair: 
Boynton/Cook Publishers, 1987.
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work of literature exists not in the mind of the author alone or on the page but in 
the interaction that takes place between the text and an individual reading. Thus, 
the reader participates to one degree or another in the creation of a work of 
literature; the author is, in a sense, a co-creator of the work of literature.*^ Such a 
view of literature necessarily undermines assumptions about the objectivity of the 
text which were central to the earlier formalist/New Criticism that sought the 
meaning of literature in the pattern of images in the work. Such critics treated the 
work of literature as a separate, independent object.*® And in focusing attention on 
the social and psychological factors that influence the reader’s interpretive 
strategies, it draws on theories of the self, formulated by the American pragmatists 
Charles Sanders Peirce and Josiah Royce, as the product of inferences from 
perception. Thus reader-response theories also undermine neo-Cartesian models of 
an autonomous subject and discards what West (1985) calls the "spectator theory 
of knowledge" for a definition of knowledge as the "product of negotiation among
*®Tompkins, pp. ix-x; Wolfgang Iser, Prospecting: From Reader Response 
to Literary Anthropology, Baltimore; Johns Hopldns University Press, 1989, p. 4.
*®See, for instance, William J. Handy and Max Westbrook, Twentieth 
Century Criticism: The Major Statements, New York: The Free Press, 1974, pp. 
2-5; Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Um: Studies in the Structure o f Poetry, 
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975; Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, 
Theory o f Literature, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, pp. 142-157.
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members of an interpretive community."*’
In rejecting the notion of autonomous readers reading autonomous texts, 
reader-response theory posits a notion of the text as a set of relations with other 
texts, as something like a "cultural Salvation Army outlet."** This intertextuality 
can take either the form of explicit references as well as unaimounced influences 
from other texts or presuppositions the text makes about its readers and what they 
know.*® In addition, it posits a notion of the reader as an "interpretation" which 
brings either personal or social preconceptions to the task of interpretation. Thus 
the nature of the interpreter’s self is problematized: interpretation becomes a 
function of identity.®” And, as Bogdan and other critics applying the insights of 
feminist theory to reader-response criticism correctly point out, the identity of the 
reader is shaped at least in part by gender, race, class, and ethnicity; in short, the 
"feeling, power, and location problems."®*
Reader-response theory sees the act of reading as an active experience in
*’Tompkins, pp. xxi, xxiii; Cornel West, "The Politics of American Neo- 
Pragmatism" in John Rajchman and Cornel West, eds., Post-Analytic Philosophy, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 259-272.
**James E. Porter, Audience and Rhetoric, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1992, p. 68.
*®Ibid., p. 69.
®**Tompkins, pp. ix, xxiii.
®*Porter, p. 64; Bogdan, p. xxxiii.
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which the meaning of a text is produced rather than discovered. Wolfgang Iser 
(1989), for instance, describes a text as a sequence of "schematized views" of its 
object between which are gaps of "indeterminacy" which require the reader to 
participate in the work's creation by making meaningful connections between the 
views. "Every literary text invites some form of participation on the part of the 
reader...indeterminacy is the fundamental prerequisite for this participation.®  ^As 
these gaps become more numerous in novels—like Beloved—vniYi multiple points of 
view, the indeterminacy, and thus the required participation of the reader, is also 
increased.®  ^Iser sees in this activity "the possibility that we may formulate 
ourselves and so discover what had previously seemed to elude our 
consciousness." Thus critical activity takes on a moral dimension.®'*
Other reader-response critics place less significance on the text in the 
production of meaning. Some argue that the experience, and thus the meaning, of a 
work of literature is limited by the linguistic and literary competence of the reader 
or by the preconceptions the reader brings to the reading so that the meaning of 
the text derives from the "interpretive communities" to which the reader may
®^ Iser, pp. 8-10.
®"lbid., p. 13.
®‘*Quoted in Tompkins, p. xv.
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belong.’* Others argue the work is shaped by the characteristic psychological 
patterns of the reader; the reader "copes" with literature the same way he or she 
copes with life.^ The stress, however, in all these positions is the significance of 
the reader to the meaning of the text: "A text only comes to life when it is read."”  
Reader-response theory does not mean, however, that the text means 
whatever the reader wants it to mean. The meaning a reader constructs in the act 
of reading is constrained by the text and by the conventions and preconceptions of 
the particular interpretive communities to which the reader belongs, conventions 
and preconceptions which the author, to some extent, shares. Iser (1989), for 
instance, says that meaning is created both by what the text says as well as what it 
does not say—the gaps of indeterminacy which the reader fills. While it is 
impossible for the reader to know precisely the author’s intent or the writer to 
know precisely how the reader will respond, the author can and does use 
indeterminacy to help guide the reader’s construction of the text’s meaning.’* While 
other critics—Bleich (1980) and Holland (1980), for instance—ascribe even less
’*See, for instance, Stanley Fish, "Literature in the Reader: Affective 
Stylistics," Jonathan Culler, "Literary Competence," and David Bleich, 
"Epistemological Assumptions in the Study of Response ” in Tompkins, pp. 70- 
100, 101-117, 134-163.
’^Tompkins, p. xix. See also Norman N. Holland, "Unity Identity Text Self’ 
in Tompkins, pp. 118-133.
’Iser, p. 4.
’"Ibid., p. 34.
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autonomy of meaning to the text or the intent of the author, meaning making is still 
constrained by interpretive structures and systems of values in which the author, 
text, and reader participate; meaning is the result of a conversation in which the 
author is as much a partner as the reader.^
An important consequence, then, of reader-response theory is that it 
restores to literature the power to influence individuals and society and thus 
"repoliticizes" literature. For, as Tompkins (1990) states, "when discourse is 
responsible for reality and not merely a reflection of it, then whose discourse 
prevails makes all the difference.""” Therefore, the recognition of the relevance of 
identity to interpretation, the relevance of the feeling, power, and location 
problems to identity, and thus the political and ethical relevance of literature not 
only unmasks the autonomous, objective, disembodied knower as being, in reality, 
a subjective, embodied knower creating and deploying discursive power, but 
requires critical interpretation that is honest and aware of itself as positioned 
knowledge.
I have elected, therefore, to render an analysis of Beloved using 
"embodied" reader-response criticism because it offers the most ethical approach
^Tompkins, p p .  xxi-xxv.
"”Ibid., p . XXV.
*°*Ibid., p. xxiii.
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given the significance of my own identity—white, male, southern, etc.—and the 
source I have selected, the novel of an Afiican-American woman. Because an 
embodied reader-response critique targets for critical scrutiny the virtual work of 
literature that comes into being via the interaction of author, text, and reader that 
takes place in the act of reading and foregrounds the positionality of the critic and 
his interpretation, it preserves both the author's and the reader's authority to 
negotiate a  reading of a text which is shaped by both the feeling, power, and 
location of the reader and by the words and intent of the author. Thus embodied 
reader-response criticism preserves the possibility of interpretation across racial 
and gender lines without denying the significance of race and gender in the 
interpretation.
Furthermore, such an approach is apparently consistent with Morrison's 
account of her teaching, with her own and other critics' accounts of her writing, 
and with the approach some Afiican-American critics have used in interpreting her 
work.*°  ^Other traditional and contemporary critical approaches are problematic
‘° I^n Gates and Appiah, pp. 390, 418 Morrison described her use of 
literature in the classroom to enable her students to see how they felt, thought, saw 
themselves, and lived. She suggests, as does Wolfgang Iser, that the study of 
literature is in some sense the study of self. She also notes that one of the major 
characteristics of black literature is the participation of the other, the audience, 
reader. Of her own writing she said "I just hold your hand while you're in the 
process of going there and hearing it and sharing it." And in Claudia Tate, 
"Conversation with Toni Morrison," Black Women Writers at Work, New York: 
Continuum, 1983, p. 125, Morrison says "...the language has to be quiet, it has to 
engage your participation...It's not just telling the story; its about involving the
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given this inquiry's focus on African-American thought across racial and gender 
lines. For instance. New Criticism, in positing the autonomy of the reader and 
objectifying the text, denies the ethical and political significance of criticism and 
hides the subjectivity of the critic behind a mask of objectivity. Such an approach 
runs the risk of perpetuating the hegemony of certain discourses over others. Post­
structuralism is also problematic in that its conception of the self and the author as 
well as the approach to literary criticism that derives from it—deconstruction— 
radically diminishes the significance of the author to the meaning of the text and 
advocates criticism as the deliberate disruption of the text's narrative intent. Thus 
the reader is free to "play" with the text's possibilities. As West (1989, 1993), 
Baker and Redmond (1989), and Roman (1993) have argued, such an approach is
reader...My language has to have holes and spaces so the reader can come into 
it...Then we...come together to make this book, to feel this experience. It doesn't 
matter what happens .I tell you in the beginning...what happens..." I take these 
comments to be a clear indication of the relevance of reader-response criticism to 
the interpretation of Morrison's fiction. On the use of reader-response by African- 
American critics of Morrison see Deborah E. McDowell, "Boundaries; Or Distant 
Relations and Close Kin" in Baker and Redmond.
‘“ Handy and Westbrook, op. cit.; Brooks, op. cit.; Porter, p. 64. For a 
broader account of the significance of identity in philosophical inquiry see Code, 
op. cit..
'“ Northrop Frye, Sheridan Baker and George Perkins, The Harper 
Handbook to Literature, New York: Harper and Row, 1985, pp. 364-365. See 
also Michel Foucault, "What is an Author? in Paul Rabinow, ed.. The Foucault 
Reader, New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, pp. 101-120 and Foucault, The 
History o f Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol. I, New York: Vintage Books, 1990.
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ethically problematic when the authors in question are women and peoples of color 
whose discourses have only recently claimed the public voice denied them for so 
long; literary theory becomes, potentially, another excuse for ignoring marginal 
voices.’”*
Clearly, reader-response criticism occupies a range of theoretical territory 
between New Criticism on one hand and post-structuralism on the other. It has 
certain affinities with both positions, evolving in part as a response to formalism 
and anticipating key aspects of post-structuralism. However, it minimizes the 
potential in both these positions to silence the voice of the author even as it clears 
a space for readers to negotiate a meaning of a particular literary text. It is, 
therefore, the most appropriate critical mode for my analysis o f Beloved as a work 
of fiction which contains an educational subtext within the larger discourse of the 
novel.
Embodied Criticism: A Direct Response to Beloved as Educational Critique
Deanne Bogdan's reclamation of the reader's direct response to a work of 
literature as a moment of critical significance grounds my own reading of Beloved 
as a novel which is relevant to education and concepts of teacher in an existential 
context marked by "dread, despair, disillusionment, disease and death and the
'”*West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, pp. 223-226 and Prophetic 
Thought in Postmodern Times, pp. 94-95; Baker and Redmond, p. 8; and Leslie G. 
Roman, "White is a Color! White Defensiveness, Postmodernism, and Anti-Racist 
Pedagogy," in McCarthy and Crichlow, pp. 71-89.
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institutional forms of oppression that dehumanize people."**’* My reading of 
Beloved was and is marked by what, for me, was a particularly powerful direct 
response: I read as a father of a small boy the story of a mother of a small girl. As 
such, my reading of the novel was invested with my own understanding of the 
obsessions and fears—both rational and irrational—of a parent's love for a child, the 
sorts of feelings that move mothers and fathers to get up in the night to listen for a 
child's breathing, the powerful mix of biology and love that can imbricate identities 
to the point of doubting one's ability to survive if "something ever happened" to 
one's child. It was with a peculiar sort of relief that I read of Beloved's haunting of 
the house at 124 Bluestone and of her return from the dead: the very possibility, 
even though I was always aware that I was reading a work of fiction, was 
compelling. Paradoxically, this recognition of my own parental love in Sethe's 
maternal—or rather my reading of this character's emotions through my own, my 
participation with Morrison and the text in the creation of a Beloved that is, to a 
significant extent, peculiar to me—did not lead me to question Sethe's killing of her 
baby girl with a rusty handsaw.'*” I trusted her explanation: there was something 
worse from which she was obligated to protect her child. But as a teacher and
'*** Bogdan, Re-educating the Imagination', West, The American Evasion 
o f Philosophy, p. 228.
'*” The inevitability of such a reading is a major tenet of reader-response 
criticism and is consistent with Toni Morrison's own accounts of her writing and 
how she expects to be read.
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educational theorist, I wonder how we might help parents and the culture in 
general enable children to survive such threats and what role religious faith may 
play in that process.
I also bring to this reading of Beloved my own identity as a straight, white, 
male of mixed (Anglo-Puerto Rican) ethnicity, mindful of the long and sorry 
history of white men writing for and defining African-Americans. Aima Julia 
Cooper's scathing critique of white writers who write on Afiican-American topics 
also gives pause;
There is one thing I would like to say to my white fellow countrymen, 
and especially to those who dabble in ink and afifect to discuss the 
Negro...it is an insult to humanity and a sin against God to publish 
any such sweeping generalizations of a race on such meager and 
superficial information. We meet it at every turn—this obtrusive and 
offensive vulgarity, this gratuitous sizing up of the Negro and 
conclusively writing down his equation, sometimes even among 
his ardent fiiends and bravest defenders. Were I not afraid of falling 
myself into the same error that I am condemning, I would say it 
seems an Anglo Saxon characteristic to have such overweening 
confidence in his own power of induction... *°*
Finally, my reading of Beloved is shaped by my vocation, teaching. I read 
the novel as a teacher of English who saw in it an innovative narrative structure 
and a story that would move students as it moved me. And I read as a philosopher 
of education convinced that Morrison's characterizations of Baby Suggs, 
Schoolteacher, and Lady Jones have something important to contribute to the
'"'Arma Julia Cooper, A Voice from the Souths New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, p. 203.
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philosophical conversation in education over the concept teacher, something that, 
given the pervasively prophetic and spiritual qualities of Morrison's work, can be 
of help in formulating a more inclusive concept teacher better able to negotiate and 
renegotiate the relationship between religion and public education. I offer this 
reading, however, with Anna Julia Cooper’s complaint as an inevitable constraint 
on any theoretical claims and with Paul D's warning to Denver ringing in my ears; 
"Watch out. Watch out. Nothing in the world more dangerous than a white 
schoolteacher" (266).
My object here, however, is not to make authoritative statements about 
African-Americans or their culture. Any assertions about Afncan-American culture 
or religious expressions are drawn from the work of scholars with far more claim 
than I to expertise in the area of Afncan-American studies and appropriately 
documented. I approach my inquiry into the educational subtext of Beloved in the 
spirit of Jane Roland Martin's claim that we must look to other sources of data— 
letters, diaries, books, oral traditions—for educational thought on objects or 
subjects considered marginal.**” And I approach it not with the idea that I have 
anything authoritative or original to say about Afncan-American culture, but rather 
with the compelling sense that this cultural tradition may have something very 
important to say about teaching, with the sense that this powerful novel has
**”Martin, p. 180.
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something important to teach me about what it means to be a teacher. My reading 
of Beloved, therefore, is in the spirit of Emerson's conception of provocation as 
creative response."” I situate my "embodied" critique theoretically in reader- 
response theory, an approach to literary analysis which targets for critical scrutiny 
the virtual work of literature that comes into being via the interaction of author, 
text, and reader and which preserves both the author’s and the reader's authority to 
negotiate a reading of a literary text shaped both by the identity of the reader and 
the intent of the author.'" In this way I hope to avoid the sorts of errors Anna Julia 
Cooper rightly condemns.
There is clearly much in this novel that I carmot understand and have, 
perhaps, misunderstood. I do not know how it feels to be a slave, to be black, to 
be a woman, to be tortured and oppressed, or even, thank God, to lose a child.
But, in that direct response, I recognize that love that is, as Paul D says, "too 
thick" (164). I recognize teachers I have known and loved or disliked, concepts of 
teacher validated by my training, others I have been taught to suspect, and still 
others my experience has moved me to emulate. And in that recognition, in that 
participation in the creation of a Beloved which it enables, I am made more
" “For a brief discussion of Emerson's notion of provocation see West, The 
American Evasion o f Philosophy, pp. 25-28.
'"Clem Young, "Readers, Texts, Teachers" and Emrys Evans, "Readers 
Recreating Texts," in Bill Corcoran and Emrys Evans, eds.. Readers, Texts, 
Teachers, Upper Montclair, NJ: Boynton/Cook Publishers, 1987, pp. 7-21, 22-40.
191
intimately and immediately aware of the tragic and its resonance at various levels 
with experiences that have shaped my own culture; the "Trail of Tears," the 
dustbowl exodus, poverty, and the recent terrorism in the so-called "heartland." In 
this recognition, and the participation Morrison's writing requires, I am engaged 
with her in important questions: How do we survive and thrive in the face of the 
tragic? Who survives? How can we learn to survive? Who teaches us? How? Can 
we learn to teach others? These are questions of profound relevance to 
contemporary education; Toni Morrison's Beloved suggests equally profound 
responses to them.
Second Approach: Prophetic Pragmatism
After foregrounding what I take to be an educationally relevant subtext in 
Beloved and fleshing out the concepts of teacher implicit in that subtext, I will 
engage in a prophetic pragmatic critique of those concepts of teacher and then 
attempt to sketch an alternative concept of teacher as prophetic pragmatist by re­
examining and revising Dewey's conception of the teacher through the lens of 
prophetic pragmatism. In this way I will offer a potentially more useful framework 
for our understanding of the role of teachers, a framework which may decrease the 
acrimony of our debates over the relationship between religion and education by 
exploring the meaning and value of the teacher as prophetic pragmatist for a 
religiously inclusive system of public, democratic, multicultural education.
West describes prophetic pragmatism as...
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a form of American left thought and action in our postmodern 
moment. It is deeply indebted to the continental traveling theories 
such as Marxism, structuralism, and poststructuralism, yet it 
remains in the American grain. It is rooted in the best of American 
radicalism but refuses to be simply another polemical position on 
the ideological spectrum. Prophetic pragmatism calls for reinvigoration 
of sane, sober, and sophisticated intellectual life in America and for 
regeneration of social forces empowering the disadvantaged, degraded, 
and dejected. It rejects the faddish cynicism and fashionable conservatism 
rampant in the intelligentsia and general populace. Prophetic pragmatism 
rests upon the conviction that the American evasion of philosophy... 
is a rich and révisable tradition that serves as the occasion for cultural 
criticism and political engagement in the service of an Emersonian 
culture of creative democracy."^
Prophetic pragmatism pursues these aims via an approach that rejects the
methodological monism that results from the imposition of any single theoretical
framework on the whole of human experience. Rather, it views philosophy not as
the "queen of the sciences" establishing the rules and defining the terms of
intellectual inquiry on the basis of fixed and firm foundations but as a mode of
cultural criticism which understands theory as a contingent framework to be
deployed strategically in the interest of furthering "an Emersonian culture of
creative democracy." Thus it does not employ a single method of inquiry, but
draws on the historicist orientation of the pragmatist tradition and the theoretical
insights of progressive Marxism guided by the norms and ideals of prophetic
ethical-religious sensibilities in order to "promote existential sustenance and
"^West, American Evasion, p. 239.
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political relevance" for ameliorative social change/"
The pragmatic orientation of prophetic pragmatism views all knowledge 
claims, truth claims, beliefs, institutions, and practices as variably révisable, 
contingent social constructions whose validity should be judged by their relation to 
temporal consequences, by their eflBcacy in furthering democratically defined ideal 
ends. Thus pragmatism rests on three principle slogans; voluntarism—^ ntimg a 
premium on human will, power, and action, ^ ///ô/7/5m~the notion of an open, 
risk-ridden future in which every claim is open to revision, and experimentalism— 
calling into question any form of dogmatism or orthodoxy in a critical, self- 
correcting manner.’"  Such transient social practices are then the subject matter for 
philosophical reflection.'" It is a philosophical perspective consistent with the 
assumptions of embodied criticism/reader-response theory which will guide the 
first move of this inquiry-foregrounding the educational subtext—since neither 
pragmatism nor reader-response theory entirely locates reality or truth in the 
concrete/text nor entirely in the subjective imagination of the individual/reader but 
in the social interaction between and among individuals and the concrete. Thus 
West's slogans of voluntarism, fallibilism, and experimentalism reflect an emphasis
'"Ibid., p. 232.
'"West, Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times, pp. 37-43.
115aWest, Keeping Faith, p. 130-31.
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on individual agency in the context of contingent subject positions quite similar to 
that defined by Bogdan's feeling, power and location problems. From a location 
defined by these problems and inspired by these slogans, I will conceptually 
critique the portraits of teacher as prophet, as technician, and as common sense 
pragmatist contained in Beloved as révisable, contingent social practices which fail 
to meet the criteria enumerated in Chapter I for a concept teacher capable of 
negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion and public 
education. I will then draw on those portraits for characteristics fi'om which to 
construct a new concept teacher—xh& prophetic pragmatist—vitiich should prove 
more effective in realizing that goal.
Prophetic pragmatism's critical focus on the existential realities of human 
experience yields an inevitable and profound awareness of tragedy—the disease, 
death, despair that plague human experience as well as the oppression of racism, 
sexism, homophobia and economic exploitation."® Its moral estimation of certain 
aspects of human experience flow from its analysis of their consequences in light of 
ethical ideals which, though in themselves recognized as contingent, nevertheless 
serve as navigational aids for cultural critique and ameliorative social progress. For 
West, these ideals are articulated in the prophetic tradition of Afro-American 
protestant Christianity: the belief that human beings were created imago dei—m. the
"®West, Keeping Faith, pp. 132-33.
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image of God—and therefore have the inalienable right to equality and dignity, the 
belief that the perceived discrepancy between man's divine origins and actual 
experience is testimony to the dialectical—both dignified and depraved—nature of 
humanity, and the "kingdom talk" that views history as the effort of fallible human 
beings to transform actual experience from what is to a what-is-to-be defined by 
the ideal of human being created in the image of God. These beliefs provide a 
model of social praxis which confronts the tragic nature of human existence 
without losing faith in the necessity and possibility of bettering the lot of people."’ 
Since West's religious heritage is similar to my own, I will use similar 
ethical ideals regarding human equality and dignity to analyze the consequences of 
the concepts of teacher I will critique as well as the one I will propose—the 
prophetic pragmatist—recogn/zmg, as does West, that these ideals too are 
révisable and contingent and that neither Christianity nor religion in general 
have any monopoly on ethical ideals worthy o f guiding prophetic practices. ‘ "
" ’Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary 
Christianity, Philadelphia; The Westminster Press, 1982, pp. 17-19.
"*West, Keeping Faith, pp. 132-34. West's religious roots are in the 
predominately Afncan-American wing of the Baptist church. His grandfather was a 
minister in this tradition, and he himself is a lay preacher. My own roots lie in the 
Southern Baptist church. Both denominations are results of a split in the Baptist 
tradition over the admission of Afncan-Americans to the denomination in the mid- 
19th century. Thus, though the Southern Baptist tradition was and is still deeply 
tainted by racist beliefs and practices and thus is much less likely to display those 
characteristics West credits with providing sustenance for the oppressed, the 
theology, moral ideals, and religiously-inspired rhetoric of both denominations
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They simply represent ethical ideals as they are expressed from a particular cultural 
location not necessarily superior or inferior to other expressions but potentially 
equally useful in guiding cultural criticism and ameliorative praxis. In this 
recognition of the inevitable limitations as well as the potential for insight from 
one's cultural location—one’s positionality—prophetic pragmatism responds to the 
same insight which leads Bogdan to propose an "embodied" form o f reader- 
response theory: the long history of hegemonic, white, male, Christian discourses 
imposed on women and people of color under the guise of "objective" truth."’ 
Prophetic pragmatism eschews such practices.
Finally, prophetic pragmatism recognizes that much of what West calls the 
tragic dimension of human experience has not only cultural origins, which 
philosophical pragmatism is particularly suited to analyze, but political and 
economic origins as well, the analysis of which. West argues, pragmatism is not as
exhibit important similarities. Though I am no longer a member of this 
denomination-I am now a member of the Episcopal Church, West's articulation of 
those ideals resonates with my own experiences of spirituality in my childhood and 
youth.
For a discussion of the history and current status of the Baptist church in 
the U.S. see Harold Bloom, The American Religion: The Emergence o f the Post- 
Christian Nation, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
For an alternative expression of a prophetic pragmatism without West's 
explicit religious orientation see Jim Garrison, Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and 
Desire in the Art o f Teaching, New York: Teachers College Press, 1997.
" ’On this topic see Lorraine Code, op. cit..
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well suited to as progressive Marxism. Thus West's admission that his cultural 
criticism is based as much in the progressive Marxist philosophy of Antonio 
Gramsci as any other secular perspective even as it acknowledges the "severe 
limitations of the Marxist tradition. Though I will not attempt to offer a full- 
fledged Marxist critique of the portraits of teacher as prophet, technician and 
pragmatist in Beloved, I will address their political and economic consequences, as 
well as those of the prophetic pragmatic teacher, modeled on West's analyses of 
race and class problems in American society.
A Hybrid Approach: Embodied Reader-Response and Prophetic Pragmatic 
Critique
The dual, sequenced approach to this inquiry described above is in keeping 
both with the spirit of Bogdan's "embodied" reader-response theory ant/West's 
prophetic pragmatism and clearly within a channel of educational inquiry cut by
‘^ ®West, Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times, pp. 60-61, 72-73, 90, 
148-151, 194 and Ethical Dimensions o f Marxist Thought, New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1991, pp. 94-101.
Keeping Faith, 133.
‘“ See West, Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times, Prophetic 
Reflections: Notes on Race and Power in America, Beyond Eurocentrism and 
Multiculturalism, Volume Two, Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1993; Race 
Matters, Boston: Beacon Press, 1993; and Prophetic Fragments: Illuminations o f 
the Crisis in American Religion and Culture, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988.
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Greene (1978), Martin (1985) and Laird (1988).*^ It uses theory strategically to 
critique contingent social practices and construct "a new...conception [of teacher] 
leading to new [contingent] modes of practice.. .proceeding from a level deeper and 
more inclusive than that represented by the practices and ideas of the contending 
parties" and intended to foster ameliorative social change.*'^ It will not offer settled 
truths about our understanding of the teacher, but, proceeding from an 
understanding of philosophy as "conversation," will offer a concept of teacher as 
prophetic pragmatist to the ongoing conversation on the proper role for teachers 
in our gendered, multicultural, multi-religious system of public education in 
America.
‘“ Greene, op. cit.; Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation, op. cit. and Laird, 
Maternal Teaching, op. cit.
'“ Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 5.
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Chapter IV
Alternative Conceptions of Teacher in Toni Morrison's Beloved
Thus far, this inquiry has advanced two fundamental propositions. The first 
proposition asserts that religious diversity, in particular our serious disagreements 
over the appropriate relationship between religion and public education, is a threat 
to the existence of the public school as an institution which fosters a democratic 
culture. The second proposition holds that three of the more influential 
educational paradigms and their corresponding conceptions of teachers—which I 
have named the prophet, the technician, and the common sense pragmatist— 
cannot adequately meet the challenge of religious diversity and, therefore, fail 
Dewey's challenge to philosophers of education faced with such disagreements 
to come up with a more inclusive plan of operations.' However, after reviewing 
the evolution of these paradigmatic concepts of teacher in Chapter II, it seemed 
possible that a contemporary branch of pragmatism. Cornel West's (1989) 
prophetic pragmatism, could offer a philosophical framework for a reconception 
of teacher as prophetic pragmatist which might contribute to a more inclusive plan
‘John Dewey, Experience and Education, New York: MacMillan/Collier 
Books, 1938, p. 5.
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of operations vis a vis the relationship between religion and public education.*
Unfortunately, Cornel West has not participated in the pragmatic tradition's 
engagement with education. Therefore, the implications of prophetic pragmatism 
for education, or for the more specific question of the concept teacher, remain 
unexplored. It is the ambition of this inquiry to contribute to educational thought 
by exploring the meaning and value of the prophetic pragmatic teacher for a more 
inclusive plan of operations capable of negotiating and renegotiating the 
relationship between religion and public education. There are, however, no clear 
conceptual models for the prophetic pragmatic teacher in traditional educational 
inquiry; nor does West attempt any application of his philosophy to educational 
questions. Therefore I have proposed, following Maxine Greene (1978) and Jane 
Roland Martin (1985), to look to a source "that the history of educational thought 
regards as far from standard;" namely, Toni Morrison's novel Beloved.^
In this chapter I will deploy a hybrid approach of literary and philosophical 
analysis pioneered by Laird (1988).'* I will utilize a form of reader-response
^Cornel West, The American Evasion o f Philosophy : A Genealogy o f 
Pragmatism, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
^Maxine Greene, Landscapes o f Learning, New York: Teachers College 
Press, 1978; Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation: The Concept o f the 
Educated Woman, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 180; Toni 
Morrison, Beloved, New York: Plume, 1987.
*Susan Laird, Maternal Teaching and Maternal Teachings: Philosophic 
and Literary Case Studies o f Educating, Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1988.
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criticism Deanne Bogdan has named embodied criticism to foreground an 
educational subtext in Morrison's novel which includes portraits of three teacher- 
characters illustrating the three concepts of teacher whose philosophical premises 
Chapter II explained: the prophet. Baby Suggs; the technician. Schoolteacher; and 
the common sense pragmatist. Lady Jones. * I will then analyze these conceptual 
portraits of teachers from the perspective of Cornel West's prophetic pragmatism. 
The objective of this chapter then will be to lay out, within the philosophical 
framework of prophetic pragmatism, a critical dialogue among the three 
conceptual portraits of teachers in Beloved from which this inquiry, in the final 
chapter, can construct the concept teacher as prophetic pragmatist and explore its 
suitability as a basis for a more inclusive plan of operations capable of negotiating 
and renegotiating the relationship between religion and public education.
Teacher Cases in Beloved
In my own experience, thinking about teaching and what it means to be a 
teacher coincided with becoming a teacher. I began my teaching career as a U.S. 
Peace Corps volunteer in a predominately Islamic region of the southern 
Philippines in the mid-1980's. The university to which I was assigned had been 
founded only twenty years before to preserve Filipino Muslim culture and to help
’Deanne Bogdan, Re-educating the Imagination: Toward a Poetics, 
Politics, and Pedagogy o f Literary Engagement, Portsmouth: Boynton/Cook, 
1992.
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bring the Muslim ethnic groups of the region into the mainstream of Philippine 
society. My assignment there came less than ten years after a bloody war for 
independence for Muslim Mindanao and coincided with the last year of the Marcos 
dictatorship and the first attempts to restore democracy under Corazon Aquino. 
My first experience of being a teacher, therefore, took place in a milieu of Islamic 
and communist guerilla movements, military oppression, American neo-colonial 
interference, and political turmoil that made for an educational environment 
saturated with issues of religious-ethnic identity and social justice. Though my 
status as an outsider and a representative of the former colonial regime propping 
up the Marcos dictatorship rendered my own teaching marginal to the events of 
the day, my presence, and the relationship I formed with a Filipino teacher (whom 
I would later marry) deeply involved in those events, gave me a glimpse of ways of 
being a teacher that were far different from anything I had ever experienced.
In that brief but intense time I came to know teachers who very literally 
risked their lives, not to mention their jobs, in the service of a vision of social 
justice informed by Marxist analysis and given direction by ethical ideals deeply 
influenced by religious faith, two of the three philosophical coordinates of West's 
prophetic pragmatism. In a climate where tragedy was so common and injustice so 
blatant, the ethical issues seemed clear: teaching which failed to respond to 
injustice by inculcating either reactionary religiosity or status quo careerism was a 
moral failure. Though the return to a quasi-democratic government dominated by
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traditional elites, the world-wide collapse of communism, and the blunting of the 
movement for Muslim independence left many of these teachers dispirited and 
disillusioned, their example constituted for me a compelling model of what it might 
mean to be a teacher, a model I find reflected in Beloved in the character of Baby 
Suggs.
Therefore, by analyzing the character of Baby Suggs as a case of the 
prophetic pragmatic teacher, I hope to identify the strengths and the weaknesses 
of this particular mode of being a teacher for a religiously and culturally diverse 
system of public education which confronts the reality of tragedy in children's lives. 
I will then use these insights to help construct a concept of the prophetic 
pragmatic teacher as a mode of being a teacher which responds to social injustice 
while negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion and 
education.
Baby Suggs: A Clear Case of the Prophetic Pragmatic Teacher
Baby Suggs, described by one reviewer of Beloved as "the most memorable 
minor character since one of Faulkner's," is not a teacher in the formal sense.® She 
is rather a teacher in a more ancient and traditional sense; she is the matriarch, the 
storyteller, the priestess, the tribal elder who, through her stories, teaches the 
people who they are and, through her prophetic exhortations, teaches them who
®Roger Sale, "Toni Morrison's Beloved' in Harold Bloom, Modem Critical 
Views, pp. 165-170.
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they should be. She represents a clear and inspiring case of teacher as prophetic 
pragmatist. A better understanding of her case, therefore, will be useful in 
delineating the relevance of this concept as a mechanism for negotiating and 
renegotiating the relationship between religion and public education in a context of 
man-made injustice and existential tragedy.
Like most of the other slaves in this novel. Baby Suggs suffers from that 
condition described by Orlando Patterson as "natal alienation; that is, the loss of 
ties at birth to both ascending and descending generations."’ "Anybody Baby 
Suggs knew, let alone loved, who hadn't run oflf or been hanged, got rented out, 
loaned out, bought up, bought back, stored up, mortgaged, won, stolen or seized" 
(23). The past, therefore, is "unspeakable" (58). Before coming to Sweet Home 
she worked the rice and tobacco fields of the Carolinas where she was beaten so 
severely she broke her hip. She bears eight children by sbc different fathers, only 
the last of whom, Halle, she is allowed to keep and raise (139). As a consequence 
of these experiences she learns, as Paul D says, to "love small," to avoid the 
powerful attachments to children and other loved ones or to trust whites, whether 
benevolent or cruel, in order to survive the inevitable severing of those ties and 
betrayal of that trust. She is finally, however, allowed to keep her last child after
’Cornel West, Prophetic Fragments: Illuminations o f the Crisis in 
American Religion and Culture, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1988, p. 43.
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she is bought by Gamer to work as a house slave on the Sweet Home plantation.
It is this last son, who is allowed to work away from the plantation for hire, who 
Gamer allows to buy his mother’s freedom when, she believes, "it didn't mean a 
thing" (23). "What does a sixty-odd-year-old slavewoman who walks like a three- 
legged dog need freedom for?" (141).
However, when Baby Suggs is carried across the Ohio to Cincinnati and 
freedom her life is transformed. "And when she stepped foot on free ground she 
could not believe that Halle knew what she didn't; that Halle, who had never drawn 
one free breath, knew that there was nothing like in this world" (141). She 
discovers herself, and owns herself for the first time: "These hands belong to me. 
These my hands" (141). She rejects her slave name, renames herself "Baby Suggs," 
and resolves that, "because slave life had 'busted her legs, back, head, eyes, hands, 
kidneys, womb and tongue,' she had nothing left to make a living with but her 
heart—which she put to work at once" (87)..."giving advice; passing messages; 
healing the sick, hiding fugitives, loving, cooking, cooking, loving, preaching, 
singing, dancing and loving everybody like it was her job and hers alone" (137). In 
short, the possibilities of freedom revise the lessons of slavery; it calls her to love 
large rather than small.
Baby Suggs' heart becomes the heart of the black community in Cincinnati. 
Her home at 124 Bluestone Road becomes a literal community center, a way 
station where messages are sent and received, where people met and argued the
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Fugitive Slave Bill and other political issues, where strangers rested, and where 
"not one but two pots simmered on the stove; where the lamp burned all night 
long" (65, 87). It is, in effect, a school-house where former slaves are initiated 
into, and through which they sustain, community in freedom. While her house 
becomes the civic, political, and educational center of black Cincinnati, "Baby 
Suggs, holy" herself becomes the cultural and spiritual center of the community:
Accepting no title of honor before her name, but allowing a small 
caress after it, she became an unchurched preacher, one who visited 
pulpits and opened her great heart to those who could use it. In 
winter and fall she carried it to AME's and Baptists, Holinesses and 
Sanctifieds, the Church of the Redeemer and the Redeemed. Uncalled, 
unrobed, unanointed, she let her great heart beat in their presence (87).
In Spring and Summer Baby Suggs leads "services" in a clearing in the
forest, services which distill and mix Christian teaching and Afiican cultural
practices and belie Anna Julia Cooper’s criticism of the "rank exuberance and often
ludicrous demonstrativeness" of this "semi-civilized religionism"as they deploy and
compellingly revise Christ's great commandment.’ Every Saturday afternoon Baby
Suggs leads "every black man, woman and child who could make it through" to
’Anna Julia Cooper, A Voice from the South, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, p. 34.
Christ's great commandment: "Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all 
thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind...and Thou shall love thy 
neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the 
prophets." Matthew 23: 37-40, King James Bible. Baby Suggs revises this 
commandment with her commandment to "love yourself as both a prerequisite for 
Christ's commandment and a necessary response to whites' failure to include blacks 
in the second part of Christ's commandment.
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the "Clearing" where she gathers the people around her and leads them in a 
cathartic and profoundly educative ritual of laughter, song, and dance.
After situating herself on a huge flat-sided rock. Baby Suggs 
bowed her head and prayed silently. The company watched her from the 
trees. They knew she was ready when she put her stick down. The she 
shouted, "Let the children come!" and they ran from the trees toward her.
"Let your mothers hear you laugh," she told them, and the woods 
rang. The adults looked on and could not help smiling.
Then "Let the grown men come," she shouted. They stepped out 
one by one from among the ringing trees.
"Let your wives and your children see you dance," she told them, 
and groundlife shuddered under their feet.
Finally she called the women to her. "Cry," she told them. "For the 
living and the dead. Just cry." And without covering their eyes the women 
let loose.
It started out that way: laughing children, dancing men, crying 
women and then it got mixed up. Women stopped crying and danced; men 
sat down and cried; children danced, women laughed, children cried until, 
exhausted and riven, all and each lay about the Clearing damp and gasping 
for breath. In the silence that followed. Baby Suggs, holy, offered up to 
them her great big heart (87-88).
The "lesson" Baby Suggs conveys through this cathartic ritual is the 
fundamental relationship between feeling and community. It is feeling, shared 
emotional experiences and ties that forge and sustain community. And it is only in 
community and through community that the kind of learning which enables 
survival—the focus of Baby Suggs' teaching—can take place. Fixation on individual 
feelings and experiences, such as Sethe's obsessive love of her dead daughter and 
her belief that she needed nothing else, threaten the existence not only of the 
community but the individual as well. The shared feeling of community, therefore, 
is the fundamental prerequisite of Baby Suggs' teaching.
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In the silence that follows this ritual of laughter, dance and tears. Baby 
Suggs offers a sermon that does not accuse them of sin and threaten them with 
damnation but rather teaches them "that the only grace they could have was the 
grace they could imagine" (88). She calls on them to recognize and to claim their 
responsibility as a community to construct their reality and their knowledge of it. 
Reality, knowledge of it, and grace—the quality of one's experience in that reality— 
are social constructs bom of the individual's capacity for self love and the nature of 
his interaction with others and with nature.
Here,' she said, 'in this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; flesh 
that dances on bare feet in grass. Love it. Love it hard. Yonder they do not 
love your flesh. They despise it. They don't love your eyes; they'd just as 
soon pick em out. No more do they love the skin on your back. Yonder 
they flay it. And O my people they do not love your hands. Those they only 
use, tie, bind, chop oflf and leave empty. Love your hands! Love them.
Raise them up and kiss them. Touch others with them, pat them together, 
stroke them on your face 'cause they don't love that either. You got to love 
it, you! And no, they ain't in love with your mouth. Yonder, out there, they 
will see it broken and break it again, what you say out of it they will not 
heed. What you scream from it they do not hear. What you put into it to 
nourish your body they will snatch away and give you leavins instead. No, 
they don't love your mouth. You got to love it. This is flesh I'm talking 
about here. Flesh that needs to be loved. Feet that need to rest and to 
dance; backs that need support; shoulders that need arms, strong arms I'm 
telling you. And O my people, out yonder, hear me, they do not love your 
neck unnoosed and straight. So love your neck; put a hand on it, grace it, 
stroke it and hold it up. And all your inside parts that they'd just as soon 
slop for hogs, you got to love them. The dark, dark liver-love it, love it, 
and the beat and beating heart, love that too. More than eyes or feet. More 
than lungs that have yet to draw free air. More than your life-holding 
womb and your live-giving private parts, hear me now, love your heart. For 
this is the prize' (88-89).
Baby Suggs' lesson is more than an exhortation to a greater sense of
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community. Whereas the ritual which opens her service suggests an emphasis on 
community as shared feeling and experience, her sermon establishes the 
importance of self love as a fundamental prerequisite to the capacity to love others 
and thereby forge and sustain community. In this she asserts a claim which Cornel 
West says is fundamental to Afro-American protestant Christianity: the 
iireducibility of the individual within participatory communities governed by the 
principle of mutual accountability.®
The message of Baby Suggs' sermon extends beyond the capacity of 
language to convey; therefore, she draws directly upon African cultural practices 
which survived the middle passage and the years of slavery. She deploys the 
aesthetic—in this instance dance and song—as a means of communicating spiritual 
truths which provide hope and enable survival in the face of the reification of 
human beings of African descent and the "lived experience of coping with a life of 
horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and lovelessness. The object of her 
command to love is clear in the verbal portion of her sermon: "This is flesh I'm 
talking about here. Flesh that needs to be loved"(89). In her dance, however.
®Comel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary 
Christianity, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982, p. 17-19.
'"Though Cornel West used these words to describe the experience of 
contemporary African-Americans, I think his words are also an accurate 
description of the slave life depicted in Beloved. Cornel West, Race Matters, 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1993, p. 14.
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which is clearly a continuation of her lesson, the object of the love she commands
is left deliberately and radically open. The dance becomes a symbol, a variable, to
which meaning may be attached by any individual in her audience but which is not
confined to that meaning. It becomes therefore an imperative: Love! Love large.
This is the only response to evil.
"Saying no more, she stood up then and danced with her twisted hip the 
rest of what her heart had to say while the others opened their mouths and 
gave her the music. Long notes held until the four-part harmony was 
perfect enough for their deeply loved flesh" (89).
What Baby Suggs' teaches, however, is a response to evil, not a guarantee 
against it. For in spite of Baby Suggs' powerful message, she is unable to detect 
and thus unable to resist when the "four horsemen of the apocalypse"— 
Schoolteacher, his nephew, the sheriff, and the slave catcher—arrive to return 
Sethe and her children to slavery (149). When Sethe responds to their arrival by 
putting her children where they would by "safe"—attempting to kill all of them— 
Baby Suggs is unable to respond. She can neither condemn Sethe's alternative 
response to the existence of evil; nor can she condone it. She is puzzled by God 
and ashamed of Him for what happened in her backyard: "Her authority in the 
pulpit, her dance in the Clearing, her powerful Call (she didn't deliver sermons or 
preach—insisting she was too ignorant for that—she called and the hearing heard)— 
all that had been mocked and rebuked by the bloodspill in her backyard" (177).
She gives up the Call and believes herself a lie and what she taught a lie (89). She
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has lost her faith and takes to her bed to "fix on something harmless in this world," 
color (179). In short, she turns to another response to the existence of evil 
different from her initial command to love and Sethe's embrace of death. She 
chooses to focus on the trivial and thus ignore the response which our knowledge 
of evil's existence requires.
"You getting in the bed to think about yellow?"
"I likes yellow."
"Then what? When you get through with blue and yellow, then what?" 
"Can't say. It's something that can't be planned."
"You blaming God," he said. "That's what you doing."
"No, Stamp. I ain't."
"You saying the whitefolks won? That what you saying?"
"I'm saying they came in my yard."
"You saying nothing counts."
"I'm saying they came in my yard."
"Sethe's the one did it."
"And if she didn't?"
"You saying God give up? Nothing left for us but pour out our own
blood?"
"I'm saying they came in my yard."
"You punishing Him, ain't you."
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"Not like He punish me."
"You can't do that. Baby. It ain't right."
"Was a time I knew what that was."
"You still know."
"What I know is what I see: a nigger woman hauling shoes" (179).
The bloodspill in her backyard shakes Baby Suggs' philosophy to its very 
foundations. It causes a radical shift in the epistemic assumptions on which her 
teaching was based. The philosophical foundation of her teaching before the 
"bloodspill" was a sense of good, of justice—"was a time I knew what that was"— 
governed by an ethic of love. Experience, however, has utterly failed to confirm 
the efficacy of that ethic: "They came in my yard." Now she knows what she sees: 
"a nigger woman hauling shoes." Her statement suggests a surrender to a more 
"realistic" philosophical orientation centered on knowledge claims which can be 
verified by observation. In this philosophical orientation feeling, community, love, 
grace are irrelevant. Faith, therefore, is irrelevant, but disappointment is no longer 
a threat.
Baby Suggs does not surrender belief in God's existence; she knew the 
"things behind things" and her belief in the reality of a spiritual dimension to the 
world she inhabits is matter of fact (37). What she loses rather is her faith. The fact 
that her message of love as resistance to evil is powerless to prevent evil from 
coming in her yard undermines her belief that God's words describing how one
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should live in the face of tragedy are true and her trust that He takes some active 
interest on the side of good and against evil." Her understanding of what is good- 
"knowing when to stop" (86)—challenges the goodness of the God who, in 
allowing the four horsemen in her yard, did not know when to stop, and suggests 
that Sethe's response—death—is the only realistic response to the tragic. And 
without her faith she is just what she sees-"?i nigger woman hauling shoes"(I79). 
Like the teachers I knew in the Philippines who lost faith and hope when the tool 
with which they hoped to transform reality—Marxism—collapsed. Baby Suggs is 
disillusioned by the failure of love to protect against evil. Without her faith in the 
power of love, she is simply the object of observation which Schoolteacher's 
epistemology always said she was.
Baby Suggs goes to bed and contemplates color until she dies. In her doubt 
and despair she considers herself a failure. And most critics who have written on 
Beloved and Baby Suggs suggest that hers is a beautiful, noble failure to find the 
formula for survival in the face of overwhelming oppression and tragedy.
"According to reformed epistemology these are the two basic elements of 
faith. Dewey J. Hoitenga, Faith and Reason From Plato to Plantinga: An 
Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1991, pp. 38-40.
*^ See, for instance, Trudier Harris, Fiction and Folklore: The Novels o f 
Toni Morrison, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991 p. 175; Wendy 
Harding and Jacky Martin, A World o f Difference: An Inter-Cultural Study o f 
Toni Morrison's Novels, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994 p. 126; and Denise 
Heinze, The Dilemma o f "Double -Consciousness": Toni Morrison’s Novels,
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However, such a reading of Baby Suggs and her teaching fails to note that her 
death is not the end of her teaching or her intervention in the lives of Sethe and 
Denver. At the most pivotal point of the novel Denver realizes that her mother and 
Beloved are locked in a relationship of consuming love, recrimination, and 
reproach that threatens to destroy them all. She stands on the porch of the house at 
124 Bluestone Road, "ready to be swallowed up in the world beyond the edge of 
the porch" (243), trying to muster the strength to leave the house—something she 
has not done in years—in order to seek help.
Out there where small things scratched and sometimes touched. Where 
words could be spoken that would close your ears shut. Where, if you were 
alone, feeling could overtake you and stick to you like a shadow. Out there 
where there were places in which things so bad had happened that when 
you went near them it would happen again...What was more—much m ore- 
out there were whitepeople, and how could you tell about them? (243-44)
At this pivotal moment, as Denver contemplates the inevitable tragedies that await
her or anyone else who ventures out into life. Baby Suggs speaks to her.
Denver stood on the porch in the sun and couldn't leave it. Her 
throat itched; her heart kicked—and then Baby Suggs laughed, clear as 
anything. "You mean I never told you nothing about Carolina? About your 
daddy? You don't remember nothing about how come I walk the way I do 
and about your mother's feet, not to speak of her back? I never told you all 
that? Is that why you can't walk down the steps? My Jesus my."
"But you said there was no defense."
"There ain't."
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993, p. 113.
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"Then what do I do?"
"Know it, and go on out the yard. Go on. "(244)
For a novel in which the supernatural is treated in such a matter-of-fact 
manner and the title character is a dead child come back to life, it cannot be a 
misreading of this passage to see it as the actual counsel of Baby Suggs from 
beyond the g rave.E ven if these lines are read simply as Denver's recollection of 
Baby Suggs' teaching, they nevertheless constitute a profound response to the 
problem of evil which Baby Suggs learned from her experience of the "four 
horsemen" coming "in her yard" which she is now teaching Denver: There is no 
defense against or final victory over evil. There is only love as perpetual resistance: 
"Know it and go on out the yard." This is the heart of Baby Suggs teaching, 
teaching which rests on an undogmatic faith in the power and necessity of love, of 
loving large, as a necessary but not necessarily sufficient condition of survival in a 
world marred by evil.
Bab\ Suggs as Teacher: Aims. Achievements. Ends
As a teacher. Baby Suggs is distinctive in terms of her audience, aims, 
methods, and achievements. In this distinctiveness she represents a clear and 
particularly inspiring example of the prophetic pragmatic teacher. Thus she
"In an interview Morrison uses the term "enchantment" to describe "this 
other knowledge or perception," "the way the world was for me and most black 
people I knew." Quoted in Jan Furman, Toni Morrison's Fiction, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1996, p. 81.
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embodies a conception of teacher quite different from those described as the 
technician and the common sense pragmatist in Chapter II, a conception which 
challenges conventional modes of being a teacher through its unapologetic 
placement of an ethic of love at the heart of educational aims and practice and its 
frank recognition of the relevance of spiritual healing and wholeness to existential 
survival. While Baby Suggs' embodiment of the prophetic pragmatic teacher is not 
without its shortcomings, particularly when translated to the context of formal 
education in a diverse society, it nevertheless exposes the disastrous inadequacies 
of more conventional modes of being teacher and highlights inspiring possibilities 
for a reconception of teacher for a religiously and culturally diverse society marred 
by social injustice.
One of these areas of inadequacy-possibility exposed through Baby Suggs' 
embodiment of the prophetic pragmatic teacher concerns the parameters of the 
teacher's audience Though Denver and Sethe are the most obvious of Baby Suggs' 
students in the context of the novel, her actual "students" consist of all the black 
men, women, and children of Cincinnati—rather than children only or those over 
whom the teacher seeks power—and by implication all those who cope with a life 
of "horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and lovelessness. Like the 
prophets, the audience for her teaching is the community as a whole rather than
'*West, Race Matters, p. 14.
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any single segment of that community. Her great sermon-lesson in the Clearing 
(87-89) includes grown men, women, and children who each in turn participate in 
the activities to which the others are called: "It started that way: laughing children, 
dancing men, crying women and then it got mixed up" (88). Even where Baby 
Suggs is addressing particular segments of the community, such as when she 
preaches at the various churches, the message of her teaching is consistent: the 
centrality of an ethic of love to the spiritual-existential survival of individuals and 
the community.
The audience for Baby Suggs' teaching is a consequence of her educational 
aims and reveals the inadequacies of the more conventional concepts of teacher as 
technician and common sense pragmatist. For unlike the technician and common 
sense pragmatist. Baby Suggs does not seek to bring her "students" into 
conformity with a methodological ideal or the conventions of the dominant 
element of the community; rather, she strives to bring her "students" into 
conformity with an ethical ideal; love. Thus, where the technician postulates 
knowledge as an ideal end and ignorance as its antithesis, and the common sense 
pragmatist postulates conformity as an ideal end with non-conformity as its 
antithesis, the prophetic pragmatic teacher postulates an ethic of love as the ideal 
end of teaching and injustice as the antithesis of that ideal. And from this 
fundamental postulate follow Baby Suggs' simple and clear "instructional" 
objectives: to forge a sense of identity and relatedness among a people suffering
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from "natal alienation," to nurture the capacity for self love and, therefore, the 
capacity to love others and, through them, God, and to marshall the spiritual 
resources which will enable individual human beings to confront, resist, and 
survive both natural and man-made tragedy.
The achievement of these objectives is illustrated in the learning that 
happens both in the community and in Denver. And the core of this learning is the 
fact that love is an act o fwili. "You got to love it, youV' Baby Suggs says to her 
pupils in her Clearing sermon (88). It is not merely an emotion or feeling by which 
one is possessed, as both Beloved and Sethe attempt to possess one another. It is 
reduced to this when it exists in isolation from community. Love becomes a 
consuming force that threatens to destroy its object as the all-consuming love of 
Sethe and Beloved threatens to do in their isolation at 124 Bluestone Road. Love, 
therefore, must exist within the context of democratic community, of mutual 
accountability and responsibility.
This relationship between love and community is embodied in Baby Suggs. 
When the community withdraws from her in resentment of her generosity and 
Sethe's terrible act. Baby Suggs begins to die and the community that existed 
around her begins to collapse: love and community enable one another. Without 
the one, the other cannot exist, leaving all vulnerable to evil. Baby Suggs learns 
this fact only after her death, and teaches it to Denver in that moment when 
Denver stands on the porch attempting to muster the courage to step into the
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world of community, which she has come to fear, in order to save her mother. 
"Know it, and go on out the yard," she tells Denver from beyond the grave (244), 
know that while love-in-community is no defense against evil, it is our only means 
of surviving it for it enables and sustains our perpetual resistance. Baby Suggs' 
teaching, therefore, can be distilled to these three truths; love is an act of will, love 
can only exist in community, and love-in-community enables survival of the tragic. 
Baby S u ^ s  as Teacher: Methods. Tasks. Means
To achieve these ends and bring about this learning Baby Suggs deploys 
three distinct yet interrelated means: narrative, art, and poiêsis.'* Baby Suggs is a 
storyteller. The stories she tells Denver and Sethe, which Sethe in turn tells again 
to Denver and Beloved, are the primary means through which both of Baby Suggs' 
granddaughters attempt to forge their identities. Beloved hungers for these stories 
and implores Sethe to tell them again and again, as if the stories themselves are 
capable of giving her rather tenuous corporeal existence some permanence. Denver 
too participates in the storytelling, passing on and embellishing the stories passed 
on to her by Sethe and Baby Suggs, creating a coherent past in order to preserve 
the present and the possibility of a future. "She told me all my daddy's things," 
Denver says. "She told me my things too" (209). And Baby Suggs' words on the
*’My understanding and discussion of poeësis is largely based on Jim 
Garrison's use of the term in Dewey and Eros: Wisdom and Desire in the Art o f 
Teaching, New York: Teachers College Press, 1997, pp. 76-88.
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porch—"You mean I never told you about Carolina? About your daddy?"(244)~ 
have the air of a teacher gently reminding a student of a lesson she has already 
been taught. Baby Suggs' use of narrative constitutes an act of creative 
imagination, a dialogue between historical events and present need that constructs 
a coherent epistemology that enables her "students" to attain the overarching goal 
of her instruction. Her narratives, however, are not divorced from historical reality, 
nor are they enslaved to it. They are a creative reading of historical reality in light 
of contemporary need designed to achieve a particular end: survival in the face of 
natural and man-made tragedy.
Narrative alone, however, is inadequate. Where words fail. Baby Suggs 
uses art—primarily dance and song—to convey lessons that can be conveyed in no 
other way. "Saying no more, she stood up then and danced with her twisted hip the 
rest of what her heart had to say while the others opened their mouths and gave 
her the music" (89). The arts Baby Suggs deploys are, significantly, art forms 
which allow for both individual and communal expression. The individual 
participates in the artistic expression of the community in a way that does not 
compromise or diminish the artistic expression of the individual even as the 
individual contributes to the construction of something larger than himself. In this 
way Baby Suggs' aesthetic method preserves the sanctity of the individual while 
emphasizing another aim of her "instruction:" the creation and sustenance of 
community. The success of her teaching is in the restoration and maintenance of
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community, in Denver's ability to step ofif the porch and save Sethe by initiating the 
process of her reintegration into the community, the only context in which she can 
survive. When she believes she has failed in her teaching and takes to her bed to 
contemplate color, she fixes on the patches of color in a quilt, traditionally a form 
of communal art, as if this small tangible product of her teaching goals is a means 
of maintaining her sanity until death closes her struggle.
Baby Suggs' preaching, the prophetic voice that "speaks the truth to the 
health of the community," constitutes another teaching method which directly 
responds to the existential questions about how one should live in the face of the 
tragic.'® Her preaching, and the very model of her being, constitutes a form of 
poiêsis, a creative calling-into-existence of that which did not exist before.This 
power of the "call" is integral to her character; "she didn't deliver sermons or 
preach—insisting that she was too ignorant for that—she called and the hearing 
heard"(177). When she surrenders to the tragedy in her life and abandons her 
sermons in the Clearing, Stamp Paid urges her to return: "Can't nobody Call like
'®In this aspect Baby Suggs mirrors Toni Morrison's objectives and 
methods. "Morrison draws fi’om the past and from tribal identity to address 
contemporary threats to the community she seeks to preserve. To have such an 
imagination...allies her with those who seek the role of prophet: One who speaks 
the truth to the health of the community." Loretta Ann McGrann, Toni Morrison 
and the American Sermonic Tradition, Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services, 
1995, p. 24.
'^Garrison, p. 76.
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you. You have to be there"(178). What Baby Suggs calls into existence in her 
sermon in the Clearing is self love and self worth, community, the existential armor 
that enables survival. She is called to her task by that love and calls it into 
existence in the lives of others. "The Word had been given to her and she had to 
speak it. Had to" (178). Baby Suggs' teaching is centered upon an ethical rather 
than an epistemological or social ideal, an ideal that calls her to "teach" and which 
she calls into existence through her teaching. That ethical ideal is love, not as mere 
sentiment or passion or individual desire, but as an act of will upon which 
community is founded and survival made possible.
Bab\> Sus2 s ' Relations with "Students"
Baby Suggs' purposes and methods are enacted from within a distinctive 
relationship with her "students." She is not a leader in any political, ideological, or 
economic sense. She is "uncalled, unrobed, unanointed" and accepted no "title of 
honor before her name," though she accepted a "small caress" after it—holy (87). 
Her authority flows from and is vested in that "small caress" by which the 
community names her critical role as a link between them and the numinous, 
between them and a non-rational, non-cognitive, yêfr sense of a transcendent good 
which they name "holy."** From her location at the "heart" of the community
**Thus "holy" is part of Baby Suggs' name. It is also, I contend, a 
characteristic of her teaching. For a discussion of the meaning of the concept see 
Rudolf Otto, The Idea o f the Holy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1958.
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rather than its "head," Baby Suggs beckons to her pupils and points to this good, 
this love, which both exists, potentially, within their experience yet transcends it as 
well, thus providing an ethical orientation which may enable their survival. She 
does not attempt to capture or define the holy in the schema of words or existing 
mythic conventions—the conventions of the various religious denominations are 
equally suitable for her message, as is the more pagan ritual of the Clearing—rather, 
she dances it, literally and figuratively, in the manner of a honey bee scout—one of 
the workers, not a queen—who dances the directions and distance to a source for 
the pollen from which the community creates the means of its own survival. Thus a 
non-schematized sense of the holy sits at the center of Baby Suggs' teaching and at 
the center of her community, a sense of the holy which is not confined by but can 
be accessed through the myths of "Baptists, Holinesses and Sanctifieds"(87), the 
quasi-pagan sermons and rituals of the Clearing, or the twisted-hip dance of Baby 
Suggs, holy.
Baby Sii^ss: Cultural and Philosophical Antecedents
Baby Suggs' cultural genealogy is, obviously enough, Afncan-American. 
However, her character also exhibits the seminal influences of her Afncan cultural 
heritage and Christian narrative influences. She enacts a number of traditional roles 
characteristic of West Afncan cultures. She is the archetypal leader of the tribe or 
clan, the ritual priestess blending aesthetic practices such as dance and music with 
the mythic function of storytelling to enact rituals which make individual behavior
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meaningful within the context of shared beliefs.*’ She is also the folk healer, 
treating not only physical wounds—as when she treats Sethe's tom back and feet— 
but also the psychic wounds of her people. “  Her repeated advice to Sethe as she 
massaged her daughter-in-law's shoulders constitutes a form of psychological 
healing; "Lay em down, Sethe. Sword and shield. Down. Down. Both of em down. 
Down by the riverside. Sword and shield. Don't study war no more. Lay all that 
mess down. Sword and shield" (86). Her beliefs also exhibit characteristics 
consistent with certain West Afncan beliefs, such as the conception o f time as 
cyclical, her matter-of-fact acceptance of the idea that life is not the end of being, 
and her apparent use of "core-clichés"—"You mean I never told you nothing about 
Carolina? Your daddy? (244)—which she repeats and elaborates upon in order to 
convey cultural values, another characteristic of African oral folk traditions.'*
Baby Suggs is her community's connection to the ancient Afncan myths; she is a 
"conjurer who is magic and prescient but also practical.
*’Harris, p. 174 and Harding and Martin, p. 111.
“^Philip Page, Dangerous Freedoms: Fusion and Fragmentation in Toni 
Morrison's Novels, Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1995, p. 147.
*^ Susan Bowers, "Beloved and the New Apocalypse" in David L. 
Middleton, ed., Toni Morrison's Fiction: Contemporary Criticism, New York: 
Garland, 1997, p. 212; Page, p. 143 and Harris, p. 154.
^Barbara Hill Rigney, The Voices o f Toni Morrison, Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1991, p. 68. Baby Suggs' knowledge of the "things behind 
things"(37), and her enactment of myth in order to render experience meaningful is 
a quality Owen Barfield has named "orginal participation," a characteristic, he
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The African roots of Baby Suggs' participatory ontology can be seen in the 
parallels between Beloved and Chinua Achebe's (1959) novel Things Fall Apart. ^  
Achebe's novel, like Morrison's, portrays a people struggling for survival in the 
face of oppression by deploying myth and ritual in a communal system of belief 
that holds them together as a society. However, both novelists suggest that simply 
holding on to the old myths does not enable survival; the characters who attempt 
to do this—Okonkwo in Things Fall Apart and Sixo in Beloved~ds& destroyed. It 
is, rather, the individuals like Baby Suggs and Achebe's Akunna who are capable of 
adapting and re-creating myth in a jazz-like improvisation on cultural themes who 
hold out any hope in either novel of keeping or putting things back together and
claims, of pre-modem cultures. Barfield claims that modem physics teaches us that 
the phenomena of human perceptions are the products of "figuration," a mental 
activity that forms sensory data into the appearances of ordinary physical reality. 
Thus human consciousness plays an active, creative role in shaping the 
fundamental particles of matter into the phenomena we perceive; the mind 
"participates" reality. Barfield argues that "primal" peoples recognized the 
participated nature of reality in their understanding that "there stands behind the 
phenomena, and on the other side of them from me, a represented which is of the 
same nature as me." What we might today refer to as totemism or pantheism is 
really "original participation," a belief that the objects of the physical world are 
representations mutually constructed by the observer and something or one behind 
the thing observed. This is Baby Suggs' ontological orientation, an orientation 
which resembles in some ways a spiritualized manifestation of philosophical 
pragmatism. See Owen Barfield, Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry, 
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965, pp. 24, 42.
^  In a comment on her reading of African writers, Morrison has stated that 
" Achebe was a real education for me. In Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and J. A. Appiah, 
Toni Morrison: Critical Perspectives Past and Present, New York: Amistad,
1993, p. 416.
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insuring the survival of their societies and the individuals who comprise them. Thus 
Baby Suggs' mythic pragmatism has obvious African roots even as it has relevance 
for any people who live with the tragic inevitabilities of cultural change.
In addition to her African genealogical heritage. Baby Suggs' character also 
draws on Christian narrative, namely, the image and behavior of Christ.^" Baby 
Suggs' unordained, untrained but "called" figure wandering and preaching from 
pulpit to pulpit to Clearing and gathering the faithful around her is reminiscent of 
Christ.^ Her "gospel" of love, a clear revision of Christ's great commandment, and 
her counsel to "lay it down, sword and shield" are also powerful echoes of the 
gospel of Christ. The imagery of Baby Suggs in Beloved is also frequently 
reminiscent of imagery associated with Christ. For instance, her careful and gentle 
bathing of Sethe, particularly her horribly disfigured feet (93), mirrors Christ's 
washing of the feet of his disciples and the woman who washed his feet with her 
tears and is reminiscent of the numerous stories of Christ's "cleansing" and 
"healing" powers.^® One of the most striking Christ-like actions of Baby Suggs is
■^*A number of critics have noted Baby Suggs' function as a Christ-figure in 
Beloved. See, for instance. Bowers, p. 220 and Ann-Janine Morey, "Margaret 
Attwood and Toni Morrison: Reflections on Postmodernism and the Study of 
Religion and Literature" in David L. Middleton, ed., Toni Morrison’s Fiction: 
Contemporary Criticism, New York: Garland Publishing, 1997, p. 252.
25See Matthew 4: 23, King James Bible.
’®See John 13: 5-12, King James Bible. See also Luke 7:38 and 16:20-24 
and John 11: 1-45.
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the celebration she devises for Sethe's and her children's arrival at 124 Bluestone 
Road. From Stamp's two buckets of blackberries grows a feast for ninety people.
Now to take two buckets of blackberries and make ten, 
maybe twelve, pies; to have turkey enough for the whole town 
pretty near, new peas in September, fresh cream but no cow, ice 
and sugar, batter bread, bread pudding, raised bread, shortbread- 
it made them mad. Loaves and Fishes were His powers...(137).
Baby Suggs' miraculous multiplication of two buckets of blackberries into a
feast for ninety is a clear reference to Christ's feeding of the multitude with "five
loaves and two fishes" and the Pharisees resentment of him.^’ Baby Suggs'
celebration also suggests communion, which is the ritual commemoration of
Christ's last supper at Passover, the Jewish celebration of their delivery out of
slavery in Egypt. And, significantly, Christ is betrayed after the last supper. The
purple juice of the blackberries and the various breads enumerated suggest the
bread and wine of communion, the ritual by which the people come together and
reaffirm their identity as a community. Clearly, as at least one critic has suggested,
to read Morrison completely and correctly one must read her with a sensitivity to
the biblical contexts of her narratives.^
The fact that these two cultural streams—the African and the Christian—
^Matthew 14:14-21 and Mark 6:35, Ibid. 
^'Matthew 26: 17 and Exodus 12:14, Ibid. 
^^cGrann, p. 26.
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merge in Baby Suggs places her squarely in the tradition of Afro-American 
protestant Christianity as an archetypal example of the Afro-American preacher 
The clear call and response patterns of her Clearing sermon are characteristic of 
the Afro-American oral tradition in both vocal music and preaching/' In a sense, 
then. Baby Suggs is a historical character because she exhibits the mixture of 
African and Christian cultural elements that constitute major influences in Afro- 
American culture. She is a creation of Morrison's jazz-like improvisation on and 
revision of Afro-American history and myth, her "Bahktinian heteroglossia," which 
devises new myths that can sustain community and enable individual survival.^^ She 
embodies the jazz-like qualities of Cornel West's freedom fighter, "fluid and 
flexible and protean and open to a variety of different sources and perspectives" as 
she "both constitute[s] a usable past, and project[s] a future" through her use of 
narrative and poiësis.^^
Baby Sug^s as Prophetic Pragmatist
Like West's prophetic pragmatic freedom fighter and Gramsci's organic
“^Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary 
Christianity, Philadelphia; Westminster Press, 1982, pp. 101-108 and Peach, p. 98.
^'Harris, p. 173 and Mobley, p. 193. 
^^Page, pp. 143, 153.
^^Comel West, Prophetic Reflections: Notes on Race, Class and Power in 
America, Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism, Vol. II, Monroe: Common 
Courage Press, 1993, p. 242.
229
intellectual. Baby Suggs draws upon the best of the knowledge available to her to 
mount a devastating and relentless critique of the political and economic forces 
that oppress her people.”  Her sermon in the Clearing constitutes a powerful 
critique of the racist domination and economic exploitation of Afncan-Americans 
by whites (88). And she refuses Sethe's argument that some whites are not so bad;
"They got me out of jail," Sethe once told Baby Suggs.
"They also put you in it," she answered.
"They drove you 'cross the river."
"On my son's back."
"They gave you this house."
"Nobody gave me nothing."
"I got a job from them."
"He got a cook from them, girl."
"Oh, some of them do all right by us."
"And every time it's a surprise, ain't it?"
"You didn't used to talk this way."
"Don't box with me. There's more of us they drowned than there is all of
them ever lived from the start of time. Lay down your sword. This ain't a
battle; it's a rout" (244).
^*0n West's debt to Gramsci see Gomel West, The American Evasion o f 
Philosophy: A Genealogy o f Pragmatism, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1989, pp. 231-235.
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While this conversation can be read as a blanket condemnation of all whites, I 
believe it can also be read as an implicit recognition that the inequalities in political 
and economic power between blacks and whites perpetuate the oppression of 
Afncan-Americans. Even those who "do all right by us"—the abolitionist Bodwins 
or the benevolent slave-master Gardner—still maintain the inequality on which their 
power is based. As a social critic. Baby Suggs is not fooled by those members of 
the "oppressor class" who "proclaim devotion to the cause of liberation yet [are] 
unable to enter into communion with the people."”
Baby Suggs is literally and figuratively in communion with the people. She 
does not use her authority to seek prestige or adulation from people; she refuses 
any "title of honor before her name" and is "accustomed to the knowledge that 
nobody prayed for her" (87, 138). She does not, like Schoolteacher, seek power. 
Nor does she deploy her criticism from the intellectuaiized margins of her 
community, claiming leadership on the basis of her superior knowledge. She 
claimed "she was too ignorant for that" (177). Rather, she deploys her social, 
economic, and ethical critique from the heart of the community as a member of 
that community. She articulates the critique that emanates from the center of her 
culture. And so her home at 124 Bluestone Road becomes a center of economic 
and political resistance where messages are passed, fugitives are hidden, and the
^*Paulo Freire, Pedagogy o f the Oppressed, New York: Continuum, 1990
p. 47.
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community is sustained in its struggle to survive in the face of racist oppression 
and economic exploitation.
Baby Suggs’ social criticism, like West's prophetic pragmatism, is rooted in 
a conception of what it means to be a human being. Her critique of whites boils 
down to a statement of hers that Denver recollects as she musters the courage to 
leave the front porch and seek help for herself and Sethe; . even when they 
thought they were behaving, it was a far cry from what real human beings did" 
(244). Real human beings live together in a community governed by a mutual 
accountability that is love. Stamp's reminder to Paul D that he would be welcome 
to stay at any black person's house in Cincinnati and the coming together of the 
local women to rescue Sethe are evidence of this ethic (230, 256-59). Though at 
least one critic has noted Baby Suggs' distance from the traditional Christian 
world, I believe her conception of what it means to be human and of the proper 
relationship of individuals in community are identical to those West describes as 
being characteristic of Afro-American protestant Christianity.^* This imago dei 
conception of human nature requires the fundamental equality of all who are made 
in God's image while the Christian dialectic of human nature—made in the image of 
the divine, yet fallen—and history—the inevitable failure of finite human beings to 
transform what is into what-ought-to-be—yields the principle of self-realization in
“ Harris, p. 173.
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community and requires the democratic control of social institutions that regulate 
people's lives as they act out their history/^ These conceptions yield, according to 
West, moral norms regarding individuality and democracy, norms consistent with 
Baby Suggs' and her community's values regarding the relationship between 
individuals and between the individual and society and embodied in her use of 
artistic expression as an educational method. Individuals are morally accountable 
for one another: this is the essence of Stamp's apology to Paul D. The individual is 
responsible to the community: this is the ethical value Sethe violates, not by killing 
Beloved, but by appearing to not need the community. And the community is 
responsible to the individual: this is what the women who come to Sethe's rescue 
finally realize after years of ostracizing her.
Baby Suggs' relentless ethical critique of "whitepeople" is based on these 
moral standards. Though she clearly struggles to adhere to them, and through her 
example teach others to adhere to them, neither she nor the individual members of 
the community fully live up to them. They are unattainable and do not guarantee 
any real protection against the tragic in human experience. They constitute, 
however, a model of social praxis which candidly confronts the tragic nature of 
human existence without losing faith in the necessity and possibility of social.
” West, Prophesy Deliverance!, pp. 16-19.
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cultural, and existential amelioration.^*
The character of Baby Suggs constitutes, I believe, a clear case of a 
prophetic pragmatic teacher and an alternative concept of teacher capable of 
negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion and education. The 
model of teacher which she embodies meets the criteria identified in Chapter I as 
necessary and sufficient—though not necessarily exhaustive—for such a 
reconception. Baby Suggs' teaching is centered in a love ethic which encompasses 
the individual and the community but which also transcends both in a moral- 
ethical ideal of the good which becomes, and is named, holy. It is this moral- 
ethical ideal, this sense of the holy at the heart of her teaching which serves as the 
foundation of Baby Suggs’ unrelenting critique of social injustice. But this sense of 
the holy, of the numenous, is given expression in terms that are meaning-full for 
her community; it is expressed equally well in the Afncan traditions enacted in the 
Clearing or the protestant Christian traditions of the various churches of Cincinnati 
in which Baby Suggs preaches. Because she recognizes that the various mythic 
schema with which different groups attempt to clothe the holy are equally 
serviceable and equally inadequate, these groups recognize in her teaching a 
message which simultaneously reflects and transcends their own, thus her teaching 
gains social authority. Though Baby Suggs temporarily loses this authority, which
^*West, ibid.
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leads to the fragmentation of the community, the loss as well as the concluding 
reassertion of that authority in the teaching—if not the person—of Baby Suggs is a 
clear indication of the necessity of social rather than divine or rational 
authorization. Baby Suggs is able to achieve this level of meaningfulness and social 
authorization for her message because she eschews absolutist epistemic and 
ontological claims. She claims social authority and espouses an anti-"realist" 
ontology. Knowledge is a contingent and thoroughly historicized product of a 
social dialogue between past and present events in the light of an orienting ethical 
ideal; love, the holy. Thus Baby Suggs' teaching affirms diversity in that it refuses 
to impose any single, authorized, or definitive schema on this orienting ethical 
ideal. While it recognizes the difference between the holy and "evil," it also 
recognizes that there are many equally useful, equally inadequate ways of 
understanding and expressing and aspiring to the holy.
What, then, does Baby Suggs' embodiment of the concept prophetic 
pragmatic teacher mean for contemporary flesh-and-blood teachers teaching 
children who must learn to survive the tragic and resist injustice in a multicultural, 
multi-religious educational milieu? How does her model of teacher differ from 
those named the technician and the common sense pragmatist in Chapter II? How 
might we translate the insights from Morrison's fictional portrait of a prophetic 
pragmatic teacher into the reality of contemporary public school teachers in 
contemporary public school classrooms?
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Schoolteacher: A Negative Case of the Prophetic Pragmatic Teacher
One of the two clearest examples of teachers in Beloved, and by far the 
most disturbing, is the man the slaves of Sweet Home call Schoolteacher. The 
appellation bestowed on this character is both descriptive of what he does—he does 
"teach" two boys in his charge as well as the Sweet Home slaves—and his name as 
well, for the novel never offers any other indication of what this character's actual 
name might be. He is always referred to as "Schoolteacher." This name—bestowed 
by an author for whom names have a special significance^’—and the character's 
obvious teacher-like activities throughout the novel suggest a deliberate and 
profoundly disturbing critique which challenges the popular contemporary 
conception of teacher I have named the technician!^ Through this character, I 
believe Morrison exposes the inherent destructiveness of an approach to the role of 
teacher which reduces the act of teaching to the production and control of 
economically valuable observable behaviors, an approach which has an ethic of
’^The importance of names and naming is stressed in Beloved in the 
character of Stamp Paid, who changed his name from Joshua to reflect his sense of 
debtlessness after refusing to kill either his wife or his master's son after the son 
had used Stamp's wife as a concubine for a year (232). Baby Suggs also rejects 
her slave name-Jenny Whitlow-to take the name of her husband-Suggs-and his pet 
name for her-baby (142). Thus naming takes on symbolic importance. Elsewhere 
Morrison has commented on her choice of names to reflect the importance of the 
Bible in the lives of African Americans. Gates and Appiah, p. 375.
“^Morrison says Schoolteacher was named to "reflect the scholarly way in 
which racism was pursued in theology and biology in the Darwinian theory of 
evolution." In Furman, p. 70.
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power, rather than love, as its focal point.
As a former two-year college instructor and dean, this is a concept of 
teaching and teacher which has permeated the particular milieu of my own 
teaching experience and which I have struggled against to preserve some space for 
the arts and humanities in the education of rural poor students. I have time and 
again, in meeting after meeting, listened to colleagues, administrators, and state 
ofiicials identify the needs of business and industry as the legitimate ends of 
teaching, espouse the values of business and industry as desirable values for 
educational institutions, and promote "scientific" methods of instruction as the 
most efficient, precise, and controllable means of achieving those ends. Underlying 
these views is, obviously enough, a controlling metaphor: the school as a factory, 
the teacher as a technician, and the student as raw material. Such values and 
assumptions, however, are not confined to my particular institution; they are the 
values and assumptions which underlie much of the current criticism of public 
schools. The moral and ethical consequences of these assumptions were never 
addressed in the institution I served, and they are rarely, if ever, addressed in the 
popular discourse on public school reform. But Morrison's characterization of 
Schoolteacher constitutes a thought experiment in which the moral consequences 
of the teacher-technician concept are drawn out and explored. It is useful, 
therefore, in helping to define what the prophetic pragmatic teacher is and is not.
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Morrison's Characterization o f Schoolteacher
Schoolteacher comes to Sweet Home with his two nephews after the death 
of Mr. Gamer, the benevolent master of the plantation who had allowed his slaves 
a degree of freedom and afforded them a level of respect which was apparently 
rare in Kentucky and resented by his fellow plantation owners. Schoolteacher, the 
husband of Mrs. Gamer's sister-in-law, is invited by Gamer's widow to oversee 
Sweet Home since her ill health, as well as the social conventions of the time, 
prevent her from mnning a plantation and its male slaves alone. Schoolteacher 
arrives in a big hat and spectacles with "a coach box full of paper"(197). He is 
described as a short, small man who always wore a collar (38). In contrast to 
Gamer, who allowed the Sweet Home men to use guns themselves. Schoolteacher 
disarms the men and keeps a shotgun constantly at his side (224). He is possessed 
of an apparently significant degree of "book learning" and characterized as gentle 
"in a lot of ways" and having "pretty manners." He "knew Jesus by his first name, 
but out of politeness never used it to his face" (38). He is a Puritanical, hard- 
driving taskmaster who "ate little, spoke less, and rested not at all." He allows no 
play (220). He is without emotion, displaying merely a mild sense of regret when 
forced to acknowledge the "unsuitability" of Sixo and Sethe, the two escaped 
slaves he recaptures. He is rational, calculating, and sexless. Returning fi-om the 
capture of the escaped Paul D and Sixo, whom he has just pronounced 
"unsuitable" and murdered. Schoolteacher is reminded by his fellows that he need
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not remain a widower. "My cogitation right now is Sweet Home," he responds 
(227). Schoolteacher's personality is that of the rational, objective, cultivated man 
of science and letters engaged in the scientific management of a business.
Schoolteacher’s epistemic approach is noted repeatedly by Sethe and Paul 
D, the two former Sweet Home slaves who narrate much of the novel. His method 
is reminiscent of that of the modem social scientist: careful observation, precise 
measurement, interviewing/questioning techniques and careful recording of 
observations. After Paul D's recapture and Sixo's murder. Schoolteacher returns 
Paul D to Sweet Home in chains and an iron collar. Then "Schoolteacher looks at 
him for a long time before he closes the door of the cabin. Carefully he looks" 
(227). Soon after, before Sethe has an opportunity to make her escape from Sweet 
Home, she suffers through a brutal attack which permanently scars the psyche of 
this young mother obsessed with getting her breast milk to her three young 
children sent ahead on the underground railroad: she is attacked by Schoolteacher’s 
nephews who hold her down and suck the milk from her breasts (16-17). 
Witnessing the scene drives her husband, Halle, insane. Schoolteacher, however, 
watches carefully and takes notes (70). Schoolteacher also takes measurements as 
a way of collecting data on this slaves. "Schoolteacher’d wrap that string all over 
my head, ’cross my nose, around my behind. Number my teeth" (191). Then he 
records the measurements in his notebook. "I thought he was a fool," Sethe says. 
"And the questions he asked was the biggest foolishness of all" (191). The
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questions, however, "tore Sixo up" (38). Schoolteacher apparently asks questions 
frequently, writing their responses up in his notebook for what, the slaves learn 
later, is a book about them (37).
Schoolteacher's data gathering is conducted in what the social scientist 
engaged in research would call an objective fashion, though to the subjects of his 
research it is anything but objective. He is never portrayed in the novel as showing 
any emotion. He is apparently never angry, sad, excited, happy. He is always 
detached, even while witnessing or participating in the brutal treatment of slaves, 
even when confronted with the horrific scene of Sethe cradling her "crawling 
already?" baby girl as blood jumps from her brutally tom throat and her two little 
boys lie apparently dead at her feet. He sees in such instances objectives—the 
beatings are designed to modify behavior—and economic utility—the loss of "three 
pickaninnies they had hoped to take back to Kentucky ...and raise ...to do the work 
of Sweet Home...and the woman [who]....had at least ten breeding years left" (49). 
He is no "participant-observer" in his data gathering techniques; "Schoolteacher 
didn't take advice from Negroes. The information they offered he called backtalk 
and developed a variety of corrections (which he recorded in his notebook) to re­
educate them" (220). He is, rather, an epitome of the detached, rational, careful 
observer gathering data and formulating "objective" knowledge "untainted" by any 
human subjectivities.
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Schoolteacher as Teacher: Aims. Achievements. Ends
In addition to his scholarly interests. Schoolteacher is also, as his name
suggests, a teacher. He has, however, two separate groups of students—his
nephews and the slaves—and two separate though related educational aims.
Schoolteacher’s is a two-track system of education designed to prepare his
students for their predetermined positions in the political-economic status quo via
a curriculum centered on the possession of power. Indeed, claiming and exercising
power or acquiescing to it seems to be the primary objective of Schoolteacher’s
instruction. For instance. Schoolteacher is teaching his nephews a way o f knowing
which dehumanizes others, reducing them to sets of isolatable characteristics that
enable and justify the exercise of power over them. His purpose is to teach them
how to manage a plantation, to manage slaves by claiming power over them. This
is the object of his lecture about beating an animal "beyond the point of education"
(149). When the nephew who "nursed" Sethe confronts the scene Stamp Paid
names "The Misery"-Sethe’s killing of her baby girl and apparent killing of her two
little boys—he is shaken and confused.
His uncle had warned him against that kind of confusion, but the 
warning didn't seem to be taking. What she go and do that for? On 
account of a beating? Hell, he’d’ been beat a million times and he was 
white. Once it hurt so bad and made him so mad he'd smashed the 
well bucket...But no beating ever made him...1 mean no way he could 
have...What she go and do that for? (150)
The "confusion" his uncle had warned him of is clearly the danger of
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responding to the slaves as human beings. Sethe's terrible response to her 
recapture touches some lingering sense of a common humanity in the nephew— 
"Hell, he'd been beat a million times"—which must be guarded against. To 
Schoolteacher, the scene, this "datum" of experience, does not challenge the 
epistemic structure he has constructed to justify his actions—as it does his nephew- 
-but rather confirms it. It is "testimony to the results of a little so-called freedom 
imposed on people who needed every care and guidance in the world to keep them 
from the cannibal life they preferred" (151). To teach this knowledge to his pupil- 
nephews requires the fragmentation, reification, and dehumanization of his pupil- 
slaves. They become sets of human and animal characteristics rather than fellow 
human beings. They are commodities to be bought and sold, valued and defined by 
their economic functions: "she (Sethe) had ten good breeding years left" (149). 
They are defined as and compared to animals: "coons" (151), a "bull" (148), a 
"foal" whose mother has "gone wild"( 149). Schoolteacher's pupil-nephews must 
learn this language and the "knowledge" it represents in order to claim and 
exercise power.
Schoolteacher's pupil-slaves must leam that this master-slave relationship is 
natural, a truth outside their or the master's desires or whims, a fact they should 
already know. They must leam who is in charge, that "definitions belong to the 
definer-not the defined" (190). Their lesson compliments the lesson of the pupil- 
nephews. Indeed, the success of either lesson depends upon the success of the
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other in learning what Schoolteacher teaches. The success of Schoolteacher’s 
instruction of his pupil-nephews results in their acquisition of power and their 
exercise of violence in order to claim it and keep it. The failure of his instruction of 
his pupil-slaves—or perhaps the inevitable outcome of the "education" he practices- 
-results in resistance: "It (the slaves’ plan to escape to the north) is a good plan. It 
can be done right under the watchful pupils and their teacher" (223). School­
teacher’s instructional methods and educational objectives do violence to both 
categories of student, teach some students—the nephews—to practice violence 
against other students—the slaves, and drive the powerless victims of this violence 
to escape the school that is Sweet Home.
Schoolteacher as Teacher: Methods. Tasks, and Means
Schoolteacher and his nephew-pupils sit and do lessons some mornings 
until breakfast (223) and then study again in the afternoons (193). In the evening 
he writes in his notebook while his nephews clean, mend and sharpen tools (223). 
The rest of the day they are all engaged in the work of the Sweet Home plantation. 
Schoolteacher’s methods would be familiar to any contemporary student or 
teacher: he lectures and his student-nephews take notes, or he reads and they take 
notes. The one assignment he is portrayed as giving his nephew-students involves 
their drawing distinctions between the animal and human characteristics of the 
slaves, matching them in one-to-one dichotomies, and arranging them in two 
parallel columns on a sheet of paper (193). He teaches them to observe carefully,
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distinguish among and select "relevant" characteristics, and then use those 
characteristics to define the object of their observations, in this case human slaves.
The incident where the nephews take Sethe's milk as Schoolteacher 
observes and takes notes suggests—even in Sethe's account, marked as it is by her 
profound sense of violation and degradation—a field experiment designed, perhaps, 
to determine Sethe's suitability for "breeding" purposes or nursing the children of 
other female slaves. He also apparently utilizes a system of positive and negative 
reinforcement to direct his nephews' behavior. For instance, when Sethe escapes 
after being brutally beaten (while six months pregnant) by one of the nephews for 
reporting their "experiment" on her to the invalid Mrs. Gamer, Schoolteacher 
chastises him:
...think-just think-what would his own horse do if you beat it beyond 
the point of education. Or Chipper, or Samson. Suppose you beat the 
hounds past that point thataway. Never again could you trust them in 
the woods or anywhere else. You'd be feeding them maybe, holding 
out a piece of rabbit in your hand and the animal would revert—bite 
your hand clean off. So he punished that nephew by not letting him 
come on the hunt. Made him stay there, feed stock, feed himself, feed 
Lillian, tend crops. See how he liked it; see what happened when you 
overheat creatures God had given you the responsibility of—the 
trouble it was and the loss (149-50).
Schoolteacher is described as being "as hard on his pupils as he was on 
them [the slaves]—except for the corrections"(220). Indeed, the "corrections" 
constitute one important methodological difference in Schoolteacher's "teaching" 
of his other pupils, the slaves. That they constitute another group of students is
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clear: "Schoolteacher changed me," Paul D. says (72). Sethe says "Schoolteacher 
was teaching us things we couldn't leam" (191). In some sense his other methods 
are similar: he speaks/commands and the slaves, rather than writing his words 
down, are expected to act and remember them. Deviations from expected behavior 
are "corrected" with physical punishments. Sethe's "impertinence" in telling Mrs. 
Gamer of her violation at the hands of the nephews and Schoolteacher is 
"corrected" with a severe beating. Though Schoolteacher chastises the nephew for 
beating her "beyond the point of education" (149), he clearly believes in the 
possibility of beating to the point of education.'*  ^When Paul D is recaptured after 
his attempted escape he is locked in a cabin and forced to wear chains and an iron 
collar with three long spokes, which prevent his lying down to rest or sleep, and 
later to wear an iron bit in his mouth. Schoolteacher's preferred method for 
modifying the behavior of Sweet Home's slaves is physical and psychological 
punishment—in short, torture.
Schoolteacher also employs another common educational technique in his 
teaching: the Socratic method. In  a scene clearly reminiscent of Plato's "teaching" 
a slave boy a mathematical formula. Schoolteacher teaches Sixo that "definitions
belief he apparently shares with contemporary advocates of corporal 
punishment.
^^Plato, Mena, in B. Jowett, ed.. The Works o f Plato, New York: Tudor 
Publishing Company, pp. 28-35
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belong to the definers, not the defined" (190):
"Did you steal that shoat? You stole that shoat." Schoolteacher 
was quiet but firm, like he was just going through the motions—not 
expecting an answer that mattered. Sbco sat there, not even getting 
up to plead or deny. He just sat there, the streak-of-lean in his hand, 
the gristle clustered in the tin plate like gemstones—rough, unpolished, 
but loot nevertheless.
"You stole that shoat, didn't you?"
"No. Sir." said Sixo, but he had the decency to keep his eyes 
on the meat.
"You telling me you didn't steal it, and I'm looking right at you?"
"No, sir. I didn't steal it."
Schoolteacher smiled. "Did you kill it?"
"Yes, sir. I killed it."
"Did you cook it?'
"Yes, sir."
"Well, then. Did you eat it?"
"Yes, sir. I sure did."
"And you telling me that's not stealing?"
"No, sir. It ain't."
"What is it then?"
"Improving your property, sir."
"What?"
"Sixo plant rye to give the high piece a better chance. Sixo
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take and feed the soil, give you more crop. Sixo take and feed Sixo 
give you more work."
Clever, but schoolteacher beat him anyway to show him 
that definitions belonged to the definers—not the defined (190).
Just as in Plato's account of Socrates teaching Meno, the teacher here
already knows what it is the student should know. The object of the exercise is to
lead the pupil to knowledge of a truth that is objective, independent of either
knower, which is natural inasmuch as it is assumed that the pupil is already in
possession of it. The knowledge is not révisable. It is not a human construction; it
is certainly not negotiated between the teacher and pupil. Morrison's revision of
this educational narrative shows that Schoolteacher's real object in this dialogue is
not the definition of the concept of theft or of determining Sixo's guilt but rather
demonstrating to Sixo who is in charge, who has the power. Her revision raises the
disturbing possibility that the real point of the Socratic method is a will to power
and the manufacture of a self-enforcing acquiescence to that power on the part of
the pupil.
Schoolteacher's Relation to "Students”
An ethic of power lies at the center of Schoolteacher's embodiment of the 
concept teacher, and deployment of power is his primary instructional technique. 
This ethic and its corresponding technique necessarily establishes a dichotomy 
between those who have power—Schoolteacher and his nephews—and those who 
do not—the slaves. This dichotomy is reflected in the subject-object relationship
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between Schoolteacher and his pupils. Schoolteacher is the "head," the "head­
master" of the educational community of Sweet Home rather than its "heart." He 
alone engages in "cogitation" on the needs and future of Sweet Home and 
determines the means necessary to meet those needs. Unlike Baby Suggs, or even 
the former master, Mr. Gamer, he does not invite his students—nephews or slaves- 
-to participate in or contribute to such "cogitation." Sweet Home is not a 
community; it is a factory, and Schoolteacher is the boss. As such, he is portrayed 
at the head of the "classroom" or standing over his students when he instructs his 
nephews. With his pupil-slaves he is constantly on the fringes, watching, taking 
notes, and controlling. He does not call, he commands. Schoolteacher’s 
relationship with his students constitutes a relation between subject and objects, 
both those who will one day be subjects in their own right and those who can 
never be anything more than objects. Thus Morrison's characterization of 
Schoolteacher suggests the inevitability of inequality and oppression in a concept 
teacher that is centered on an ethic of power defined in economic terms.
The conception of teacher which Schoolteacher represents has clear 
political and economic purposes. Paulo Freire calls it the "banking concept of 
education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far 
as receiving, filing, and storing deposits.'"*  ^It is characterized, Freire states, by
'‘^ Freire, p. 58.
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student-teacher relationship which involves a "narrating Subject (the teacher) and 
patient, listening objects (the students). The teacher talks about reality as if it were 
motionless, static, compartmentalized, and predictable."" It projects an absolute 
ignorance onto others, alienating the students "like the slave in the Hegelian 
dialectic. Borrowing Eric Fromm’s language, Freire describes the banking 
concept of education as necrophilic, a love that "is driven by the desire to 
transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all 
living persons were things."" However, though the "mechanistic, static, 
naturalized, spatialized view of consciousness" of banking education attempts to 
transform "students into receiving objects," it contains contradictions which "may 
lead formerly passive students to turn against their domestication and the attempt 
to domesticate reality."*’
Freire's analysis of the banking concept of education is remarkably 
consistent with Schoolteacher's teaching practice, a conception of teaching I have 
referred to as the teacher-technician.** For instance. Schoolteacher's method of
"Ibid., p. 57.
"Ibid., p. 59.
"Eric Fromm, The Heart o f Man, New York, 1966, p. 41. Ccited in Freire, 
Pedagogy o f the Oppressed, p. 64.
"Ibid., p. 61.
**Describing this conception of the teacher as technician rather than using 
Freire's banking metaphor is more appropriate since deposits into a bank benefit
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lecturing or reading to his nephew-students while they quietly take notes illustrates 
nicely the narrative character of Freire's banking education (193). His designation 
of any information the slaves offer him as "backtalk" further illustrates this 
narrative, rather than dialogical, nature of the student-teacher relationship which 
results from the conception of the teacher as technician., the slaves' backtalk is a 
violation of their responsibility to receive, file, and store deposits (220). 
Schoolteacher’s lessons, as Friere predicts, exacerbate the alienation between 
teacher-master and student-slave to the point of resistance, o f struggling for 
liberation. Sethe says to herself, "When the train came I had to be ready [to 
escape]. Schoolteacher was teaching us things we couldn't leam" (191).
Schoolteacher fits Eric Fromm's description of the "necrophilous" person;
The necrophilous person can relate to an object-a flower or person-only if 
he possesses it; hence a threat to his possession is a threat to himself; if he 
loses possession he loses contact with the world. ..He loves control, and in 
the act of controlling he kills life.
When he enters the woodshed to which Sethe runs with her children, he is
confronted with this very "threat to himself," this loss of possession. "Right away it
was clear, to schoolteacher especially, that there was nothing left to claim" (149).
the bank as much or more than it benefits the depositors. Schoolteacher’s practice 
(his deposits) do not benefit his students (the bank). The technician metaphor 
names what Freire describes inasmuch as the technician manipulates objects 
(students) to his own purposes, purposes in which the object (student) has no say.
^®Cited in Freire, p. 64.
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For Sethe had "something in her arms that stopped him in his tracks. He took a 
backward step with each jump of the baby heart until finally there were none" 
(164). Then "Schoolteacher beat his hat against his thigh and spit before leaving 
the woodshed" (150). Schoolteacher is stopped not by any sense of revulsion 
caused by this horrific madonna-child tableau but rather by the recognition that 
there is "nothing there to claim;" he is stopped not by the presence of death but 
rather by the presence of a love and a subjectivity so powerful in its resistance to 
his objectification that it can choose death as an option to be preferred over life 
under Schoolteacher.
The purpose of Schoolteacher, of the concept of teacher as technician, is 
to claim and maintain economic and political power for himself and his class. 
"Education as the exercise of domination," Freire writes, "stimulates the credulity 
of students, with the ideological intent of indoctrinating them to the world of 
oppression. " Its object is to "change the consciousness of the oppressed, not the 
situation which oppresses them" in order to preserve the power of the minority to 
prescribe to the majority.’” Paul D, the "last of the Sweet Home men," testifies to 
the process of this dehumanizing educational practice; "But wasn't no way I'd ever 
be Paul D again, living or dead. Schoolteacher changed me. I was something else 
and that something was less than a chicken sitting in the sun on a tub" (72).
’"Freire, pp. 60, 63, 65.
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Schoolteacher: Cultural mid Philosophical Antecedents
In order to more fully understand the relevance of Toni Morrison's fictional 
character Schoolteacher for contemporary conceptions of teachers in recent 
educational thought, it is useful to tease out the philosophical implications of this 
particular concept of teacher. To accomplish this task I will again employ the 
mode of cultural criticism which Cornel West has named prophetic pragmatism. 
According to West, prophetic pragmatism "refines and revises Emerson's concern 
with power, provocation, and personality in light of Dewey's stress on historical 
consciousness and DuBois' focus on the plight of the wretched of the earth.”  As 
West practices it, prophetic pragmatism involves the strategic deployment of 
genealogical analyses of historical and philosophical antecedents, progressive 
Marxist-inspired critique of relevant political and economic issues, and ethical 
critique grounded in the conception of human nature and tragic sense of the 
prophetic wing of Afro-American protestant Christianity.” In what follows, then, I 
will address the following questions; What are the philosophical antecedents of the 
conception of the teacher represented by Schoolteacher? What are the political and 
economic ramifications of that conception of the teacher? What ethical problems
"West, The American Evasion o f Philosophy, p. 212. 
” lbid.
"Ibid., pp. 211-214, 226-235.
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does this conception present?
Schoolteacher’s philosophical antecedents place him in a distinguished 
company of educational philosophers. One might even say he is in the mainstream 
of traditional educational philosophy with roots in Plato, Rousseau, and the 
Enlightenment and the Weberian conception of the academic vocation. For 
instance. Schoolteacher's assumptions about education bear a striking similarity to 
those of Plato. In the one scene where Morrison portrays his direct "instruction" of 
the slave Sixo we see him utilize a dialogical method of questioning designed to 
lead his pupil-slave to the conclusion that he has indeed stolen the shoat. As I 
mentioned earlier, this is the same method Socrates uses in the Meno to teach 
another pupil-slave a mathematical concept. '^* Schoolteacher and Socrates also 
share a hierarchical conception of the ideal society where individuals occupy 
different social strata on the basis of their natural attributes.** Both societies are 
also, significantly, slave societies. The object of education and the role of the 
teacher is sorting and preparing individuals for their natural position in society.*® 
This is readily apparent in the different objectives of Schoolteacher's instruction of 
his pupil-nephews and his pupil-slaves: He teaches his nephews how to work a
*^Jowett, pp. 28-35.
**Plato, The Republic, Allan Bloom, ed.. New York: Basic Books, 1968, p.
434 d.
*®Ibid., p. 443 d, e.
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plantation and manage slaves; he teaches his slaves to be obedient. He is preparing 
both sets of pupils for their station in life. The scholar-master Schoolteacher also 
holds a position in the totalitarian Sweet Home society not unlike Socrates' 
philosopher-king; he sits atop a social pyramid with absolute rule over a society 
foimded on slave labor. As an academic. Schoolteacher also shares important 
epistemological assumptions with Plato. Though to the extent Schoolteacher's 
observing, measuring and note-taking suggests a scientific approach to knowledge 
acquisition rather than Platonic idealism, their epistemologies are both 
foundational.”  They both assume that knowledge claims are grounded in a reality 
that exists prior to and separate from individual desires or social conventions and 
that there are individuals with privileged access to it.
There are, however, clear and important differences between Plato's ideal 
society and educational philosophy and Schoolteacher's. One of the most notable is 
their radically different basis for social stratification. Socrates would differentiate 
among individuals on the basis of their intellectual capacity; Schoolteacher 
differentiates on the basis of race. Socrates is open to the possibility that potential 
guardians may be found at any level of society and educated accordingly; 
Schoolteacher's racist ideal society cannot entertain the possibility of the slave
"Hoitenga, pp. 7-8, 27-30.
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having the same intellectual capacity as whites.** However, the similarities between 
Schoolteacher's and Plato's conceptions of education and the ideal society 
implicitly challenge the Platonic conceptions, as well as contemporary conceptions 
of society, education, and the teacher that look to them for inspiration, because 
Morrison's drawing out of the implications of those concepts for those who occupy 
the bottom rung of society—the poor and oppressed—dramatizes their horrible 
costs.
Morrison's account of Schoolteacher and his educational philosophy also 
share certain characteristics with Rousseau's philosophy as it is outlined in Emile 
In both Emile and Beloved we find education taking place in an idealized rural 
setting between a tutor and one or two pupils. Sweet Home is described in Edenic 
terms while the site of Emile's education is deliberately chosen for its isolation 
fi"om the corruptions of social life. While Schoolteacher perhaps engages in more 
traditional lecturing, reading, and note-taking than does Rousseau, the education 
of both of their charges is significantly based on experiential learning. 
Schoolteacher's nephews are employed in the operation of the plantation, learning 
fi"om their work and by drawing conclusions from careful observation of their 
environment. This is apparent from the lesson Sethe overhears where the pupil-
**Plato, The Republic, p. 415 b, c.
” Jean-Jacques Rousseu, Emile, Allan Bloom, trans.. New York: Basic 
Books, 1979.
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nephews are determining her animal and human characteristics (193). Emile too is 
expected to leam by observing his environment—a bent stick in the water, the 
motion of the sun and the changing pattern of its setting, etc.—and drawing 
conclusions.®” This approach to the acquisition of knowledge via observation, 
measurement, hypothesis, testing of hypotheses, etc. is precisely Schoolteacher's 
method.
Rousseau's philosophy of education also posits the existence of two very 
different kinds of individuals making up society, a difference which requires 
different sorts of education. According to Rousseau, men and women are of 
radically different natures and thus require radically different educational 
experiences.®' Where Emile is to be educated for intellectual independence and 
social power both within the state and the family, Sophie is educated for service 
and subservience to her husband and confinement to the home. This is reminiscent 
of Schoolteacher's different educational objectives for his pupil-nephews and pupil- 
slaves. His nephews are taught to exercise power within Sweet Home society; his 
pupil-slaves are taught to serve and obey. Interestingly, the attributes 
Schoolteacher valued in Sethe are not unlike the attributes Sophie is expected to 
develop: she made "fine ink (for Schoolteacher to write with), damned good soup
®%id., pp. 169-70.
®'Ibid., Book V, pp. 357-450.
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(she was a good cook), [and] pressed his collars the way he liked them besides 
having at least ten breeding years left" (149). And one of Schoolteacher's first 
actions upon taking over Sweet Home is to forbid the slaves from leaving their 
plantation home.
Clearly, though, Rousseau did not intend his educational experiment to be 
a Sweet Home. Rousseau isolates Emile in his education to protect him from 
corruption and thus ensure the development of the naturally good man who can 
take his place in a democratic society. His conception of the just society is one 
founded on love and tolerance and made up of men who are capable of extending 
self-love to others, of recognizing himself in others.® However, the clear affinities 
between Schoolteacher’s practice and Rousseau's philosophy raise disturbing 
questions about Rousseau's educational enterprise. Emile, who Rousseau admits is 
self-centered and amoral when he is first introduced to society, has been educated 
for independence in isolation, a very different education from that given Sophie.® 
Given their very different natures and education, how will they develop the 
capacity to pity the other, a sentiment Rousseau claims is the means by which self 
love is expanded to others and the love and tolerance on which the just society is
“ Rousseau, pp. 226, 304-8.
“ Ibid., pp. 207-8.
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based produced?*^ Morrison's portrayal of Schoolteacher's nephews suggests that 
the production of difference and unequal power relations through education means 
that pity is /M/jeducative—recall Schoolteacher's warning his nephew of 
"confusion," i.e. pity for Sethe (150)—and thus more likely to produce 
Schoolteacher's distopia than Rousseau's utopia.
Sweet Home is clearly not like the just societies Plato or Rousseau 
imagined. But all three imaginary societies—Morrison's Sweet Home, Plato's 
republic, and Rousseau's democracy—rest upon oppression—of slaves in the first 
two and women in the third. All three conceive of education as a process of sorting 
individuals according to their nature and shaping them to fit predetermined 
functions in the ideal social machine. The teacher in all three is a technician, a lathe 
operator taking raw metal stock and turning out precision parts for a machine. Just 
as the part has no say in the shape or purpose of the machine, the individual human 
student has no influence on the nature of the society for which he is fitted. The 
needs and ends of the social machine shape the student through education; the 
needs and ends of the individual human being do not shape the education or the 
society. Morrison's depiction of these common conceptions of education and the 
teacher in the person and practice of Schoolteacher shows us these philosophies 
from the perspective of their victims—the parts—and thus reveals their potentially
®^ Ibid., pp. 222, 224, 309-10.
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horrific costs in terms of human suffering.
Schoolteacher is both a product and disseminator of notions of white 
supremacy inscribed in the very discourse of modernity.®  ^Cornel West contends 
these notions emerge from a discourse consisting of four elements: Cartesian 
philosophy, scientific investigation, Greek ocular metaphors, and classical 
aesthetics.®® Descartes' philosophical propositions regarding the autonomous 
subject and a representational conception of knowledge constituted the theoretical 
basis for the legitimacy of modem science and its two fundamental props: 
observation and evidence.®’ The revival of interest in Greek cultural ideals of 
beauty, proportion, and moderation during the Renaissance and Enlightenment 
provided a norm while Cartesian philosophy and modem science provided a 
comparative tendency. Together these elements produced a "normative gaze" 
which denied black "equality in terms of beauty, culture, and intellectual 
capacity."®*
This discourse of white supremacy is readily apparent in the character of 
Schoolteacher, which suggests, perhaps, racist propensities in the conception of 
teacher as technician which he represents. Schoolteacher is very much the
®®West, Prophesy Deliverance!, p. 47. 
®®Ibid., p. 48.
®’lbid., p. 51.
®*Ibid., pp. 48, 51-53.
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autonomous subject. He apparently has no need for nor does he involve himself in 
human relationships: He does not need a wife for his "cogitation is Sweet Home" 
(227). He is portrayed as always observing, watching the slaves and taking notes. 
"Talking soft and watching hard" (197). He is the voyeur taking notes while his 
nephews take Sethe's milk (70). After he locks up the recaptured Paul D he "looks 
at him for a long time....Carefully he looks" (227). He is portrayed as constantly 
gathering and recording data, measuring them, numbering their teeth, and always 
asking questions (191). Schoolteacher, in effect, constructs a racist ontology and 
epistemology so powerful that, when conft-onted with the fact of a young mother 
who prefers to cut her baby girl's throat with a handsaw rather than allow her to be 
"measured" or have her characteristics listed on the animal side of the paper by 
Schoolteacher, it is interpreted as evidence of the "results of a little so-called 
freedom imposed on people who needed every care and guidance in the world to 
keep them from the cannibal life they preferred" (151). In short, contradictory 
evidence is transmuted by the discourse of white supremacy into supporting 
evidence.
Schoolteacher represents a peculiarly modem conception of the academic 
which is the culmination of forces with their roots in the Enlightenment. Mark 
Schwehn identifies this modernist conception of the academic vocation with Max 
Weber, the German sociologist and historian.*® Modeled on a scientistic
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conception of scholarship, the Weberian academic is an individualistic, alienated 
scholar relying on rigorous methodologies and focused on the production of 
knowledge rather than education for character formation, thoughtfulness, inquiry 
into the truths of human experience or other objectives of earlier religiously 
inspired conceptions of the academic vocation. The Weberian conception of the 
academic vocation moves western scholarship and teaching—at the university level 
at least—toward an emphasis on technology and control, toward an education for 
power rather than understanding, truth, or community.™ It produces, Schwehn 
argues, alienated individuals with multiplist relativistic notions of ethics and 
m orality.The epistemological assumptions upon which it is based conceal the 
subjectivities of the knower behind a mask of objectivity and detachment; they 
portray his knowledge claims as facts discovered in nature by means of rigorous 
methodologies which produce knowledge of the world as it really is independent of 
the desires of the knower.™ Lorraine Code’s study of post-Enlightenment 
epistemology from the insight afforded by contemporary feminist theory 
demonstrates, however, that behind this mask lies a white, male, propertied
* ^ark  R. Schwehn, Exiles from Eden: Religion and the Academic 
Vocation in America, New York; Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 6-16.
"Tbid.
™lbid., p. 63.
™Lorraine Code, What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the 
Construction o f Knowledge, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 269-284.
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knower.^ Behind this mask lies Schoolteacher. Morrison's fictional portrait of this 
Weberian academic, this teacher-technician, penetrates the objectivist-rationalist 
mask, dramatizes its use in the production of racism, uncovers its real motivations, 
and lays bare its ethical consequences.
Schoolteacher vs. Prophetic Praiimatism
The "world of oppression" the Sweet Home slaves inhabit, and which, 
according to Cornel West, we still inhabit, is marked by two "sacred cows;" the 
sacred cow of "economic growth by means of corporate priorities" and the sacred 
cow of "endemic racism, patriarchy and homophobia. The consequences of such 
a society include the commodification of culture and the commercialization of 
art.’* It also results in the reification of human beings as objects, commodities that 
can be bought or sold, their relationships governed by the paradigm of the 
market.’® This commodification of human beings, the essence of slavery, is one of 
the lessons Paul D leams from Schoolteacher. After his recapture Paul D leams 
that he is worth nine hundred dollars (226). This "market culture," as West calls it, 
combines with the natal alienation of blacks—the loss of ties at birth to ascending
73Ibid.
’“‘Cornel West, Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times: Beyond 
Eurocentrism andMuliticulturalism, Volume /, Monroe: Common Courage Press, 
1993, pp. 60-61.
’®West, Prophetic Reflections^ p. 41.
’®West, Prophetic Thought, pp. 90, 148.
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or descending generations—to produce the "highest level of forms of self- 
destruction known in black history" and right-wing, potentially fascist politics in 
the larger society.^ These social products of market culture are dramatized in 
Sethe's "rough response to the Fugitive Slave Bill" and the proto-fascist political 
implications of the slave-based political and economic order of the Old South. The 
purpose of Schoolteacher then, of the concept of teacher as technician, was and 
is—according to the implications of West's analysis of contemporary late capitalist 
society—the changing of the consciousness of the oppressed to adapt to the world 
the oppressors have created in order to perpetuate the political and economic 
power of a few at the expense of the masses. Thus it contradicts the love ethic 
identified in Chapter I as a criterion for a concept teacher capable of negotiating 
the relationship between religion and education within a context of cultural 
diversity and existential tragedy: it does not aflSrm the dignity and worth of the 
individual or the individual's ability to grow as a moral agent.
This concept of teacher as technician, what Schwehn refers to as the 
Weberian model, has profound ethical ramifications.’* In keeping with Cornel 
West's prophetic pragmatic mode of cultural criticism, I will explore those 
ramifications fi-om an ethical worldview informed by particular Christian moral
” lbid., pp. 149-50, 194. 
’*Schwehn, p. 63.
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values. However, in doing so I in no way mean to suggest that such values are 
peculiar to Christianity or that Christian moral values are superior to those of other 
religious or secular traditions. I do so because one of the consequences of 
prophetic pragmatism's radical historicism is the recognition of the futility of any 
search for objective philosophic foundations for moral principles and the 
recognition that the only viable candidates for such grounds are "contingent, 
community-specific agreements people make in relation to particular norms, aims, 
goals, and objectives."™ One consequence then of this historicist ethics is the idea 
that justification is not some last court of appeal to transcendent moral absolutes, 
but rather a way of reminding oneself of the particular community to which one 
belongs.*" Modes of criticism, therefore, are guided by "moral visions and ethical 
norms which flow from synoptic worldviews, including such matters as the ideal of 
what it is to be human, the good society, loving relationships and other precious 
conceptions."*'
For many of the wretched of the earth these synoptic worldviews are 
religious.*^ Certainly the worldviews of both slaves and masters as they are
™Comel West, The Ethical Dimensions o f Marxist Thought, New York. 
Monthly Review Press, 1991, p. 1.
*"Ibid., p. 3.
*'Comel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America, New 
York: Routledge, 1994, p. 132.
*^West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, p. 233.
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portrayed in Beloved have significant religious dimensions. Sethe has frequent 
"talk-think" sessions with God and Baby Suggs' preaching and spiritual power, 
equally rooted in both Christian and African religious traditions, is the 
community’s cohesive force. Even Schoolteacher and his nephews go to church 
each Sunday. Furthermore, if prophetic pragmatism has any relevance for a 
reconception of the teacher which honors the importance of religion in people's 
lives as a source of moral guidance and existential hope in the face of tragedy, then 
it makes some sense to explore that relevance in the context of a Christian 
religious expression which saturates U.S. society in general and Afro-American 
society in particular.*^
According to West, the moral and ethical norms of protestant Christianity 
are grounded in the belief that human beings are created imago dei, in the image of 
God, and are all therefore equal before God. From this belief comes the moral 
norm of individuality and the equality of all before God. This equality, in turn, 
posits a principle of self-realization within community which requires democratic 
control of institutions that regulate individuals' lives as they act out their history. 
The individual is thus ideally irreducible within participatory communities 
governed by the principle of mutual accountability. *“* These moral norms, held as
'^Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, 
Washington, D C : Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992, pp. 7-18, 99.
*'*West, Prophesy Deliverance!, pp. 16-18.
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they are in the context of "disease, disillusionment, despair, and death" and the life- 
denying forces of "economic exploitation, state, repression, bureaucratic 
domination, racial, sexual and heterosexual subjugation, and ecological 
subjection," yield a dialectical conception of human nature as both dignified and 
depraved and a conception of human history as a continual struggle toward ethical 
ideal which, though unrealizable within history, nevertheless guide human conduct 
and preclude this world utopias or distopias.*’ These moral norms and the 
conceptions of human nature and history which follow from them provide a model 
of social praxis which confronts the tragic nature of human existence and provides 
a basis for critique of and resistance to injustice and social misery.'^
Schoolteacher's educational practices clearly contradict the criteria of 
moral-ethical idealism and meaningfulness which follow from West's description 
of prophetic pragmatism and were proposed in Chapter I as necessary attributes of 
a concept teacher capable of negotiating the relationship between religious faith 
and public education and responding to the existence of tragedy. He denies the 
individuality and dignity of the Sweet Home slaves through processes of 
dehumanization and commodification, processes which substitute economic ends 
for ethical ideals. They are not human beings made in the image of God, but rather
” Ibid. and West, Keeping Faith, pp. 132-33.
**West, Prophesy Deliverance!, pp. 17-19.
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"coons," "baboons," "foals," and breeders, "creatures God had given [him] the 
responsibility o f  (150). He teaches Sbco that definitions belong to the definer, and 
then defines him and the other slaves as animals, as "something less than a chicken 
sitting in on a tub in the sun" (190, 72). With this redefinition he is able to reject 
the democratic principle of self-realization within participatory communities 
because it does not apply to animals. Thus meaning is not made by the community 
as a whole; it is made by those in power for those in power.
Schoolteacher, the teacher-technician, necessarily undermines and subverts 
the moral principles of the dignity and equality of individuals because the 
foundational epistemic and ontological assumptions of his philosophical worldview 
separates ethics and knowledge and objectifies human beings in order to produce 
the inequality on which his economic, and hence political, power rests. 
Schoolteacher's embrace of absolutist claims about knowledge and reality are the 
foundation of his assumption of the fundamental inequality of himself and the 
Sweet Home slaves. Therefore, the concept of teacher which he embodies clearly 
does not meet the criteria of social authorization, anti-”realist" ontology, and 
affirmation o f diversity identified in Chapter I as necessary attributes of a concept 
teacher capable of negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion 
and public education in a context of cultural diversity and existential tragedy.
The teacher-technician simply will not do: the worldview which the 
teacher-technician functions to maintain cannot and does not perceive the tragic,
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for to do so would entail accepting one form or another of the principle of the 
equality and dignity of individuals and thus recognizing its own violations of that 
principle. Instead of tragedy it recognizes economic loss. And because it cannot 
perceive tragedy, it cannot help human beings confronted by the tragedy of human 
experience, the existential facts of "disease, disillusionment, despair, and death. It 
can only perpetuate tragedy. Thus Morrison's depiction of the "four horsemen"— 
Schoolteacher, his nephew, the sheriff and the slave catcher—riding up to 124 
Bluestone Road to reclaim Sethe and her children takes on, appropriately, the air 
of apocalypse. Though Schoolteacher does, in some partial sense, meet the 
criterion of social authorization, and his use of a conscious technique may be a 
useful lesson for our reconception of teacher, Morrison's depiction of the 
consequences of the teacher-technician concept reveals the utter inadequacy of 
authority without love, of method without an ethical ideal, of teaching without a 
sense of the holy. Lacking these qualities, the teacher-technician is incapable of 
negotiating the relationship between religion and public education or helping 
children resist injustice or face existential tragedy. Schoolteacher will not do.
Lady Jones: A Borderline Case of the Prophetic Pragmatic Teacher
Perhaps the clearest case of a teacher-character in Beloved is the character 
known as Lady Jones. Though her character is much less developed than the other 
teacher-characters examined in this inquiry she is most recognizable as a teacher 
because she so clearly embodies the characteristics commonly associated with a
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traditional image of the teacher: female, educated, teaching groups of children to 
read and write in the school house (inverted by Morrison to read "house-school" to 
reflect the lack of formal schools for black children), inculcating the general 
religious and culture values of the dominant society, and providing children with 
the basic academic skills for further "book" learning or to take their places as 
members of society. In this character Morrison renders a sympathetic, composite 
portrait o f the rural, small town schoolteacher as the respected pillar of the 
community who, with a firm hand and genuine affection, helps mold children into 
solid members of their community. In this character I see my grandmother, who, 
like Lady Jones, spent much of her life teaching young children to read and write 
and do arithmetic and develop a sense of Bible-based morality in one-room 
"schoolhouses" and small, rural schools, whose no-nonsense demeanor masked a 
genuine love of children that resulted in life-long student-teacher relationships 
characterized by mutual respect and affection. In this character Morrison embodies 
much of what is best in the traditional schoolteacher.
However, in spite of this positive portrait, interpreted as it is through the 
lens of my own respect and affection for my grandmother as a truly beloved 
teacher, I will argue that neither Lady Jones nor my grandmother offer adequate 
models for a conception of teacher cable of negotiating and renegotiating the 
relationship between religion and public education. They constitute a best-case 
embodiment of the common sense pragmatist teacher. And though this best-case
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embodiment, like Baby Suggs, meets many of the criteria identified in Chapter I as 
necessary for a reconception of teacher which can meet the challenge of religious 
diversity, it fails short of Baby Suggs' model in one vital aspect; its understanding 
of the holy.
Morrison’s Characterization o f Lady Jones
Lady Jones is a woman of mixed race with grey eyes and yellow hair, 
which she hates. At some time in earlier life she had been "picked" because of her 
light skin to attend a "colored girls' normal school" in Pennsylvania. Self conscious 
about her "high yellow" status, she deliberately married "the blackest man she 
could find, had five rainbow-colored children and sent them all to Wilberforce, 
after teaching them all she knew right along with the others who sat in her parlor" 
(247). In many other respects she is much like the other women of her community, 
cooking, keeping house, raising children, serving on church committees, baking for 
church activities, etc. Her mixed race and education however make her unique, 
marginalized in important ways. She is described as disliking everybody "a little 
bit" because "she believed in her heart that, except for her husband, the whole 
world (including her children) despised her and her hair" (247). However, after 
receiving her education, "she dispensed with rancor and was indiscriminately 
polite, saving her real affection for the unpicked children of Cinciimati" (247).
Lady Jones' school is in the small parlor of her home because there are no 
schools for the colored children of Cincinnati. In a scene reminiscent, somewhat,
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of both Schoolteacher and Baby Suggs, Lady Jones is portrayed teaching two 
hours every afternoon from a straight-backed chair to the children who sit cross- 
legged around her and write with chalk on slates (102). Thus she is both separated 
from and "above" her pupils, like Schoolteacher, but situated at the center of her 
classroom-community, as was Baby Suggs. "For a nickel a month. Lady Jones did 
what whitepeople thought unnecessary if not illegal; crowded her little parlor with 
the colored children who had time for and interest in book learning" (102). She 
teaches both boys and girls, the "unpicked" children of Cincinnati who "played in 
dirt until they were old enough for chores" (247).
Lxidy Jones as Teacher: Aims. Achievements. Ends
Lady Jones' teaching displays two pedagogical goals which serve a single, 
overarching educational aim: the acquisition of skills in literacy and numeracy and 
the development of a shared sense of morality which will enable her pupils to take 
their place as adult members of the community. In the context of the novel. Lady 
Jones represents Denver's connection to the community outside 124 Bluestone 
after Sethe's murder of Denver's older sister. Beloved, and the death of her 
grandmother. Baby Suggs. She, in effect, represents community and the ordinary 
day-to-day relationships with others that constitute community. It is Lady Jones 
who provides, via her "house-school," an opening into the community for Denver 
after she and her mother have been ostracized over the murder of Beloved. Lady 
Jones discovers Denver's childhood spying on the activity of the school and invites
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her in: "Come in the front door. Miss Denver. This is not a side show" (102). The 
seven-year-old Denver studies with Lady Jones for a year, two "precious" hours 
each afternoon learning to spell and count and write, until a young boy asks her a 
question about her imprisonment with her mother, forcing long-repressed 
memories to the surface and traumatizing the child to the point that she no longer 
hears or speaks, which causes her to drop out of Lady Jones' house-school.
Many years later, however, when the devastating emotional struggle 
between the returned Beloved and Sethe threatens to destroy her mother, Denver 
ends her long confinement to the house at 124 Bluestone by seeking out Lady 
Jones for help. The teacher initiates Denver’s reintegration into the community by 
orchestrating the anonymous donation of food to prevent the starvation of Denver, 
Sethe, and Beloved and beginning to teach again her now grown former student. 
Thus Lady Jones and her school serve as a vital link for Denver to the community 
from which she has been cut off since Beloved's murder. Preparing children to 
enter the community is clearly the central function of Lady Jones' teaching.
Lady Jones also teaches her pupils to read "the deeply mournful sentences 
from the Bible Lady Jones used as a textbook" as well as to write their names on 
slates and to do arithmetic. Her only text is the Bible, which she uses both as a 
reader and, presumably, to inculcate in the children the shared moral values of the 
community. The novel portrays her as a caring, effective teacher who has earned 
the affection of her students and the appreciation of their families, and who has
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trained children who are, evidently, reasonably considerate of one another. Even 
Nelson Lord, the boy who asks Denver the question that "blocked up her ears," 
asks it with "no meanness in his face or voice. Just curiosity" (102). Later, his 
caring words will open her mind (252). An important achievement, then, of Lady 
Jones' teaching is a moral capacity in her pupils which enables them to display 
genuine compassion for others.
Lady Jones' success in achieving these goals is evident: her own children 
and Denver acquire sufficient academic skills to attend Wilberforce and Oberlin 
(252, 266), Nelson Lord is portrayed as a compassionate and caring child, and her 
role as teacher is the catalyst for the reintegration of Sethe and Denver into the 
Afiican-American community of Cincinnati.
Lady Jones as Teacher: Methods. Tasks. Means
Lady Jones' identity as a teacher is less important to the plot of the novel 
than is her role as Denver's means for re-entering the community; therefore, her 
instructional methods are not fully realized in the text of Beloved. However, the 
teaching that is described supports the assertion that Lady Jones is an embodiment 
of the conventional educational ideals and methods which I have named the 
common sense pragmatist. Lady Jones, not unlike Schoolteacher with his 
nephews, employs recitation as one instructional strategy: Denver first sees her 
"saying something too soft to hear" which the children then repeat or write down 
on their slates (102). And like Baby Suggs, Lady Jones deploys aesthetic
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appreciation and practices to inculcate academic skills and moral precepts; she 
teaches the children songs to spell and count by and apparently fosters an aesthetic 
appreciation for the music of Bible verses as well as their moral content (120). 
Finally, Lady Jones utilizes what Jane Roland Martin (1994) has called the 
"reproductive processes"—in this case the preparation and presentation of food—as 
an expression of and a curriculum in the "care, concern, and connection" that 
makes community, and Denver’s re-entry into it, possible.*’
Lady Jones' Relation with "Students"
Lady Jones’ place is very much a part of the community yet simultaneously 
marginalized within it. She serves with other women in the community on a church 
committee organized to feed the hungry. She clearly knows and is known by 
everyone. When Denver attempts to return the dishes left by the anonymous 
donors of food organized by Lady Jones, it is Lady Jones who helps her identify 
the owners. When Stamp Paid reminds Paul D that any family in the community 
would give him shelter, he specifically mentions Lady Jones. In spite of her 
education and mixed race, she clearly shares in the community’s moral bottom line 
that no black man or woman will go hungry, homeless, or unaided.
Yet Lady Jones is also marginalized from the community in very important 
ways. Though she attributes her underlying unease with others in the community to
‘’Jane Roland Martin, Changing the Educational Landscape: Philosophy, 
Women, and Curriculum, New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 7-8, 113-115.
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her mixed race, the equally likely cause of her alienation is her education. It earns 
her the title "Lady," a telling contrast to Baby Suggs' refusal of any honorific title, 
and makes her an important person in the community, a person one wants to 
impress (46). The extent of her alienation is illustrated by her relationship, or lack 
thereof, with Baby Suggs. Baby Suggs is seen by the black citizens of Cincinnati 
as the heart of the community. To them she is "Baby Suggs, holy." She is the 
"mountain" to their "sky." Her home at 124 Bluestone Road is a way station, the 
community crossroads where people meet, leave messages, gather for news, etc. 
To Lady Jones, however, she is Denver's "ignorant grandmother, a "woods 
preacher who mended shoes" (247). Lady Jones' education, sophistication, and 
perhaps her conventional Christianity render her unable or unwilling to believe the 
reports of Beloved's "haunting" of Sethe. She "didn't believe the story and hated 
the ignorance of those who did" (257). For most others in the community, 
however, the news is a confirmation of what they have long accepted as true—that 
death is not the end of being—and a call to reassert the boundaries between this 
world and the other and rescue Sethe.** Lady Jones is, therefore, unable or 
unwilling to take part in Sethe's "baptism" back into the African-American 
community of Cincinnati.
**The belief that life is not the end of being is, according to Trudier Harris, 
characteristic of West African belief systems. See Harris, p. 154. Morrison has 
made clear in an interview that such "enchantment" of the world was "the way the 
world was for me and most black people I knew. See Furman, p. 81.
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Lady Jones' image of Baby Suggs and her "hatred of the ignorance" of 
those who believed the enchantment taking place at 124 Bluestone Road suggest a 
certain level o f intolerance of some of the more African elements of the black 
culture in which she lives. That intolerance alienates her from a very deep and 
important part of her cultural milieu. She evidently does not participate in the 
gatherings in the Clearing where black people from the area engage in a cathartic 
ritual of song, dance, preaching and laughter which combines West African and 
Christian religious practices in a "service" that provides strength and solace for a 
people just out of slavery and suffering under racist oppression. She evidently does 
not believe in the enchantment of the world around her. Her alienation from these 
aspects of her culture is, in fact, alienation from her past, the history of her people. 
She is, in an important sense, a dangling person, cut off from the identity, 
solidarity, and solace others find in their traditions, prevented by DuBois' veil 
from ever fully taking a place in the dominant culture, and "gifted with [a] second 
sight... that only lets [her] see [herself] through the revelation of the other world."*® 
With the handicap of this alienation, it seems there are lessons which her students 
need to leam but she cannot teach.
Late in the novel, Denver, in reminiscing about her own education, recalls a 
story Baby Suggs told her about her father, Halle. He had been taught by his boss.
*®W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls o f Black Folk, New York; Signet, 1903, p.
45
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Mr Gamer, to read, write, and do arithmetic. Gamer offered to teach the other 
"Sweet Home men," but they refused. "One of them with a number for a name 
[Sixo] said it would change his mind—make him forget things he shouldn't and 
memorize things he shouldn't and he didn't want his mind messed up. But my 
daddy said. If you can't count they can cheat you. If you can't read they can beat 
you" (208). This debate, even though it occurred on Sweet Home long before 
Denver or any of the other characters have met Lady Jones, contains an implicit 
critique of the teacher as common sense pragmatist personified by Lady Jones. As 
valuable as the literacy and numeracy skills she teaches are, they do not protect 
Halle from being beaten or cheated; he is driven insane by Schoolteacher's abuse of 
Sethe in spite of them. And, as Sixo wamed, they have made Lady Jones forget 
some things she shouldn't. They cannot sustain the individual confronted with 
tragedy or oppression. As vital as her preparation is for her pupils' entrance into 
their community, it cannot sustain community in the face of Sethe's tragedy. It 
takes a different kind of teaching and a different kind of teacher.
Lady Jones: Cultural and Philosophical Antecedents
Though Lady Jones does play a crucial role in the plot of Beloved, she is a 
comparatively minor character as far as the amount of text devoted to her 
development is concerned. Consequently, there is really not an abundance of 
textual evidence on her teaching practice to fully tease out her philosophy of 
education. There is, however, enough information in the novel on her background
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and values to recognize clear affinities between this fictional portrait of a teacher 
and a particularly influential tradition of educational philosophy. Thus it is possible 
to infer the general outlines of her educational philosophy. Such an analysis shows 
Lady Jones to be an excellent representation of the sort of teacher those modem 
critics have in mind who refer to a golden age of American education when God 
had His proper place in the school. Specifically, it suggests a pedagogical and 
philosophical lineage that includes Catharine Beecher and Anna Julia Cooper. I 
will, therefore, explore the affinities between the portrait of Lady Jones and the 
thought of Beecher and Cooper and then attempt to clarify where the concept of 
teacher they embody falls short of this inquiry's goal of a conception of teacher 
capable of negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion and 
public education.
Catharine Beecher's educational philosophy was widely influential in the 
19th century U.S. Beecher saw women's most important ministry as the physical, 
intellectual and moral education of children.’® Though she counseled subordination 
for women in matters outside the home, she argued for indirect political influence 
through the inculcation, via education, of virtues such as rational self-control.
’“Catharine Beecher, "Essay on the Education of Female Teachers " in 
Shirley Nelson Kersey, ed.. Classics in the Education o f Girls and Women, 
Metuchen; Scarecrow Press, 1981, p. 288. See also Susan Laird, "Beecher, 
Catharine Esther" in J.J. Chambliss, ed.. Philosophy o f E ^cation: An 
Encyclopedia, New York: Garland Publishing, 1996, p. 50.
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piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity in themselves and submission of will, 
self denial, and benevolence in children.®* Though Beecher's philosophy has been 
read as rationalizing women's subservience, she in fact sought to assert a social and 
political importance for the activity of women in the home equal to that accorded 
to the activity of men outside the home.®^  She accomplished this via a curriculum 
that included both the domestic tasks associated with managing a home and 
children and a broad liberal education in such subjects as mathematics, language, 
literature, the sciences, philosophy and religion.®^
With her emphasis on a broad liberal education and the development of 
rational self-control, Beecher "granted epistemological authority to reason and to 
the evidence of sensory and revelatory experience."®  ^Emphasizing "learned moral 
conduct rather than conversion," Beecher advocated a system of moral and 
religious education in schools, arguing that its absence led to "vice and discontent" 
and suggesting that the Bible be taught in all schools.®® She counseled teaching 
through "love and patience rather than fear," called for the establishment of teacher 
training institutions, and suggested that those unable to afford the training they
®‘Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation, pp. 105, 111, 127-28. 
®%id., 122-23.
®®Ibid., 112-13.
®‘*Laird, "Beecher," p. 51.
®®Laird, "Beecher," p. 50; Beecher, pp. 290-292.
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offered "shall be furnished gratuitously with what they cannot purchase; while all 
who receive these advantages shall consider themselves pledged to devote 
themselves to the cause of education."®®
Lady Jones' values and educational practice are quite similar to those 
espoused by Beecher. Perhaps the most obvious is her sense of "ministry." Because 
she was "picked" to attend a normal school she repays that privilege by teaching 
the "unpicked" children of Cincinnati, just as Beecher suggested she should (247). 
She is engaged in the physical, intellectual, and moral education of children 
through a curriculum which complements the domestic education children receive 
in their homes—those who played in dirt until they were old enough for chores— 
and includes academic subjects—arithmetic, reading, and writing—and moral 
education through the reading and study of the Bible (102, 247). Unlike 
Schoolteacher, she does not employ punishment or fear as a pedagogical method 
but rather the love and patience Beecher advocated. The results of her educational 
efforts are well educated, benevolent children. And though one can do little but 
speculate about Lady Jones' likely political activities—she is not portrayed 
participating in the lively political conversations at 124 Bluestone or the direct 
political resistance of helping escaped slaves—the fact that she is engaged in what 
"whitepeople thought unnecessary if not illegal" suggests that she sees the
®®Laird, ibid.; Beecher, ibid., p. 294-95.
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potential political influence of her teaching and that, while she may do what she 
can with her subordinate social position as a black woman, she is subservient to no 
one.
In many other respects Morrison's portrait of Lady Jones also displays 
strong afiinities with the life and thought of Anna Julia Cooper, the Afiican- 
American social critic, feminist, and educator whose work has been recently 
"rediscovered." Both Lady Jones and Cooper were bom during slavery and are of 
mixed race. Both are permitted to attend normal schools which have been opened 
to African-Americans. Lady Jones repays that privilege by choosing to teach the 
"unpicked" children of Cincinnati while Cooper spends her entire career educating 
Afiican-American children and vigorously promoting expanded education of 
"undefended" poor blacks. Like Lady Jones, Anna Julia Cooper has five children, 
the grandchildren of her half-brother whom she adopts in 1915 .”  Both are firmly 
rooted in the soil of the Afiican-American church and dedicated to a social 
meliorism which grows out of their sense of Christian moral values: Lady Jones 
serves on a church committee charged with feeding the hungry locally while Anna 
Julia Cooper's social activism was driven by the "engine" of her faith.®* The
®’Mary Helen Washington, "Introduction," to Anna Julia Cooper, A Voice 
From The South, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. xxxi-xxxviii.
®*Anna Julia Cooper, A Voice from the South, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, p. 302.
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superior education and Christian-influenced social activism of Lady Jones and 
Cooper breed a mild elitism and condescension toward some of the cultural beliefs 
and practices of poor African-Americans. Lady Jones, for instance, dismisses Baby 
Suggs as "the ignorant grandmother, a woods preacher" (247). Similarly, Anna 
Julia Cooper speaks of the "semi-civilized religionism" of ordinary African- 
Americans and their "peculiar faults of worship—the rank exuberance and often 
ludicrous demonstrativeness of their people."^
Many of Cooper's views on women in society and the importance of 
education are consistent with those of Catharine Beecher. Though, like Beecher, 
an eloquent and forceful spokesperson for the rights and education of women, her 
arguments on behalf of black women are influenced by the "ethics of true 
womanhood," an idea, shared by Beecher, that saw women's proper spheres of 
influence as the home, the education of children, and work in voluntary 
organizations rather than direct involvement in politics. Cooper's philosophy of 
education consisted of a faith in the power of education to change society and a 
proto-Deweyean emphasis on knowledge as it is applied in daily life.
The youth must be taught to use his trigonometry in surveying his own 
and his neighbor's farm; to employ his geology and chemistry in finding out
” lbid., p. 34. Mary Helen Washington also notes Cooper's tendency to 
speak "for ordinary black women" rather than speaking "to them." Mary Helen 
Washington, p. xxx.
‘“ Ibid., p. xlvi.
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the nature of the soil ; to apply his mechanics and physics to the
construction and handling of machinery-to the intelligent management of 
iron works and water works and steam works and electric works.
...knowledge of physiology makes them better mothers and housekeepers; 
their knowledge of chemistry makes them better cooks; while from their 
training in other natural sciences and in mathematics, they obtain an 
accuracy and fair-mindedness which is of great value to them in dealing 
with their children or employees.
Thus her philosophy of education seems to constitute an intervention in the
DuBois-Washington debate over the relative merits of academic vs. vocational
training for African-Americans.'”
Cooper also argued for the social value of racial and cultural diversity for
social progress and wrote eloquently in support of the rights of other minorities,
particularly Native A m ericans.She wrote, spoke, and taught against racism and
the domination of women and in favor of the social "uplifting" of African-
Americans, the poor, women, and other racial minorities. She mounts a powerful
critique of capitalism and its role in perpetuating social misery and inequality.'”
And she critically engages the dehumanizing and objectifying tendencies of the sort
“"Cooper, p. 262.
'“ Ibid., pp. 71-72.
'“ DuBois, pp. 79-95. 
'“ Cooper, Voice, pp. 123-125. 
'“ Ibid., pp. 48-79, 80-118. 
'“ Ibid., p. 130.
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of post-Enlightenment, positivist epistemological assumptions represented by 
Schoolteacher.Cooper is moved to take these positions by a belief in the 
possibility of human improvement and an ethical imperative to struggle for such 
improvement, both of which grow out of her Christian faith. She takes as her 
fundamental moral premise the belief that man is created imago dei and that there 
is in fact a brotherhood of man which places a moral burden on the individual to 
respond to the needs of her brothers and sisters. Faith is what enables the 
individual to respond to this moral imperative; agnosticism, she argues, cannot 
provide the necessary positive motivation.
Though I in no way intend to make the claim that Lady Jones is Catherine 
Beecher or Anna Julia Cooper, or even to imply that Morrison had either of these 
two important philosophers of education in mind when she created Lady Jones, I 
do contend that the affinities between the fictional teacher and these real teachers 
are clear. These affinities make it possible to a gain a fuller understanding of Lady 
Jones through the thought of Beecher and Cooper and a fuller understanding of 
Beecher and Cooper through the lens of Morrison's portrait of Lady Jones. And 
recognizing the image of these women and their ideals in the actual lives of 
ordinary teachers like my grandmother makes it possible to recognize the
‘“'Ibid., pp. 286-293. 
‘“'Ibid., pp. 295-303.
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continuity that draws a line from this fictional character to these historic women 
and to the thousands of ordinary teachers who have served and serve in our public 
schools. With this fuller understanding it is possible to clarify the strengths and 
weaknesses of not just the ordinary common sense pragmatist described in 
Chapter II, but some of the most admirable instances of the common sense 
pragmatist: Catherine Beecher, Anna Julia Cooper, my grandmother, and Lady 
Jones.
Lady Jones and Prophetic Pragmatism
The conception of teacher embodied in Lady Jones, Catherine Beecher, 
Anna Cooper, and even my grandmother exhibit most of the characteristics 
described in Chapter I as necessary and sufficient criteria for a concept teacher 
adequate to the challenge of negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between 
religion and education in a multicultural context marred by natural and man-made 
tragedy. Though there were segments of society that disapproved of their thought 
and work, it nevertheless enjoyed a degree of social authorization to the extent 
that it appealed to a clear sense of moral-ethical idealism that was recognizable by 
their society even if their society often failed to live up those ideals. Their work 
and thought also clearly exhibited a love ethic which is intimately connected to 
what Cornel West (1982) has described as the Christian dialectic of human nature; 
the innate dignity and simultaneous fallenness of human beings created imago
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dei}°^ This ethic is most beautifully expressed in Lady Jones recognition in Denver 
of "the unmistakable love call that shimmered around children until they learned 
better" (247). And the fact that their ethical ideals are expressed within a 
recognizably protestant, Christian framework make their thought and work 
mecmingful to their audiences. Their thought and work also exhibits an affirmation 
o f diversity in that it promotes the expansion of education to those to whom it has 
been denied.
It is, however, in this apparent affirmation o f diversity that we begin to see 
the weakness of the concept teacher embodied in Lady Jones. For Lady Jones is 
unable to appreciate the significance of the "ignorant back woods preacher" to a 
community for whom she is the "mountain to their sky" (247) or to do anything 
other than "hate the ignorance" of those who continue to entertain a spirituality 
opposed by her conventional Christianity (257). This intolerance of religious 
diversity is mirrored in Anna Julia Cooper, who, in spite of writing 
approvingly of Buddha and Mohammed as examples of faith-inspired actors on 
behalf of human improvement, also denigrates Arab, "oriental," and Turkish 
culture as "efifete and immobile civilization[s].""° And though she frequently writes 
approvingly of the Afiican heritage and Afro-American folk culture, she criticizes
"’’West, Prophesy Deliverance!, pp. 15-24. 
'"’Ibid., pp. 9-11, 154, 302.
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the "rank exuberance and often ludicrous demonstrativeness" of African- 
Americans who embody that heritage and culture in their lived experience.'"
Though Cooper criticizes Christianity's failures in its treatment of African- 
Americans, she is an eloquent proponent of the propagation of the Christian gospel 
around the world and the evangelization by the Episcopal church of Aftican- 
Americans in the south in order to correct their "semi-civilized religionism.
And though she rejects fundamentalism—"the straight-teaching of irreproachable 
credos"—and defines truth as closely related to belief rather than the product of 
"cast-iron formulas"—a position remarkably close to the anti-foundationalism of 
pragmatism"^—the evangelical bent of her own Christian faith suggests a fealty to a 
truth she believes is superior to others and which she feels morally compelled to 
propagate.
Cooper's and Lady Jones' models are European. They accept the academic 
assumptions of their day which characterized ancient, non-Westem civilizations as 
stagnant and valorizes European cultural products and ideals as the goal toward 
which all-Europeans and Afncan-Americans alike-should aspire."" In short.
'"Ibid., pp. 238, 234, 34. 
"^Ibid., pp. 33-34, 43-44.
"^Cornel West, "The Politics of American Pragmatism," in John Rajchman 
and Cornel West, eds., Post-Analytic Philosophy, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1985, pp. 259-272.
""Cooper, pp. 153-161.
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Cooper’s thought, and Lady Jones' example, as inspiring and morally compelling as 
they are, are limited somewhat by the "orientalist" intellectual biases of their day 
which defined cultures in comparison to a Euro-American culture seen as the 
pinnacle of cultural evolution."* Thus there are cultural and political dangers in 
their near total faith in education to transform society and improve the lot of poor 
Afiican-Americans, for the "knowledge" disseminated in such education contains 
within it assumptions which continue to define the cultural origins of Afiican- 
Americans as inferior to those of Euro-Americans and will, therefore, not by itself 
change society. This is the substance of Sbco's warning that education can "make 
him forget things he shouldn't and memorize things he shouldn't" (208) and the 
lesson of Halle and W.E.B. DuBois' parable "Of the Coming of John.""® Anna 
Cooper, Lady Jones, and my beloved grandmother as well ultimately fail the 
criteria of social authorization and anti-"realist" ontology because they subscribe 
to an epistemic and ontological foundationalism that is rooted in their Christian 
faith. They adhere to a fixed and clearly defined conception of the holy and are
"*For a discussion of "orientalism" and its evolution see Edward Said, 
Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
"®DuBois, pp. 245-263. In this story DuBois tells of a young black man 
who receives an advanced liberal education and returns to his community to teach 
and improve the lives of his people. His education and aspiration however do not 
change whites' reaction to him. He kills a white man who has attacked an Afiican- 
American woman. The story ends with John's lynching at the hands of a white 
mob.
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thus unable to aflRrm religious diversity, a fatal flaw for a concept teacher which 
aspires to negotiate and renegotiate the relationship between religion and public 
education in a culturally and religiously diverse society.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored three fictional portraits of teachers 
portrayed in Toni Morrison's novel Beloved. I have attempted to flesh out the 
portraits of these secondary characters and define their relevance to the task of 
constructing a concept teacher capable of negotiating and renegotiating the 
relationship between religion and public education by clarifying their relationships 
to particular philosophies of education and to the common concepts of teacher 
discussed in Chapter II. I have then examined each of these more philosophically 
detailed conceptual portraits against the criteria developed from the prophetic 
pragmatism of Cornel West (1989) and proposed in Chapter I as necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a concept teacher capable of negotiating the relationship 
between religion and education in a context of cultural and religious diversity 
marred by natural and man-made tragedy.
The results of this analysis suggest that Morrison's fictional portrait of 
Baby Suggs constitutes a powerful conceptual model of the prophetic pragmatist 
as teacher, a model which meets the criteria proposed in Chapter I and which is 
distinguished from the other conceptual models embodied in the characters 
Schoolteacher and Lady Jones by a fundamental difference in their conception of
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the holy as an ethical orientation. For the technician. Schoolteacher, nothing is 
holy. For the common sense pragmatist. Lady Jones, the holy is defined and 
circumscribed by the conventions of her Christian faith. For Baby Suggs, the 
prophetic pragmatist, the holy is real but undefinable; it can only be pointed to, 
temporarily, imperfectly, and indirectly clothed in the language of story, dance, 
song and the lived experience of the individual. The analysis of this chapter 
suggests that it is Baby Suggs' orientation to and understanding of the holy that is 
crucial to a concept teacher capable of meeting the challenges outlined in Chapter 
I of this inquiry.
But Baby Suggs is the furthest of the characters analyzed here from the 
reality of classroom teaching. Schoolteacher and Lady Jones are much more 
obviously teachers. Baby Suggs is a prophet, preacher, healer, community leader, 
wise woman, and archetypal grandmother. How might we adapt the insight of this 
creation of Morrison's artistic genius to the more recognizable teaching milieu of a 
contemporary classroom? Would Baby Suggs have anything to learn from Lady 
Jones or Schoolteacher? What would it mean to place Baby Suggs' orientation 
toward the holy at the heart of the concept teacherl What are the possible 
consequences of such a reconception for a democratic system of public education 
buffeted by cultural and religious tensions and challenged to respond to the tragedy 
in the lives of children?
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Chapter V 
A More Inclusive Concept of Teacher?
The Prophetic Pragmatist and a Sense of the Holy
Chapter I of this inquiry reviewed the current social conflict that rages over 
the proper relationship between religion and public education, noting the threat 
that this polarizing debate may pose for the survival of democratic public 
education and taking up Dewey's challenge to philosophers of education 
confronted with such conflicts to look for a "more inclusive plan of operations I 
suggested that there were compelling ethical and philosophical arguments for 
renegotiating the relationship between religion and public education which did not 
entirely depend upon or reject the assumptions of either side in these debates. I 
then focused this inquiry on an analysis of the inadequacies of three common 
concepts of teacher and the need for a reformulation of that concept for any 
renegotiated relationship between religion and public education. The chapter 
concluded with the proposition that any reconception of teacher adequate to the 
challenge of negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion and 
public education must meet six necessary and sufficient—but not necessarily 
exhaustive—criteria: it must affirm diversity, exhibit a social authority grounded in
'John Dewey, Experience and Education, New York: Collier Books, 1938,
p. 5.
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non-foundationalist epistemic claims and an anti-"realist” ontology, display a 
moral-ethical idealism, be centered in a "love ethic, " and represent a "meaning- 
fu ll"  response to its audience's experience of the tragic.
Chapter II of this inquiry then reviewed the philosophical lineage of three 
conceptions of teacher—the prophet, the technician, and the common sense 
pragmatist—winch are now and have been prominent in educational discourse and 
practice and which contain certain implicit assumptions about the proper 
relationship between religion and public education. I claimed, based on an analysis 
of these concepts, that they are either unacceptable or inadequate as conceptual 
models o f teacher capable of negotiating and renegotiating the relationship 
between religion and education for a democratic, multicultural system of public 
education confronted with the reality of natural and man-made tragedy in the lives 
of children. The analysis presented in Chapter II, however, concluded that a 
contemporary revision of philosophical pragmatism. Cornel West's (1989) 
prophetic pragmatism, could offer a more suitable philosophical framework for a 
reconception of teacher capable of meeting the challenge posed in Chapter I.^
Based on the pioneering approaches of Maxine Greene (1978), Jane 
Roland Martin (1985), and Susan Laird (1988), Chapter III argued for the 
relevance of literary fiction as a source for philosophical reflection on teacher-
^Comel West, The American Evasion o f Philosophy: A Genealogy o f 
Pragmatism, Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, pp. 211-242.
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cases that would support my claim that the concepts of teacher as prophet, 
technician, and common sense pragmatist are unsuitable for a renegotiated 
relationship between religion and education, primarily due to their inadequate 
responses to the fact of religious and cultural diversity and the existence of 
oppression/ In that chapter I identified a suitable source for such an inquiry—Toni 
Morrison's Beloved—and identified two relevant methodological approaches to it: 
embodied criticism/reader-response theory to foreground the educational subtext 
of the novel and prophetic pragmatism to critique the cultural and ethical 
consequences of the conceptions of teacher represented in the novel.
Chapter IV essayed a close reading of Beloved through the lens of 
embodied criticism/reader-response theory, foregrounding the novel's educational 
subtext inherent in its characterizations of Baby Suggs, Schoolteacher, and Lady 
Jones. My analysis of these teacher-characters through the twin methodological 
lenses of embodied criticism and prophetic pragmatism suggested that two of these 
characters—Schoolteacher and Lady Jones—were fictional embodiments of the 
technician and common sense pragmatist concepts discussed in Chapter II. As 
such, they constitute, respectively, a negative case and a border-line case of the
^Maxine Greene, Landscapes o f Learning, New York: Teachers College 
Press, 1978; Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal o f the 
Educated Woman, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985; Susan Laird, 
Maternal Teaching and Maternal Teachings: Philosophic and Literary Case 
Studies o f Educating, Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1988.
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concept prophetic pragmatic teacher. The character Baby Suggs, however, 
embodied an important revision of the teacher-prophet concept which was 
consistent with the tenets of prophetic pragmatism and the criteria proposed in 
Chapter I as necessary and sufficient—though not necessarily exhaustive—for a 
concept teacher suitable for a renegotiated relationship between religion and public 
education. I concluded, therefore, that her character embodied a clear case of the 
prophetic pragmatic teacher. I concluded Chapter IV with the proposition that the 
most significant defining characteristic of Baby Suggs as a prophetic pragmatic 
teacher was an morally orienting but non-absolutist sense of the holy.
In this final chapter I propose to explore the meaning and value of a 
conception of teacher as prophetic pragmatist centered on a morally orienting but 
non-absolutist sense of the holy. I will begin by identifying the explicit parallels 
between Morrison's characterization of Baby Suggs and West's description of 
prophetic pragmatism. I will then tease out and delineate the conception of the 
holy implicit in both. Finally, I will begin to explore the meaning and value for 
contemporary teaching of a concept of teacher as prophetic pragmatist centered in 
a radically open conception of the holy. What would such a conceptual model 
mean in the day-to-day context of real-life teachers in ordinary public school 
classrooms teaching children fi~om a plethora of cultural and religious 
backgrounds? What are its implications for teachers' aims and achievements, their 
methods, or their relations with students? What is its value in terms of school
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children's experience of the tragic? What is its value in the on-going cultural and 
political conflict over the proper place of religion in public education?
Baby Suggs as Prophetic Pragmatist
Cornel West locates prophetic pragmatism within the pragmatic tradition 
by embracing the historicist orientation and anti-foundationalism of pragmatism 
while identifying key failures of that tradition which West's project rectifies/ He 
argues that pragmatism fails to adequately appreciate the significance of political 
and economic forces; therefore, progressive Marxist social analysis is an 
indispensable analytic tool, balancing this weakness of pragmatism even as 
pragmatism compensates for Marxism's inadequate theorization of culture/ 
Furthermore, the pragmatic tradition—with the exception of W.E.B. DuBois, the 
African American sociologist and philosopher of education—ignores race, displays 
a distrust of the masses as historical agents, and lacks an adequate understanding 
of the tragic, "the irreducible predicament of unique individuals who undergo 
dread, despair, disillusionment, disease and death and the institutional forms of
^Cornel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America, New 
York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 107-118, 135-141.
^Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary 
Christianity, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982, pp. 95-130; Ethical 
Dimensions o f Marxist Thought, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1991, pp. 
xxi-xxiv; Prophetic Reflections: Notes on Race and Power in America, Beyond 
Eurocentrism andMulticulturalism, Volume II, Monroe; Common Courage Press, 
1993, pp. 177-182.
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oppression that dehumanize people. I believe," West writes, "that a deep sense of 
evil and the tragic must infuse any meaning and value of democracy.^
The prophetic wing of the black protestant church makes two key 
contributions to West's prophetic pragmatism. It offers an articulation of moral 
and ethical norms firmly rooted in a cultural tradition which guides analysis and 
lends direction to pragmatic experimentalism. And, of equal importance, it offers a 
fully developed tragic sense which both preserves hope for a better future and 
requires struggle to realize that hope. These moral and ethical norms are founded 
on the belief that all human beings are created in the image of God and are, 
therefore, equal before God and alike in their claims to individual dignity and the 
respect of others.^ The tragic sense, which West argues both pragmatism and 
Marxism lack, stems fi"om the "Christian dialectic of human nature"—the 
recognition of the dignity and fallenness of human beings who are called upon to 
struggle toward an ethical ideal which, because of their fallenness, can never be 
attained. This struggle is carried out both on an individual level and in communities 
which simultaneously support and critique the individual's struggle to realize these 
ideals. The individual is thus irreducible within participatory communities governed
American Evasion o f Philosophy, pp. 128, 137, 228. 
est. Prophesy Deliverance!, pp. 16-18.
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by the principle of mutual accountability.* This ethical perspective precludes this- 
world utopias or distopias often promised or delivered by vulgar Marxisms while it 
candidly confronts the existential facts of human existence—"disease, 
disillusionment, despair, and death"—without giving up the struggle for a better 
world or giving up hope for an ethical ideal which, though recognized as 
unattainable within history, nevertheless guides human actions. This is, according 
to West, what the black protestant church, in particular, has offered African 
Americans since its inception.
West uses the term prophetic, therefore, "in order to harken back to the 
rich, though flawed, traditions o f Judaism and Christianity that promote 
courageous resistance against, and relentless critique of, injustice and social 
misery."® Attaching the term pragmatism creates a philosophical point of view 
which "analyzes the causes of unnecessary forms of social misery, promotes moral 
outrage against them, and organizes different constituencies to alleviate them, yet 
does so with an opermess to its own blindnesses and shortcomings.
West's Christian faith is central to his conceptualization of prophetic 
pragmatism. "I follow the biblical injunction to look at the world through the eyes
*Ibid., pp. 17-19.
^esX , Keeping Faith, p. 139.
•“Ibid.
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of its victims," he writes, "and the Christocentric perspective which requires that 
one see the world through the lens of the Cross—and thereby see our relative 
victimizing and victimization."" However, West does not ignore the crimes of the 
Christian church or valorize Christianity over other religious traditions. He 
repeatedly recognizes and criticizes the racism, patriarchy, and homophobia of 
Christianity in general and the black church in particular.*^ And West explicitly 
afiBrms the relevance of prophetic orientations grounded in other religious or even 
secular traditions, though he claims secular traditions have not had the time or 
maturity "to bequeath to us potent cultural forms of ultimacy, intimacy, and 
sociality comparable to older and richer religious traditions." West's prophetic 
pragmatism is overtly Christian simply because it is the tradition in which he is 
grounded, which provides him meaning and sanity and because he has found none 
better for himself}^
West's political and philosophical response to oppression and the tragic not 
only articulates and embodies a distinctive mode of intellectual life, it strongly 
suggests a radical reconception of the progressive teacher working with a 
culturally diverse society still steeped in religiosity and marred by social injustice.
"Ibid., p. 133.
*^West, American Evasion, p. 233. 
*^West, Keeping Faith, pp. 132-134.
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His conception of the intellectual is based on Antonio Gramsci's notion of the 
"organic intellectual," one who is familiar with the best of contemporary thought 
but is firmly rooted in the traditions, institutions and everyday lives of the masses. 
The organic intellectual is a fi-eedom fighter equipped with powerful analytic tools, 
governed by a normative vision, and committed to creative praxis in the spirit of 
jazz, "an improvisational mode of protean, fluid, and flexible dispositions toward 
reality and suspicious of either/or viewpoints, dogmatic pronouncements, or 
supremacist ideologies. The intellectual's role is to help build institutions across 
racial, ethnic, gender or religious lines—to re-bind in the etymological sense of the 
word religion~\n order to mold people with the dispositions to seize the fleeting 
"hot" moments, to respond to the cultural crises that make progress possible.**
West's various descriptions of the intellectual vocation that follow from his 
philosophy of prophetic pragmatism exhibit several common themes that suggest a 
single underlying conception of the academic vocation which is obviously 
applicable to the role of the teacher. Organic intellectuals, for instance, are those 
"who, because they are organically linked to prophetic movements or priestly 
institutions, take the life of the mind seriously enough to relate ideas to the 
everyday life of ordinary folk." They are distinguished fi'om traditional intellectuals
‘^ Cornel West, Race Matters, Boston: Beacon Press, 1993, p. 105.
**Comel West, Prophetic Reflections, p. 6.
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who "revel in the world of ideas while nesting in comfortable places far removed 
from the everyday realities of the common life" and who are alienated, out of touch 
with the common people, especially in their understanding of the place of religion 
in ordinary people's lives. "Organic intellectuals," on the other hand, "are activistic 
and engaged; traditional intellectuals are academic and detached."'® The organic 
intellectual is thus not an individual academic ensconced in the ivory tower of the 
university, writing for other academics, and imparting knowledge for the sake of 
knowledge but a "critical organic catalyst" rooted in the traditions and institutions 
of ordinary people and working for the transformation of society in solidarity with 
the oppressed.
The Christian freedom fighter, West argues, operates on three levels: the 
normative, the analytic, and praxis.'* The normative level of operation rests on 
three key moral assumptions of the Christian tradition: the idea that humankind is 
created in the image of God and is, therefore, equal before God; the notion of 
mankind's fallenness, which requires checks and balances on all institutions and 
continual critique of imperfect individuals and institutions; and the tradition of
'®Comel West, Prophetic Fragments: Illuminations o f the Crisis in 
American Religion and Culture, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1988, p. 
271.
'^In bell hooks and Cornel West, Breaking Bread: Insurgent Black 
Intellectual Life, Boston: South End Press, 1991, p. 30.
Prophetic Reflections, p. 183.
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"Kingdom Talk," the faith in ultimate success which sustains hope for those 
engaged in struggle against overwhelming odds. At the analytic level the prophetic 
Christian freedom fighter strategically deploys theory to analyze and demystify the 
social, psychological, cultural, political, and economic forces that undergird social 
inequality and oppression. At the level of praxis, the prophetic Christian freedom 
fighter, armed with a clear understanding of actually existing social conditions and 
guided and inspired by the normative ideals of the Christian tradition, translates 
and fuses theory and practice into intelligent action; the conscientization, 
organization, and mobilization of people to change society.*® This notion of the 
prophetic Christian freedom fighter highlights the importance of a compelling 
moral vision which both guides and is subject to critical analysis as indispensable 
to praxis. "My notion of the prophetic," West says, "is a democratic one in which, 
in the midst of the quotidian, the commonplace, in the midst of the messy struggle 
in which one's hands are dirty, that one is holding on to moral convictions and tries 
to convince others that they ought to be accepted even though these moral 
convictions themselves can still be subject to criticism and change in vision.
Though Morrison does not portray her as an intellectual. Baby Suggs is 
nevertheless a clear case of the prophetic pragmatist because she embodies the
*®West, Prophetic Reflections, pp. 183-195. 
‘^*Ibid., p. 67.
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tenets of prophetic pragmatism and the practice of the "Christian" freedom fighter. 
Hers is an analysis and experimentalism guided by moral and ethical norms which 
are rooted in the cultural traditions of her community. Hers is a thoroughly 
historicized vision which appropriates the past and recasts it in narratives designed 
to tell Sethe, Denver, Beloved and others who they are by reminding them of 
where they have been. "She told me my daddy's things," Denver says (209).
You mean I never told you nothing about Carolina? About your 
daddy? You don't remember nothing about how come I walk the 
way I do and about your mother's feet, not to speak of her back?
I never to told you dl that? (244)
And the purpose of such narrative, of the historicized vision, is to enable intelligent
action and survival: "Is that why you can't walk down the steps? My Jesus my"
(244). Those stories should enable Denver to walk down the steps and seek help
from the community. That is what they were meant to do.
Baby Suggs' sermon in the Clearing is a powerful social critique of
unnecessary forms of social misery and oppression. It correctly identifies the
source of their oppression in the racism "out there" where "they do not love your. .
hands. . . neck. . heart" and correctly identifies the only response to that
oppression which can enable survival: the ability to love oneself and one's neighbor
(88). She recognizes the false generosity of even "good" whites like the benevolent
slave master Mr Gamer or the abolitionist Bodwins who, even in their apparent
generosity, preserve the disparities in power which enable oppression.
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"They got me out of jail, Sethe once told Baby Suggs.
"They also put you in it."
"They drove you 'cross the river."
"On my son's back."
"They gave you this house."
"Nobody gave me nothing."
"I got a job from them. "
"He got a cook from them, girl."
"Oh, some of them do all right by us."
"And every time it's a surprise, ain't it?" (244)
Baby Sugg's analysis is framed and given direction by a deep sense of evil 
and the tragic and by moral-ethical norms. "Everything depends on knowing how 
much," she said, and "Good is knowing when to stop" (87). Evil is, presumably, 
not knowing when to stop; "There was no bad luck in the world but 
whitepeople...They don't know when to stop" (104). Love, loving large, is the key 
to the survival of both the individual and the community, even though it is in the 
end no defense against evil (87-89). Misery is the four horsemen—Schoolteacher, 
his nephew, the slave catcher, and the sheriff-coming in her yard (148-153). These 
norms give direction and purpose to her struggle and a resilient hope for its 
ultimate success that, though beaten down in her life, resonates in her command to 
Denver from beyond the grave: "Know it and go on out the yard" (244).
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Like West's organic Christian freedom fighter. Baby Suggs is rooted in the 
traditions, institutions and everyday lives of the masses. She is the heart of the 
black community of Cincinnati. She has shared their experience of slavery and 
oppression and lives their cultural mix of West African spiritual practices and 
Christian faith. And like West's fi-eedom fighter she is engaged in the effort to re­
bind a community and mold people with the dispositions to respond to the cultural 
crises that make progress, and survival, possible. She engages this struggle at the 
three levels at which the freedom fighter operates: the normative, analytic, and 
praxis. And her praxis clearly expresses the spirit of jazz, that "improvisational 
mode of protean, fluid, and flexible dispositions toward reality.. . suspicious of 
either/or viewpoints, dogmatic pronouncements, or supremacist ideologies."^' It is 
the spirit which inspires in the Clearing her to dance "with her twisted hip the rest 
of what her heart had to say while the others opened their mouths and gave her the 
music" (89).
Though West's prophetic pragmatism is articulated in explicitly Christian 
terms, those terms are provisional. He recognizes that the moral-ethical norms 
which orient his thought and guide his praxis are not limited to their Christian 
articulation. They may be articulated in the language of other religions or no 
religion at all. Like West, Baby Suggs eschews absolutist expressions of the moral-
^'West, Race Matters, p. 105.
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ethical ideals which animate her praxis. Her message is intelligible to the "A.M.E.'s 
and Baptists, Holinesses and Sanctifieds, the Church of the Redeemer and the 
Redeemed" (87). It is also intelligible to those who recognize the West Afncan 
origins of her Clearing rituals. These ideals are not contained by the language used 
to express them. The language is merely a convenient mechanism for pointing to 
them, a means of expressing an ultimately inexpressible sense of a transcendent 
good in terms that are culturally meaningful and useful in orienting ethical 
behavior. The language, like Baby Suggs, dances around a profound sense of the 
holy. This is what lies at the heart of both West's prophetic pragmatism and Baby 
Suggs' praxis.
Beloved Teacher: Babv Suggs. Prophetic Pragmatism, and the Holv
In Chapter IV I concluded that one crucial difference between Baby Suggs 
and the other teacher-characters—Schoolteacher and Lady Jones—was this sense of 
the holy. For Schoolteacher, nothing is holy. For Lady Jones, the holy is 
exclusively defined by the tenets of her apparently conventional protestant 
Christianity. For Baby Suggs, however, the holy is something that can be 
expressed in the religious tenets of the Sanctifieds, Holinesses, etc. but is not 
limited to them; it is something that can be expressed in the unspoken language of 
dance but is not limited to it either. It exceeds the power of any language to fully 
express it. Yet it provides the inspiration and direction for her preaching, for her 
dancing, for her loving "large."
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West's prophetic pragmatism is also inspired and directed by an orientation 
toward that which provides a source of moral and ethical ideals but which is not in 
any way defined by those ideals. It exceeds any ideal articulated by fallen, fallible 
human beings. And it is equally understood and misunderstood by the various 
religious and secular narratives which attempt to comprehend it. A sense of the 
holy sits at the heart of West's prophetic pragmatism and Baby Suggs' teaching. 
Thus a sense of the holy lies at the heart of the prophetic pragmatic teacher. But 
what, exactly, does the concept holy mean?
The German theologian, Rudolf Otto (1917/1958), suggests that the 
concept holy originally referred to the "numenous," a term he uses to name the 
non-rational, or supra-rational aspect of certain ideas that cannot be contained in 
the conceptual formulations of reason.^ Though the concept holy has come to 
mean absolute good or absolute moral will, this is but a "schematization" of the 
numenous, an attempt by reason to comprehend our experience of the numenous 
by describing it conceptually, by describing it in terms of the already known, the 
only means reason has of grasping the novel. According to Otto, holy originally 
referred to this "overplus" of meaning beyond what can be captured or defined in 
the conceptual formulations of reason and language. "There is no religion in which
“ Rudolf Otto, The Idea o f the Holy, New York: Oxford University Press,
1958.
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it does not live as the real innermost core," writes Otto.^
Otto characterizes our experience of the holy as a sense of "mysterium 
tremendum," a sense of awe, and wonder, and mystery that is often awakened in 
our experiences of nature and of other human beings and which somehow exceeds 
our power to name it, to comprehend it in language. Our attempts to do so are 
"schematizations." While these schematizations are accurate—in some sense—they 
do not fully contain the holy, the numenous. It extends beyond them. According to 
Otto, the concepts of religion and philosophy, as well as the narratives of myth and 
scripture, are analogies, metaphors—schematizations—which attempt to explain the 
unexplainable, to explain that which is "wholly other" and thus beyond reason.'^ 
There is something more to beauty or love, for example, than is contained in the 
conceptions and formulations which we deploy in language to describe them. Thus 
religious language and thought, in fact all language and thought which attempts to 
comprehend the "mysterium tremendum," is fundamentally poetic. Unfortunately, 
the analogies and metaphors lose their character as analogy and metaphor and are 
taken literally, thus losing their poetic character and diminishing the holy. This is 
the mistake Lady Jones has made and Baby Suggs has avoided.
In A Common Faith, John Dewey makes a distinction between religion and
“ Ibid., p. 6.
“ Ibid., pp. 25-31,41-50.
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religious that is quite similar to the distinction Otto makes between the 
schematizations and the ho ly^  According to Dewey, a religion "always signifies a 
special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional 
organization" which holds "that the essential framework [of reality, good and evil, 
etc.] is settled in its significant moral features at least, and that new elements that 
are offered must be judged by conformity to this framework. Religious, on the 
other hand, denotes a quality of "any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end 
against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of 
its general and enduring value. Religion is a body of "schematizations" of the 
human experience of nature and the holy which have long since lost their 
metaphoric quality. Because of this, Dewey concluded, "the opposition between 
religious values as I conceive them and religions is not to be bridged. Just because 
the release of these values is so important, their identification with the creeds and 
cults of religions must be dissolved."^*
Baby Suggs, as prophetic pragmatic teacher, is clearly religious, as Dewey 
defines the term. However, because her sense of the holy is consistent with Otto’s 
articulation of that concept, her character calls into question Dewey's call to
“ John Dewey, A Common Faith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934. 
“ Ibid., pp. 9, 26.
“ Ibid., p. 27 
“ Ibid., p. 28.
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dissolve the relationship between religion and the religious. For, as Otto suggests, 
religions are poetic "schematizations" of the holy. They are necessary, though 
necessarily imperfect, attempts to explain the human experience of mysterium 
tremendum, to explain that which cannot be adequately expressed in any other 
form than the poetry that is religion. Though any particular religion might 
disappear, the need to articulate this aspect of human experience will simply result 
in new schematizations, new religions. Both Baby Suggs and Cornel West 
implicitly recognize this fact in their clear awareness that the religious traditions 
which they live out are simply convenient, contingent, imperfect but culturally 
meaningful "languages" within which they attempt to comprehend the holy. 
Therefore, to "dissolve" the link between religion and religious may be impossible 
and undesirable for many individuals. However, to avoid the hardening of poetic 
schematizations into literalist dogma which both Dewey and Otto criticize is both 
possible and desirable. Prophetic pragmatism and Baby Suggs' teaching are both 
premised on that possibility.
While Dewey's call to dissolve the link between religious and religion may 
be impossible and undesirable, the loosening of the exclusive identification of the 
two is useful to the goal of this inquiry to develop a concept teacher capable of 
negotiating and renegotiating the relationship between religion and education in a 
multicultural, multi-religious democracy. It raises the possibility within schools of 
purposive activity imbued with a "religious" quality: "pursued in behalf of an ideal
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end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction 
of its general and enduring value. This possibility and the concept of the 
prophetic pragmatic teacher implied in Cornel West's thought and embodied in 
Morrison's creation of Baby Suggs yield potentially profound consequences for 
public school teaching at a historical moment characterized by divisive secular- 
religious tensions and marred by both man-made and natural tragedies. What 
value, then, might the concept prophetic pragmatic teacher hold for contemporary 
public school teaching?
The Prophetic Pragmatic Teacher in Contemporary Public Education
In many important characteristics the prophetic pragmatic teacher might 
not be radically different from the technician and common sense pragmatist to the 
extent that the latter embody significant aspects o f being a teacher which are 
missing from the characterization of Baby Suggs. For instance. Lady Jones' focus 
on basic academic skills in curricula and the overall goal of adapting to one's 
contemporary society are important goals of teaching. And the notion of a 
conscious technique embodied in Schoolteacher's practice is a worthwhile lesson 
for teachers even if the particular technique he used is morally problematic. 
However, in the final analysis, the prophetic pragmatic teacher is a radical 
departure fi'om the traditions embodied in the technician and common sense
% d . ,  p. 27.
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pragmatist because its basic orientation is fundamentally different. Though it 
recognizes the importance of occupational skills and assimilation into society, 
these goals are not the central purpose of teaching.
The prophetic pragmatic teacher eschews the idolatry of the technician 
and the common sense pragmatist in favor of a practice that places a sense of the 
holy at the heart of teaching. In a learning community governed by a love ethic, the 
prophetic pragmatic teacher would strive to acknowledge the sense of the holy 
implicit in the experience and beliefs of students, to develop and strengthen that 
sense through students' growing awareness of its centrality in human experience, 
and to foster a religious devotion to the moral-ethical ideals which their sense of 
the holy inspires.
This is, to be sure, religiously loaded language. However, by keeping in 
mind Otto's conception of holy and Dewey's definition of religious, such a 
description of prophetic pragmatic teaching begins to sketch the rough outlines of 
a teaching practice which acknowledges the "schematizations" of these concepts 
offered in different religions but is not limited to any one of them or even to the 
more general concept of religion. Otto's conception of holy described a sense of 
mysterium tremendum, a sense of mystery, awe, and wonder, a sense of the 
"wholly other" that is unexplainable but which elicits a rational-emotional response 
that nevertheless attempts to explain this very human experience in the rational 
schema of myths, religious narratives, or scientific theories. And Dewey used the
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schema of myths, religious narratives, or scientific theories. And Dewey used the 
term religious to describe a quality of human activity that may include religion but 
is not necessarily confined to it. Therefore, the use here of the concepts holy and 
religious as aspects of prophetic pragmatic teaching denotes a teaching practice 
that is centered on that existential sense of mystery, awe, and wonder, that is 
centered on questions rather than trivializing answers, that is radically open rather 
than closed and recognizes the various religious, secular, and scientific narratives 
as historically contingent, more or less imperfect rational-emotional 
schematizations of the mysterium tremendum that inspires our search for 
knowledge and which characterizes our response to the holy.
The concept of the prophetic pragmatic teacher then defines a mode of 
being teacher that would respond to the current tensions over the proper place of 
religion in public education by including, rather than excluding or ignoring, 
religious—as well as secular and scientific—voices and narratives on their own 
terms as historically contingent, imperfect, but meaningful instances of that human 
impulse to explain the mysteries of human existence and thereby derive some 
moral-ethical structure by which we might order our individual and collective lives. 
As such, it contains profound implications for the aims, achievements, methods, 
and relations of contemporary teachers.
Aims. Achievements. Ends
In many surface aspects the prophetic pragmatic teacher might not appear
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basic skills in literacy, numeracy, and science common to contemporary curricula 
could be a part of the prophetic pragmatist's curriculum as well. And, given the 
undeniable importance of productive work, relevant occupational skills would not 
be ignored. Where the prophetic pragmatic teacher would differ most radically 
from the prophet, the technician, and the common sense pragmatist is in terms of 
its most basic aims. It would reject the indoctrination of the prophet, the 
commodification of the technician, and the assimilation of the common sense 
pragmatist.
The most fundamental educational aim of the prophetic pragmatic teacher 
would be to foster that innate sense of wonder and awe before the fundamental 
mysteries of our existence from within communities governed by an ethic of love. 
Such a governing principle, combined with this radical openness to what Otto 
called the numenous, creates the assumption of the basic goodness of the 
numenous. It creates, in short, a sense of the holy which functions as a kind of 
screen onto which students project moral-ethical ideals that guide and inspire 
religious~\n Dewey's sense of the term—struggle.
A concomitant educational aim of the prophetic pragmatic teacher would 
be a sense of intellectual humility before the holy, a recognition that our various 
attempts to comprehend it in scientific or mythological narratives are historically 
contingent, provisional, variously imperfect schema which we project on it rather 
than absolute truths which we discover. Thus the prophetic pragmatic teacher's
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approach is a non-foundational, radically historicist understanding of both scientific 
and religious narratives as the attempts of finite beings to understand the mysteries 
they both inhabit and embody. This would not necessarily preclude judgements of 
the relative merit of one such narrative over another, but it would move the basis 
for such judgements from absolutist epistemic or ontological claims to the more 
pragmatic ground of the narrative's meaningfulness for particular communities in 
achieving particular ends at particular times.
These aims might be accomplished via a curriculum that does not ignore 
basic academic or occupational skills but which focuses on the various scientific, 
cultural, aesthetic, and religious schema as imperfect, provisional attempts to 
understand what we do not understand. Students would be allowed to identify with 
a particular narrative if, for reasons of culture or identity or personal affinity, it is 
meaningful to them, but they would be taught foremost to identify with the search 
itself, to learn and take inspiration from the various attempts of others to create 
meaningful answers to existential questions and lead ethical lives. Such aims 
suggest a curriculum which emphasizes the humanities and the sciences, but which 
also includes religious narratives as important instances of individual's and 
communities' attempts to organize their lives and explain their existence.
Methods. Tasks. Means
Once again, the prophetic pragmatic teacher would not necessarily eschew 
many of the instructional techniques now common in schools; however, she would
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reject the dehumanizing methods of the technician as well as the conformist 
practices of the common sense pragmatist as inconsistent with the love ethic that 
governs the prophetic pragmatic learning community and a violation of the sanctity 
of the individual. Central to the prophetic pragmatist's instructional method would 
be questions rather than answers, large, open-ended questions that convey to the 
student the idea that learning is not the acquisition of pre-determined answers but 
rather the growing ability to ask the right questions and live with the ambiguity of 
necessarily provisional answers. The prophetic pragmatic teacher might deploy a 
Whitmanesque method of indirect allusion to an orienting but unarticulated center 
through the examination of multiple, ultimately inadequate, attempts to articulate 
it.^ ° This, I believe, is the method embodied in Baby Suggs' dance in the Clearing. 
It is an invitation to the learner to participate in the construction of tentative, 
meaningful answers to existential questions; it is an invitation to the learner to
am referring here to Walt Whitman's use of long lists of different, often 
contradictory, images, scenes, stories, and self-identifications to indirectly point to 
a transcendent truth which is embodied in each item in his list but not exhausted by 
any single item. I am suggesting that the various scientific, aesthetic, and religious 
narratives would serve a purpose similar to the items in Whitman's catalogs; they 
embody, but do not entirely comprehend the numenous. When they are examined 
together, as in Whitman's "Song of Myself," they indirectly and imperfectly outline 
the mystery that is the numenous. And when they are examined from within a 
learning community governed by a love ethic, they suggest an unschematized 
conception of the holy that can define a moral-ethical orientation without defining 
moral-ethical ideals. See Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself," Leaves o f Grass,
Edwin Haviland Miller, ed., Arlington Heights; ARM Publishing, 1970, pp. 16-85.
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participate in the construction of knowledge.
Embodiment o f the Prophetic P ra^a tic  Teacher
Like Morrison's Baby Suggs, the prophetic pragmatic teacher would be 
the heart, rather than the head, of her learning community. She would be a learner 
among learners rather than the repository of answers designed to shape students to 
the purposes of others. Because her practice is centered on a conception of the 
/jo/y—an openness to existential mystery from within a community governed by an 
ethic of love—she embodies a moral-ethical orientation, articulated in contingent 
moral-ethical ideals, which inspires relentless and uncompromising criticism of 
injustice and oppression as well as the moral dogmatism of religious or ideological 
prophets. In this she is religious, in the Deweyan sense of an activity pursued "in 
behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss."^' 
Just as Cornel West identifies himself as a Christian because that narrative tradition 
has meaning for him, the prophetic pragmatic teacher may also be religious in a 
more conventional sense.^  ^However, she will recognize that the particular 
narrative schema that she finds meaningful is contingent and imperfect and does 
not exhaust the meaning of holy or trump other religious or scientific narratives. 
Like West, she will recognize that it is useful and meaningful for her and that other
‘^Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 27.
^^West, American Evasion o f Philosophy, pp. 232-233.
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narratives may be useful and meaningful for others.
The prophetic pragmatic teacher will be able to eschew both ethical 
relativism and ethical absolutism because she embodies a moral-ethical orientation 
which follows from the sense of the holy at the heart of her practice but which is 
articulated in the moral-ethical ideals of a particular community that she recognizes 
as imperfect and contingent. She does not have to resort to the moral dogmatism 
of the prophet or the common sense pragmatist, nor does she have to resort to the 
amorality of the technician. Because of the tension between the prophetic, which 
calls on a long tradition of critique of existing societies from the perspective of 
supposedly transcendent ideals, and the pragmatic, which recognizes any 
articulation of those ideals as imperfect social constructs, the prophetic pragmatic 
teacher is able to go between the horns of this dilemma. She would, therefore, 
teach and practice the moral critique of human actions, including not only social, 
political, and economic injustices but the ethical ramifications of subjects which are 
often considered objective—science, for instance—from the perspective of the 
moral-ethical ideals embodied in the narrative "schema" of different communities. 
However, in recognizing the contingency of these ideals, the prophetic pragmatic 
teacher would also recognize the inevitable imperfection of her own and her 
students' attempts to realize those ideals, maintaining an ethical humility while 
striving for them that is all too often lacking in those who would make "traditional" 
values the focal point of education.
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The Prophetic Praematic Teacher. Religion, and Public Education
The concept of the prophetic pragmatic teacher offers a more useful 
conceptual framework for the challenge of negotiating and renegotiating the 
relationship between religion and education in a religiously and culturally diverse 
system of democratic public education. It constitutes a useful response to John 
Dewey's challenge—to "indicate a plan of operations proceeding from a level 
deeper and more inclusive than is represented by the contending parties"— which 
motivated this inquiry.”  It indicates such a plan of operations by locating an 
unschematized sense of the holy—a. radically open response to existential mystery 
from within communities governed by an ethic of love—at the heart of teaching 
practice. It recognizes both religious and scientific narratives as imperfect, 
contingent, socially constructed "schematizations" which have attempted to 
comprehend this existential mystery, this "numenous." And it does so while 
steering a course between the Scylla of ethical relativism and the Charybdis of 
ethical absolutism because it hews to a moral-ethical orientation implicit in the 
concept holy while recognizing the imperfection and contingency of any specific 
articulation moral-ethical ideals.
Thus the concept of the prophetic pragmatic teacher defines a teaching
” John Dewey, Experience and Education, New York; Collier Books, 
1938, p. 5.
318
practice that would include religious and scientific narratives on their own terms as 
historically contingent products of the human impulse to understand what we do 
not understand. It would not exclude religion fi~om the realm of public education 
simply because it is religion. Nor, with the important exception of violence against 
children and others, would it place arbitrary conditions on the sorts of religious 
expression that are acceptable in the school by demanding that particular religions 
surrender certain tenets of their belief as the price of their admission into the 
dialogue of the public school.^ "* However, it would also prohibit any imposition of 
the particular tenets of any individual faith as an ethically and epistemologically 
unwarranted instance of indoctrination, of offering definitive answers that trivialize 
the profound questions that underlie the concept holy. The prophetic pragmatic 
teacher says to all "believers"—secular or religious—"you can bring your most 
cherished beliefs to the dialogue, but you cannot expect to impose them on 
others." While such a plan of operations is unlikely to satisfy the absolutists on 
either side of the debate over the appropriate place of religion in public education, 
it can help minimize the tension by substituting a response of "both/and" for the 
"either/or" character of much of the contemporary disagreement.
am referring here to John Dewey's and the theologian Leonard Swidler's 
insistence that religion give up its absolutist claims before being admitted into 
dialogue with others. See John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 33 and Leonard 
Swidler, After the Absolute: The Dialogical Future o f Religious Reflection, 
Minneapolis; Fortress Press, 1990, p. 66.
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The concept of the prophetic pragmatic teacher, in focusing the practice of 
teaching on existential mystery from within communities governed by a love ethic, 
centers teaching practice in a sense of the holy from which contingent, undogmatic 
moral-ethical ideals can be derived to guide "Deweyan-religious" activity. It, 
therefore, includes religion but is in no way confined to religion. Thus it 
accomplishes the task of identifying a more inclusive plan of operations than those 
represented by the contending parties in the debate over religion and education 
because, underlying its inclusion of religious and non-religious narratives, is a 
recognition that learning and wisdom are not a result of having definitive answers, 
but rather of recognizing the contingency and insufficiency of our answers, of 
recognizing, in short, our ignorance.
Issues for Further Inquiry
The limited object of this inquiry has been to explore the possibilities of a 
concept teacher which can acknowledge the place of religion in the lives of many 
students and teachers and negotiate the relationship between these beliefs and 
public education in a democratic, multicultural, multi-religious society. I have 
concluded that the concept of the prophetic pragmatic teacher is better able to 
meet that challenge than the more traditional conceptions of teacher as prophets, 
technicians, or common sense pragmatists, and I have attempted to identify the 
conceptual characteristics by which we can identify prophetic pragmatic teachers 
other than Baby Suggs.
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The rethinking of any concept as basic as teacher, however, inevitably 
raises questions about other aspects of education. What, for instance, would the 
concept prophetic pragmatic teacher mean for curriculum? How might learning 
take on a different character because of it? What are its consequences for teacher 
education? How does the prophetic pragmatic teacher face the challenge of 
religious fundamentalism? These are but a few of the important theoretical 
questions which the reconceptualization of teacher addressed here raises. They 
are, however, beyond the scope of this inquiry. I must leave them for my own 
future studies and, in the Emersonian spirit o f  "provocation," for the future study 
o f other scholars as well.
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